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This thesis consists of four self-contained papers, which are all related to important 
environmental and natural resource issues from a developing country perspective.  
 
Paper [I] concerns climate policy and addresses the potential welfare gains of introducing a 
technology transfer from the North (richer countries) to the South (poorer countries). The 
results largely depend on the environmental policy in the pre- transfer resource allocation and, 
in particular, whether or not the South abates its own emissions. Although the technology 
transfer is desirable from a “global social planners” point of view, it is shown that the 
incentives to use the transfer might be weak from the perspective of the North; at least if the 
South takes its own measures to reduce emissions. However, in a situation where the North is 
committed to emission reductions according to the Kyoto protocol, it is shown that there will 
clearly be incentives for the North to use the technology transfer in order to reach the Kyoto 
targets in a more cost efficient way. 
 
In paper [II], the likely effects of an environmental fiscal reform in Namibia are examined by 
means of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. The results show that the 
introduction of an environmental fiscal reform, where taxes on natural and environmental 
resources (fish rents, energy and water) are recycled to the economy in different ways might 
give rise to benefits in terms of GDP, employment and income distribution, in addition to the 
environmental impacts. While subsidizing unskilled labour would give the most favourable 
outcome in terms of real GDP and employment impacts, a decrease in food taxes might be a 
more interesting option if GDP, employment, income distribution and environmental impacts 
are considered in combination.  
 
In paper [III], the value of irrigation water used for different crop alternatives in the Hardap 
region in Southern Namibia is estimated. The study finds that all crop alternatives that farmers 
in the region currently choose among, will remain financially viable after the planned 
increases in user charges. However, if full cost recovery is to be achieved in the future, 
substantial changes in the agricultural production will most likely be necessary. The method is 
also extended in order to study the potential effects on total water demand if further increases 
in user charges are implemented. 
 
Paper [IV] studies the likely effects of exogenous international food and oil price shocks on 
the Namibian economy. This is particularly interesting in a country where the domestic 
consumption of corn and petroleum products is mainly imported, and where water scarcity 
represents one of the main constraints to agricultural expansion. The results show that the 
Namibian economy will be negatively affected from the food and oil price increases, and 
water scarcity will further limit the ability of the economy to adapt to international oil and 
food price increases. 
 
Keywords: Climate policy, technology transfer, computable general equilibrium model, 
environmental fiscal reform, revenue recycling, water scarcity, resource prices Acknowledgements 
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1. Introduction 
 
This thesis consists of four self-contained papers, which are all related to important 
environmental and natural resource issues from a developing country perspective.  
 
The topic of the first paper is Climate Change. One of the most controversial issues in the 
debate over global climate change is the apparent divide between the interests and obligations 
of developed and developing countries. The principle of equity – which represents the view 
that industrialised countries should act first since they are the source of most past and current 
emissions - is embedded in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) and in the Kyoto Protocol, which sets binding targets for industrialised countries 
only. This raises concern, however, about the cost efficiency of these emission reductions, and 
among a number of possible means for increasing cost efficiency, technology transfers have 
become one of the core issues of the UNFCCC. In the first paper in this thesis, the potential 
global welfare gains of introducing a technology transfer from richer to poorer countries in 
order to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions is examined using a general equilibrium model of 
the global economy. 
 
In developing countries, where income levels and per capita CO2-emissions are, in general, 
far below those of industrialised countries, other environmental concerns than CO2-emissions 
are often on top of the policy agenda. In Namibia, a country that is highly dependent on 
natural resources (for example fishing and agriculture) and has one of the most unequal 
income distributions in the world, the government is searching for policies that can ensure a 
sound and sustainable management of resources, while at the same time contributing to a less 
skewed income distribution. In the second paper, the likely impacts of introducing an 
environmental fiscal reform are studied by means of a computable general equilibrium model 
of the Namibian economy. An interesting feature of this analysis is that the environmental 
fiscal reform studied does not only include CO2-taxation, but also taxation on the resource 
rents generated in the fishing sector as well as the removal of the current water subsidies.  
 
Water is often considered to be one of the most important constraints to development in many 
developing countries. Market prices of water do not in general reflect the social opportunity 
cost of using water, and in many developing countries, water subsidies are often relatively 
widespread, especially within the agricultural sectors. In order to ensure a sound managementSummary   2 
of scarce water resources, the value of water needs to be recognised, and for that reason, 
economic valuation has come to play an increasingly important role in public decisions of 
different water policies. Paper three in this thesis is an estimation of the value of irrigation 
water in a southern commercial agricultural region in Namibia.  
 
Water resources and agriculture is in focus also for the forth paper in this thesis. Water 
scarcity might be a significant constraint for the ability of the economy to adapt to exogenous 
shocks. A recent example of such external shocks is the rising world market prices of food 
and oil, which have raised concerns about how developing countries will be affected. As a dry 
corn- and oil-importing country, Namibia is among the group of countries considered likely to 
be most negatively affected from these price increases. In paper four, the likely economy-
wide impacts of the recently observed increases in international food and oil prices on the 
Namibian economy are analysed with special focus on the importance of water scarcity for 
the ability for agricultural production to adapt to the changes. 
 
The remaining part of the introduction will be structured so that for each one of the above 
mentioned topics, a more thorough introduction is first given, followed by a summary of the 
paper associated with that specific topic.  
 
2. The role of Technology Transfers in International Climate Policy 
Due to the global nature of the problem of greenhouse gas emissions, there is today wide 
consensus that in order to address the problem of climate change, international coordination is 
required. The first step towards organised international cooperation in this area was taken 
through the establishment of the international treaty United Nations Framework Convention 
on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which first entered into force in 1994. In 1997, an addition to 
this treaty was signed by a number of nations at the Kyoto Conference. In the Kyoto protocol 
legally binding emission targets were developed, and the protocol is in that sense more 
powerful than the former treaty. The Kyoto protocol sets binding targets for the industrialised 
countries (which in the protocol are labelled “Annex I” countries), while developing countries 
(labelled “non-Annex I” countries) are exempted from such targets. This fact raises the 
relevant question of how cost-efficiency can be ensured when only some countries are faced 
with emission targets. One way to achieve a more cost-efficient abatement is to introduce 
technology transfers between the regions (see e.g. Forsyth, 1999 and Grubb, 2000), and theSummary   3 
discussion of technology transfer has received much attention in the recent UNFCCC 
conferences. Among the countries that have ratified the UN Climate Change Convention, the 
developed countries commit themselves to “promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, 
the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other 
parties, particularly to developing countries, to enable them to implement the provisions of the 
Convention” (see Article 4.5 of the UN Climate Convention). In recent years, there has also 
been an increased recognition that projects including technology transfers often provide 
additional benefits in terms of job creation, mitigation of other emissions than greenhouse 
gases as well as health benefits (UNFCCC 2007). In the Kyoto protocol, the idea of 
technology transfer is formalised via the “Clean Development Mechanism”, which allows 
Annex I countries to invest in projects aiming at reducing emissions in non-Annex I countries, 
and also to offset the emission reductions achieved by those projects against their own 
emission targets. In this respect, the CDM might provide an important tool by creating 
incentives for technologies to be transferred between richer and poorer countries. Several 
studies show that an important part of total CDM projects actually involves technology 
transfers from Annex I to non Annex I countries (see e.g. Haites et al., 2006, Youngman et al., 
2007 and Coninck et al., 2008). However, it is important to note that the purpose of this 
project based flexibility mechanism is also to contribute to development in the hosting 
country. There are a number of previous studies modelling CDM, and other flexible 
mechanisms, in a way similar to emissions trading (see e.g. Ellerman et al., 1998, Zhang, 
2001 and Anger et al., 2007), i.e. focusing only on the cost-efficiency effect from using such 
mechanisms while ignoring potential “non-carbon welfare effects” associated with this. It has 
been shown that some of the additional benefits from actual CDM projects are, for instance, 
improved air and water quality and increased employment (see e.g. Austin and Faith, 1999 
and Banuri and Gupta, 2000).  
 
In paper I, the potential welfare effects from introducing a technology transfer between the 
North (Annex I) and the South (non-Annex I) are analysed. Special focus is given to how the 
pre-transfer resource allocation affects the incentives to use the transfer. The effects of 
unilateral technology transfers from the North to the South in a general equilibrium model 
framework were first addressed by Yang (1999). However, Yang’s analysis does not take into 
account the effect of adding the Kyoto emission reduction targets as a constraint on the North 
and, therefore, does not capture the potential additional incentives for using a technology 
transfer through the implementation of CDM projects within the Kyoto protocol. AnotherSummary   4 
important contribution of our paper is that, by dividing the Southern economy in a formal and 
informal economic sector, we are also able to incorporate the effects of labour mobility 
between the two sectors into the analysis. This effect can be seen as one important additional 
benefit for the host country arising from the technology transfer. Another distinction from 
Yang’s analysis is that in our study, the abatement cost differential depends on the level of 
domestic abatement already implemented in the South before the introduction of the 
technology transfer. This is a reasonable assumption as there is probably less low-cost options 
available for technology transfer the more abatement efforts the South already has 
implemented on their own.  
 
Summary of Paper [I]
In this paper, the likely welfare effects from introducing a technology transfer from the 
industrialised countries (North) to the developing countries (South) in order to mitigate 
greenhouse gas emissions are studied. This is analysed in a stylised numerical general 
equilibrium model, where the world-economy is divided into two regions, North (Annex I in 
the Kyoto protocol) and South (non-Annex I). The southern economy is divided into a formal 
and an informal sector. This is motivated by the fact that in developing countries, the informal 
sector generally has a more important role than in most developed countries (see e.g. Ihrig 
and Moe, 2000). The southern formal sector is assumed to be less labour intensive and is also 
characterized by a higher average productivity compared to the informal sector. The 
technology transfer, as modelled in our paper, gives rise to a movement of labour from the 
informal to the formal sector, resulting in a positive welfare effect in addition to the emission 
reductions achieved through the implementation of the new abatement technology.  
 
We consider four different regimes with respect to the pre-transfer resource allocation; (i) the 
regions are described as uncontrolled market economies, meaning that no policy measures are 
undertaken in order to combat emissions; (ii) the regions are imperfectly controlled market 
economies, meaning that the uncontrolled market economy is extended to represent a 
situation where the emission control targets according to the Kyoto protocol are implemented; 
(iii) the resource allocation is a cooperative equilibrium, here described as a conditional first 
best resource allocation implemented by a global social planner; (iv) the resource allocation is 
the outcome of a noncooperative Nash game, implying that each region only acts in order to 
maximize their own residents’ utility while taking the actions of the other region as given. 
The first and fourth scenarios represent two extreme views on how the regions behave if they Summary   5 
do not cooperate. Although the third scenario might seem unrealistic from a current practical 
policy perspective, it provides an interesting comparison as the result from this cooperative 
scenario is a first best outcome. 
 
The study finds that by introducing a technology transfer, total emissions can be reduced and 
global welfare improved. If the regions do not cooperate, although global welfare will 
improve, there appears to be little incentives for the North to introduce the technology 
transfer, at least if the South is assumed to take own measures to reduce emissions. However, 
if it is assumed that the South does not abate its own emissions prior to the introduction of the 
technology transfer, the North will benefit from using the transfer. This implies that if there is 
concern from the industrialised countries that developing countries are not taking any/enough 
measures to decrease their emissions, it may be in the industrialised countries interest to 
transfer environmental technology to achieve abatement in a more cost-efficient way.  
 
If, hypothetically, there was a global social planner to decide on the optimal policy, both the 
North and the South would abate their own emissions, and a transfer from the North to the 
South would also be used. An interesting result is the finding of what role the introduction of 
the technology transfer (as a CDM project) might play when the North is subject to the 
emission constraint in the Kyoto protocol. In this case, the incentives for North to use the 
technology transfer increase compared to the Nash equilibrium, and the technology transfer 
will be used independently of whether South abate emissions by themselves or not. For the 
South, it is shown that the technology transfer will lead to increased welfare, partly because of 
a reallocation of labour from the informal less productive, sector to the formal more 
productive sector. 
3. Environmental Fiscal Reforms in Developing Countries 
In recent years there has been an intensified debate about the linkages between poverty and 
the environment, and one result from this discussion is an increased interest in environmental 
fiscal reforms in developing country literature. The idea is that if environmental taxes could 
improve environmental quality without negatively affecting the poorest people, the additional 
environmental tax revenues could, in turn, be used in order to decrease poverty (World Bank 
2005). The design of environmental fiscal reforms in developing countries might differ 
somewhat from the traditional environmental tax reforms which so far mainly have been Summary   6 
implemented and studied in the US and Europe. While the environmental tax reforms in US 
and Europe focus mainly on energy taxation (see e.g. Goulder, 1995, Bovenberg and Van der 
Ploeg, 1998 and Bovenberg 1999), in natural resource rich developing countries, taxes on 
natural resource use and the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies can also be of 
great interest (Bosquet, 2000). Further, in some recent studies of environmental fiscal reforms 
in developing countries, it is clear that the focus on potential additional benefits is partly 
shifted from the traditional GDP and employment effects into impacts on poverty and income 
distribution (see e.g. Van Heerden et al., 2006a and b and O’Ryan, 2005). The reason is that 
in poor countries, poverty might not only be related to unemployment; it is often more 
widespread and might also depend on the prices of commodities that make up a significant 
share of household’s consumption expenditures.  
 
Even though the taxation of natural resource rents are often pointed out as an interesting part 
of environmental fiscal reforms in developing countries, there are few studies focusing on 
pure rent taxation. One reason is of course, the fact that there are usually no available 
estimates of actual resource rents in developing countries. In the light of this, Namibia 
provides an interesting exception due to it’s relatively well developed system of Natural 
Resource Accounting. In paper II, the potential impacts, primarily in terms of GDP, 
employment and income distribution, of an environmental fiscal reform including partly rent 
taxation, are studied by using a computable general equilibrium model of the Namibian 
economy.
Summary of Paper [II] 
As Namibia is a country highly dependent on its natural resource base (mining, fishing, 
agriculture and wildlife based tourism) and has one of the world’s most unequal income 
distributions (the gini-coefficient is 0.7), the government is struggling to set up policies which 
can contribute to a more sustainable management and a reduced poverty and inequality. The 
purpose of this study is to analyse the likely impacts of an environmental fiscal reform, where 
taxes on environmental resources are recycled to the economy in order to give rise to other 
benefits, in addition to the environmental impacts. These additional benefits could be, for 
example, increased GDP, increased employment and a less skewed income distribution. This 
is studied by means of a Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model of the Namibian 
economy. In order to fit the purpose of this analysis, the main database on which the model is 
based is, to some extent, extended to include also environmental data and natural resource Summary   7 
accounts. The environmental fiscal revenues consist of increased taxation of fish rents and 
energy together with a removal of the present water subsidies. The economy wide effects are 
analysed for five different revenue-neutral scenarios, which differ according to the way the 
environmental fiscal revenues are recycled; a) a general decrease in the commodity sales tax 
b) a decrease in the commodity sales tax on food only c) subsidization of unskilled labour d) 
an increase of direct governmental transfers to all households and e) an increase of direct 
governmental transfers to poor households only.  
 
One interesting result from this analysis is that environmental taxes might not necessarily be 
regressive in nature. The increased taxes on fish rents and energy, together with the decreased 
subsidies of water will mainly affect the richer households. Although all recycling options 
reinforce the redistribution of income from rich to poor households, the degree of the 
redistribution differs between recycling options, and in terms of combined environmental, 
GDP, employment and income distribution effects, the choice of recycling turns out to be 
important. While subsidizing unskilled labour gives the largest effects in terms of GDP and 
employment, when it comes to reducing CO2-emissions as well as lowering the gap between 
rich and poor households this is not necessarily the first choice. It turns out that a decrease in 
the taxes on food might be a more interesting option if all target variables are to be considered 
in combination. 
 
In general, the results from this study provide further evidence for the idea that in poor 
countries, poverty is not only a question of employment, but also of the prices of the 
commodities that make up a significant part of poor households expenditures. Although the 
employment effect is about the same whether the overall commodity taxes or taxes on food 
only are reduced, the food tax cut performs significantly better in terms of targeting the poor 
households.  
 
4. Estimating the Value of Water 
In many developing countries, water is considered to be one of the most important constraints 
for development. Despite this, water is often treated as an open-access resource with no 
indication of the actual value of the resource. In situations where water tariffs exist, these do 
not, in general, reflect the cost of providing water, and especially within agriculture, water is 
often subsidized. In many developing countries, agricultural activities use about 70 percent of Summary   8 
the national total water consumption, and irrigated crop production is in most cases the most 
water intensive activity. As the competition for water resources is likely to intensify in the 
future, it is increasingly important to promote an efficient use of the resource. In order to 
achieve an efficient management of the water resource, the value of water needs to be 
recognised, and among economists, there are a number of commonly used methods for 
estimating the value of water. These include for example the hedonic price method, the 
contingent valuation method, the production function approach and the residual method (see 
Young, 2005 for a comprehensive description of different water valuation techniques). Since 
irrigated agriculture constitutes a major user of water, there are several examples of studies 
where the value of irrigation water in specific regions is estimated. For case studies using the 
hedonic price method to estimate the value of irrigation water, see e.g. Faux and Perry (1999) 
for a study in Oregon, USA and Latinopoulos et al. (2004) for a study applied to one of the 
regions in Greece. A study by Chowdhurry (2005) on the other hand, provides an example of 
a production function approach to estimate the value of irrigation water in Bangladesh, and in 
Speelman et al. (2008) a residual value approach is used for estimating the value of irrigation 
water in a province in South Africa. 
 
In the third paper of this thesis, a variant of the residual method is used to estimate the value 
of irrigation water used in a specific region in Namibia. The residual imputation method is 
one of the most frequently used methods for estimating the value of irrigation water, and one 
explanation for its popularity, especially concerning valuation studies in developing countries, 
is that it is less data-intensive compared to, for example, the hedonic price method and the 
production function approach. The residual method measures the value of a specific non-
priced input by subtracting all other costs of production from the total value of output. The 
remaining, or residual, value after all other costs are subtracted, is assigned to the non priced 
input of interest (Young, 1996). To derive the residual function, two conditions have to be 
fulfilled. The first requirement is that prices of the inputs are equated to returns at the margin, 
implying that the producer is assumed to add inputs to the production process until the value 
of marginal inputs is equal to the opportunity cost of inputs, i.e. the producer is profit 
maximizing. The second requirement is that the total value of production can be divided into 
shares so that each factor, except the non-priced one, is paid according to its marginal 
productivity. This implies that the total value of the production is completely exhausted, and 
this presumes that a situation with constant returns to scale is at hand (Debertin, 1986).  
 Summary   9 
The Net-Back method used in this paper can be seen as a variant of the residual approach, 
which relaxes some of the restrictive assumptions of the residual imputation method. As there 
are reasons to believe that the markets for human and physical capital in many developing 
countries are not completely competitive and that farmers not necessarily needs to be profit 
maximizing, the estimated residual value is interpreted as the maximum ability to pay, rather 
than the marginal willingness to pay. (see e.g. Bate and Dubourg, 1996 and Tren, 1997).  
Summary of Paper [III]
In Namibia, water use has been increasing rapidly over the past decades, and there is concern 
that the water supply resources might be running short of demand. Therefore, water 
management is one important component of Namibia’s development strategy, and a 
sustainable management of water resources will require an understanding of the full social 
value of water. Agriculture, and especially irrigated crop production, is the single most water 
intensive activity in Namibia, implying that the value of irrigation water is of particular 
interest. In addition, water used for irrigated crop production has traditionally been subject to 
considerable governmental subsidies, and when the government now attempts to phase out 
these subsidies, the likely impacts on agricultural production as well as society as a whole, 
will largely depend on the actual value of irrigation water.  
 
In this paper, the net back technique is applied in order to estimate the value of irrigation 
water used in the Hardap region in southern Namibia. This method can be used in situations 
where lack of data prevents a detailed model of constraints that affect the farmers’ decisions. 
The value (maximum ability to pay) for irrigation water is calculated for different crop 
alternatives and different irrigation techniques. These values are then compared to the current 
tariff for irrigation water and also to the total cost for water supply in order to see what water 
tariffs farmers would be able to pay, while still remaining profitable.  
 
The results show that the planned increase of water tariffs by the government will most likely 
not have any effect at all on farming in the Hardap area. All the crops that are currently grown 
will remain financially viable also after the intended increase of the water tariff. However, if 
farmers would be faced with the full private cost of supplying water, the most common crop 
alternatives produced (lucerne, wheat and maize) would no longer be profitable. This implies 
that if water user charges are raised to the point where none of the current low-value crops 
remain profitable, the current farmers would either change their production into more valuable Summary   10 
crops (grapes) or be replaced by other farmers. The problem is that although many farmers are 
aware of the benefits of changing their production, they are concerned about the high 
investment costs and high initial losses from growing grapes. The analysis shows that as there 
is high potential of employment generation in grape production, it might be motivated from 
society’s point of view that the government were to provide state-guaranteed loans and 
training for those farmers who wish to start growing grapes. Such a policy would reduce the 
total water demand among the farmers. 
5. The likely impacts of the rising food and oil prices on water scarce 
developing countries 
Water scarcity might be a significant constraint concerning the ability for an economy to 
adapt to exogenous shocks. One example of such a shock is the recently observed increases in 
the world market prices of food and oil, which have raised concern about how developing 
countries will be affected, both in terms of overall economic activity and poverty (World 
Bank, 2008a). Whether countries will benefit or loose from these rising world market prices 
depends, to a great extent, on whether they are net-exporters or net-importers of the products. 
According to studies by the World Bank as well as the International Energy Agency, Sub-
Saharan African countries are considered to be particularly vulnerable since they are often 
net-importers of both corn and oil-products
1. At the same time, the rising food prices will 
increase the profitability within the agricultural sectors. However, the expected positive effect 
on agricultural production from rising food prices alone might be somewhat offset by the 
simultaneous increase in fuel prices. The expected growth of agricultural production in 
developing countries also raise further concerns about the sustainability of natural resources, 
especially water resources. The Sub-Saharan African countries are often dry countries where 
the agricultural sector typically constitutes the major user of water. This implies that water 
scarcity might be another important constraint for the ability of agricultural production to 
expand its production following increased food prices (Von Braun, 2008).  
 
On the household level, the rising food-and oil prices might have different effects for low and 
high income households. While increased fuel prices to a greater extent will affect the richer 
households, the increased food prices will most likely do more harm to the poor households 
since these households spend a larger share of their total consumption on food products. 
                                                 
1 See World Bank (2008a) and International Energy Agency (2004). Summary   11 
Although most studies concerning poverty impacts of rising food prices have shown that the 
effects on poverty will, in general, be adverse (see e.g. Warr, 2005 and Byerlee et al., 2006), 
there is need for an explicit analysis of the poverty impacts in each specific case since farm 
households, which are often among the poorest groups in low-income countries, may 
experience a rise of factor income following the food price increases, (see e.g. Hertel, 2004 
and Aksoy and Dikmelik, 2008).  
 
In paper IV, the likely impacts of the recently observed increases in international food and oil 
prices on the Namibian economy are studied using a CGE-model. Since Namibia is a dry 
country, the analysis takes the importance of water scarcity into account by explicitly 
including water as a factor of production in the model. In addition to the economy-wide 
impacts, the analysis provides further examination of the likely poverty impacts of these 
international price increases. 
 
In previous CGE-based literature, impacts of food and oil price shocks on developing 
countries are in general studied separately, and concerning food, the existing analyses often 
focus on specific trade liberalisation policies, and can therefore not provide any general 
conclusions about how the recently observed increases in several food product prices will 
affect developing countries (see e.g. Warr, 2005, Essama-Nssah et al., 2007 and Ivanik and 
Martin, 2008). Therefore, an impact analysis focusing on the recently observed increases in 
both food and oil prices simultaneously is highly motivated. In addition, although the 
potential environmental impacts from expanded agricultural production are often mentioned 
in previous studies about food price changes, the magnitude of these effects are not in general 
examined (See e.g. Ravallion, 2004). Therefore, the inclusion of water as a factor of 
production in this CGE-model adds another interesting dimension to the analysis of the 
combined price shocks, and thereby, the paper also contributes to the relatively sparse 
literature dealing with supply and demand for water in a general equilibrium framework (see 
e.g. Berrittella et al., 2007, Diao and Roe, 2003 and Goodman, 2000).  
 
Summary of Paper [IV] 
In this paper, the economy-wide impacts of the international food and oil price increases on 
the Namibian economy are analysed by means of a CGE- model. Special focus is given to the 
importance of water scarcity for agricultural expansion.  
 Summary   12 
Namibia provides a particularly interesting country for this kind of analysis, since it is a dry 
cereal- and oil-importing Sub-Saharan country, implying that it is among the group of 
countries that is most likely to be negatively affected from the international price increases. In 
this paper, water is explicitly included as a factor of production in the agricultural sectors as 
well as in a water distribution service sector, which in turn distributes water to all other 
sectors in the economy. Namibia is one of few developing countries where water accounts are 
constructed following the UN’s framework for System of Environmental and Economic 
Accounts (SEEA). These water accounts provide data on water supply and use in Namibia, 
which enables the inclusion of water as a factor of production, in addition to the original 
economic sector data. 
 
The results show that the overall impact from the rising world market prices on food and oil 
on Namibia’s total production will be negative; GDP will decrease by more or less 1.1 to 1.3 
per cent. The main reason is that the increased exports of mainly agricultural products can not 
offset the rise in production costs due to more expensive input factors, which causes a 
contraction of the economy. The overall effect on the structure of the economy is a 
redistribution of production from the non-exporting sectors (traditional agriculture and service 
sectors) to the exporting sectors (commercial agriculture, fishing and mining). This is an 
interesting result as the exporting sectors are all natural resource abundant sectors, depending 
on land, water, fish and mining products, implying that the Namibian economy will most 
likely be even more dependent on its natural resources in the future. This will require 
additional effort on how to ensure a sustainable management of these resources. 
 
The results also show that water scarcity, at least to some extent, can become a constraining 
factor for the ability for the economy to adapt to these exogenous price changes. According to 
the results, agricultural growth will significantly depend on the availability of additional water 
resources.  
 
Concerning the poverty impacts of the exogenous price increases, the analysis shows that 
while the oil price increase alone will mainly affect the richer households, the combination of 
food and oil price increases makes the poorer households significantly less well off. This 
result reinforces the general concern that the poor subsistence farmers in developing countries 
might not necessarily gain from the food price increases.  Summary   13 
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1. Introduction 
The importance of international cooperation in order to address the climate problem is widely 
recognised. This is often exemplified by the Kyoto Conference in 1997, which resulted in a 
protocol with legally binding emission targets. The protocol sets binding targets for the 
industrialised countries (Annex I), while there are no such commitments for the developing 
countries (non-Annex I). A relevant question is how the climate policy can be implemented in 
a cost-efficient way in a world where only part of the countries faces explicit emission targets. 
The importance of cost-efficient implementation has been recognised by the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), Art. 3.3., which states that the climate policy 
should “ensure global benefits at the lowest possible cost”. In practice, this means that, 
although the emission targets are imposed on a limited number of countries, there is some 
flexibility in the implementation of these targets, allowing for a more cost-efficient outcome 
than would otherwise be accomplished. One way of increasing the cost-efficiency is to 
introduce technology transfers from Annex I to non-Annex I.
1 Among the countries that have 
ratified the UN Climate Change Convention, the industrialised countries commit themselves 
to “promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, 
environmentally sound technologies and know-how to other parties, particularly to developing 
countries, to enable them to implement the provisions of the Convention” (See Article 4.5. of 
the UNFCCC). In addition, a technology transfer needs not (necessarily) only be a means of 
lowering the abatement cost; it may also contribute to economic growth in the host country.
2 
However, despite that the idea of technology transfers has received attention in the academic 
as well as policy discussion, it has so far only played a minor role in practice.
3 In the light of 
these observations, the purpose of this paper is to examine the likely welfare effects of 
technology transfers in terms of a numerical general equilibrium model. Our approach will be 
explained more thoroughly below. 
 
In the Kyoto protocol, the idea of technology transfers is formalised via the ‘Clean 
Development Mechanism’ (CDM), allowing Annex I countries to invest in projects aimed at 
                                                 
1 See e.g. Forsyth (1999) and Grubb (2000). 
2 For a discussion of possible additional benefits of projects including technology transfers, see e.g. UNFCCC 
(2007). For details about the relationship between foreign direct investments in technology and economic 
growth, see e.g. Borensztein et al. (1998). See also Ambec and Barla (2006), Wagner (2003) and Roediger-
Schluga (2004) for surveys of the literature on investments in environmental capital. 
3 See e.g.  Forsyth  (1999). Technology Transfers…   2 
reducing the emissions in non-Annex I countries and, at the same time, relax their own 
emission targets in exchange for the emission reduction induced by these projects.
4 The 
purpose of the CDM is “to assist parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable 
development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the convention and to assist 
Annex I countries in reaching their targets”.
5 Earlier studies typically model the CDM in a 
way similar to emission trading.
6 However, this approach fails to recognise the first part of 
the purpose of the CDM (to assist non-Annex I in achieving sustainable development). 
Another aspect of relevance for our analysis is that the ‘non-carbon welfare effects’ associated 
with the CDM are potentially very important for the non-Annex I countries, when they decide 
on whether or not to participate in projects aiming at lower emissions. In case studies focusing 
on Brazil, China and India, it is shown that these countries could benefit substantially from 
many viable abatement projects. The non-carbon benefits include, for instance, improved air 
and water quality, electrification of rural and remote areas, and increased employment.
7
 
In this paper, we simulate the welfare effects of introducing a technology transfer in a stylised 
world-economy comprising two regions; the North (Annex I) and the South (non-Annex I). 
Our analysis is based on a numerical general equilibrium, in which agents make intertemporal 
choices. The data and parameters for the regions are, to a large extent, based on the RICE- 
and DICE-models.
8 Clearly, the welfare effects of a technology transfer depend on the pre-
transfer resource allocation. We consider four different regimes; (i) the regions behave as 
uncontrolled market economies (which is our reference case); (ii) the regions are imperfectly 
controlled market economies, which means implementing the emission reductions associated 
with the Kyoto Protocol in an otherwise uncontrolled market economy; (iii) the pre-transfer 
resource allocation is a conditional cooperative equilibrium, where ‘conditional’ means that 
the resource allocation is decided upon in the absence of the option of using the transfer; and 
(iv) the pre-transfer resource allocation is a noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where the 
resource allocation in each region is decided upon by a ‘regional social planner’. The first and 
fourth regimes are interesting in the sense of representing two extreme views on how the 
regions behave in the absence of cooperation. The uncontrolled market economy means that 
all externalities remain uninternalised at the equilibrium, whereas the noncooperative Nash 
                                                 
4 There are some recent studies showing that a considerable amount of CDM projects actually involve 
technology transfers. See e.g. Haites et al. (2006), Youngman et al. (2007) and Coninck et al. (2008). 
5 See Article 12 in the Kyoto Protocol. 
6 See e.g. Ellerman et al. (1998), Zhang (2001) and Anger et al. (2007). 
7 See e.g. Austin and Faeth (1999) and Banuri and Gupta (2000). 
8 See Nordhaus and Yang (1996). Technology Transfers…   3 
equilibrium implies that each region internalises the externalities it imposes on the domestic 
residents, while the transboundary component remains uninternalised. Although the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium appears to be the most common alternative to cooperation 
in earlier literature on international environmental policy, both these regimes have been 
addressed before in various contexts.
9 Despite being unrealistic from a (current) practical 
policy perspective, the conditional cooperative equilibrium is interesting for purposes of 
comparison, as it allows the preferences of both the North and the South (and not just the 
North as in the other two regimes) to govern the decision underlying the use of the technology 
transfer.
 
In addition to the distinction between the four regimes mentioned above, another novelty is 
that we divide the Southern economy between a formal and an informal sector, which is 
reasonable since the informal sector seems to play a much more important role in developing 
economies than in developed economies.
10 This enables us to assess (or at least illustrate) the 
importance of labour mobility between the two sectors following a technology transfer. By 
assumption, the formal sector is more capital intensive than the informal sector and is 
characterised by higher average productivity. From the perspective of the North, the 
technology transfer is motivated by the difference in abatement costs between the regions. 
However, a technology transfer may also be thought of as an investment in a new and more 
efficient abatement technology, which might increase total factor productivity in the Southern 
formal sector. The issue of unilateral technology transfers from the North to the South was 
raised by Yang (1999). He considers the impact of such transfers in a dynamic general 
equilibrium model, where greenhouse gases give rise to a transboundary externality. At the 
same time, the technology transfer in Yang’s model does not have any direct effects on the 
Southern economy other than a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions; in other words, Yang 
did not address the productivity-oriented effect mentioned above. Another difference between 
Yang’s model and ours is that we allow the abatement cost differential between the regions to 
depend on the abatement efforts chosen by the South. Therefore, the potential benefits of a 
technology transfer from the North to the South depend on the level of abatement 
implemented by the Southern economy prior to the implementation of the transfer. 
 
                                                 
9 For a more detailed discussion, see also the theoretical literature dealing with environmental policy in 
economies with transboundary environmental problems; e.g. Carraro and Siniscalco (1993), Barrett (1994), 
Tahvonen (1994), Aronsson and Blomquist (2003), Aronsson et al. (2004) and Aronsson et al. (2006). 
10 See e.g. Ihrig and Moe (2000). Technology Transfers…   4 
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2, we present the basic structure of our 
numerical model. Section 3 describes the data as well as the ideas underlying the calibration. 
The results are presented in section 4. Section 5 gives the concluding remarks. 
2. The Numerical Model 
Consider a world economy comprising two regions, North (n) and South (s). The model to be 
described below is, to a large extent, based on the Rice-model developed by Nordhaus and 
Yang (1996) with the modifications mentioned in the previous section. The model is highly 
stylised and focuses on environmental interaction. To simplify the analysis, we follow earlier 
comparable literature by disregarding international factor mobility and trade (although we 
allow for labour mobility within the Southern economy, as mentioned above). This does not 
reflect a belief that international factor mobility and trade are unimportant; only that the 
underlying incentives are not easily captured by our model, which is designed to examine the 
effects of technology transfers from Annex I to non-Annex I. 
 
We use the following notations (neglecting the region-specific indicator); 
 
C Aggregate  consumption 
N Employment 
K Capital  stock 
c=C/N  Consumption per capita 
I Investments 
E CO2 emissions 
  CO2 emissions per unit of output 
  CO2 emission control rate (a measure of abatement) 
Tr Technology  transfer 
TE Atmospheric  temperature 
 
Let us begin by presenting the consumption part of the model. Each region is characterised by 
identical individuals
11 and a variable population. The objective function underlying public 
policy in each region is assumed to be utilitarian 
 
                                                 
11 This assumption simplifies the analysis considerably. In the context of the South, it means that the 
representative agent earns part of his/her income from the formal sector and part from the informal sector. 
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instantaneous utility function. 
 
Turning to the production structure, we assume that both regions are characterised by Cobb-
Douglas technologies. Despite this similarity, there are several differences between the 
regions. The production function for the North is written 
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represents the level of technology in period t, meaning that we allow for the possibility of 
‘abatement driven’ technological change. The variable   is an exogenous time-dependent 
function, whereas   is a depreciation rate indicating that the (possible) contribution to 
productivity of environmental policy depreciates as time passes. The expression 
 represents a production externality due to global warming. 
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output net of abatement and transfer expenditures, which can be used for domestic 
consumption and net investments, is given by 
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in which  )) ( ( t Tr   is the cost of the technology transfer, whereas   and   characterize 
the abatement technology available in period  . The expression within the brackets reflects 
the cost of abatement in terms of lost output, whereas the final term (the cost of the 
technology transfer) is determined by the abatement technology available in the Southern 
region in period t and is, therefore, dependent on the Southern abatement cost. Capital 
formation is governed by 
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In the South, there is a distinction between the formal (f) and informal (i) sectors. The 
production functions are written 
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Since the Southern economy comprises two sectors, we have   and , 
where   and   represent the share of the labour unit that each individual supplies to the 
formal and informal sector, respectively. The parameterisation of equations (7) and (8) is 
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reflects the idea that the technological change in the formal sector is driven both by domestic 
abatement (as in the North) and the technology transfer, whereas   in equation (8) is an  ) (t A
s
iTechnology Transfers…   7 
exogenous and time-dependent technology function in the informal sector. The parameters in 
the expression for   are analogous to, and have the same interpretations as, the 
parameters in the corresponding technology function for the North. Similarly, the production 
externality is defined as  . Finally, the part of output used 
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meaning that we allow for abatement efforts also in the South, although our reference case 
below is based on the assumption that the South does not abate. The capital formation in the 
two sectors is governed by 
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Let us now turn to the external effect. The total emissions of carbon dioxide are given by 
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where the three components on the right hand side (measuring emissions in the North, 
emissions in the formal sector in the South and emissions in the informal sector in the South, 
respectively) are defined as  
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The flow of carbon dioxide emissions in equation (12) gives rise to stocks of greenhouse 
gases in the air and water which, in part, determine how the temperature influences the output. 
This relationship is described in the Appendix A. 
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3. Data Sources and Model Calibration 
 
Our model is mainly based on the data and parameters from the RICE-99 and DICE-99 
economic models of global warming.
12 From the original RICE-99-model with 13 regions, 
Japan, the U.S., Europe, other high income countries, Russia and Eastern Europe are 
aggregated into region North. The North can also be called ‘Annex I’, because it contains all 
countries that are subject to emission targets in the Kyoto protocol.
13 China, India, Africa and 
other low- and middle income regions are aggregated into the Southern region and can also be 
seen as the developing countries, which have made no commitments to reduce their 
emissions. The base year in our model is 1990, and the time horizon is 20 periods, where each 
period represents one decade. However, following Nordhaus and Yang (1996), we have 
chosen to present the equilibrium paths of some of the key variables during a shorter time 
period; more exactly, the first 13 periods (1990-2110). The welfare analysis for each of the 
four regimes is conducted by using all 20 periods. 
 
The possible gains for the North, from carrying out the technology transfer depend on the 
preexisting level of abatement in the South (i.e. the level chosen prior to the technology 
transfer). The more domestic abatement the South has already accomplished, the higher will 
be the cost of abatement. In other words, the South has the opportunity to choose its domestic 
level of abatement before the North decides upon the technology transfer. This approach 
differs from Yang (1999); he assumes that the North has access to a given technology, which 
can be used either for domestic abatement or as a technology transfer, while the cost of the 
transfer does not depend on the current level of abatement in the South. However, from the 
perspective of the CDM, it is also interesting to consider situations where the South chooses 
to abate before the technology transfer is carried out. The reason is that it should not 
(according to the Kyoto protocol) be possible for the North to capture ‘low-cost’ abatement 
opportunities in the South, if there is a chance that the abatement project would have been 
implemented without the CDM. 
 
As we indicated above, another difference in comparison with earlier research is that the 
production in the South has been divided into a formal and an informal sector. It is a common 
                                                 
12 See Versions 020899, available at http://www.econ.yale.edu/~nordhaus/homepage/homepage.htm. 
13 A list of the Annex I countries can be found in the Kyoto Protocol. Out of all Annex I countries, only the US 
had not yet ratified the Protocol in September 2008. Technology Transfers…   9 
feature that the informal sector is significantly larger in developing countries than in 
industrialised countries. Estimates of the informal sector share of GDP in the developing 
countries average more than one third, while the corresponding share in the OECD is much 
smaller.
14 This leads to more uncertain estimates of the actual GDP in the developing 
countries. We assume that there is a ‘hidden’ informal sector of about one third of the 
production in the formal (observed) sector in the Southern economy. The informal sector is 
more labour intensive than the formal sector, and the average productivity is lower than in the 
formal sector. This implies that movements of labour from the informal to the formal sector 
will most likely lead to higher output in the Southern economy. We calibrate the model in 
such a way, that the production in the Southern formal sector corresponds to the observed 
regional equivalent to GDP, and the industrial emissions of the South are equal to the 
observed emissions, in the beginning of the planning period. Note that the observed industrial 
emissions originate from the formal sector; this assumes that there are no large industries in 
the informal sector. However, there is also another source of emissions, which is treated as 
exogenous in the original RICE-99 and DICE-99 models. This source refers to land-use 
emissions, which mainly originate from the harvesting of forests in the developing countries. 
At present, these constitute about 20 per cent of the total emissions from the developing 
countries.
15 Realising that a sector without large industries can be a significant source of 
emissions, we have chosen to transform the exogenous land-use emissions into endogenous 
emissions in the informal sector. In the reference case (see below), the informal sector 
emissions decrease over time in a way similar to the path for the exogenous land-use 
emissions in the original RICE-99 and DICE-99 models. The possibility to control emissions 
via investments in abatement technologies is assumed only to exist in the formal sector, which 
means that in order to change the path of the emissions in the informal sector, the size of the 
informal sector must be changed.  
 
The difference in marginal abatement costs between the regions motivates the transfer from 
the North to the South. In addition, as we indicated above, there may be an extra gain for the 
South associated with the transfer. This is recognised by allowing the total factor productivity 
(TFP) of the regions to depend on the emission control rate. For the Southern economy, both 
the domestic abatement and the technology transfer affect the TFP. The productivity effect 
associated with the technology transfer gives rise to labour mobility from the informal to the 
                                                 
14 See Ihrig and Moe (2000). 
15 See IPCC (2007). Technology Transfers…   10 
formal sector in the South. This implies increased output and possibly also higher emissions 
in the Southern formal sector.
 
Our choices of parameter values are described in the Appendix B, and Section 4.4. contains a 
sensitivity analysis for some of these parameters (the parameters we have added by extending 




As mentioned in the introduction, we distinguish between four different resource allocations 
prior to the introduction of the technology transfer; (i) uncontrolled market economies – our 
reference case; (ii) imperfectly controlled market economy, where the emission control 
reflects the target in the Kyoto protocol; (iii) a cooperative equilibrium; and (iv) a 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium
17. The comparison to be carried out refers to the present 
value of future consumption in each region as well as at the global level (i.e. over both 
regions); entities which are observable (or estimable) in practice. We also illustrate the 
predicted change in the global mean temperature over time in each scenario. 
 
Note also that the four regimes only differ with respect to the environmental policy; we do not 
explicitly address other aspects of public policy. This enables us to concentrate the 
comparison to environmental policy aspects, which is in line with earlier, comparable, 
research. Equilibrium paths for key variables are presented in the Appendix C. Our reference 
case, by which the other regimes is compared, is the uncontrolled market economy, in which 
there are no policies to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases. In each of the pre-transfer 
resource allocations described above, we present results from a baseline simulation, where the 
option of using the transfer is not available. Other simulations are based on the assumption 
that the size of the transfer is subject to choice (by the global social planner in the cooperative 
regime and by the North in the noncooperative regimes). We also relate the incentives of 
using the transfer to whether or not the South is carrying out domestic abatement. 
                                                 
16 As the productivity effect of the technology transfer is highly uncertain, we have chosen parameter values such 
that this effect becomes very small. Therefore, the qualitative results regarding how the technology transfer 
affects the resource allocation and welfare would remain the same, even if we were to disregard the productivity 
effect of the technology transfer. 
17 The noncooperative Nash game is an open-loop form game, which means that the whole time-sequence of 
each control variable is chosen at the outset of the game. 
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4.1. The uncontrolled market economy – our reference case 
The uncontrolled market economy is a projection of what would happen if no government 
intervention were used to slow down the global warming. Emissions are dealt with as a side 
effect of the production, and each firm treats the aggregate stock of greenhouse gases as 
exogenous. In this case, the global temperature increase (relative to the exogenous base 
temperature) is simulated to be 2.463 degrees Celsius by the year 2110. The emission paths 
for each region can be seen in Appendix C (Figure 1). It is interesting to note that, within a 
few decades, the South will be the main emitter of carbon dioxide, while the simulated 
emission path for the North is relatively constant. However, in terms of emissions per capita, 
the South will not reach the level of the North during the whole simulation period. 
 
Table 1: Reference case – uncontrolled market economy 
Scenario  Temp
† PVCN*
  PVCS*  PVCTOT*
 
Reference case   2.463 903.188  792.321  1695.509 
†  Temp measures the expected temperature change – evaluated at the end of the planning period - by 
comparison with a pre-industrial temperature level. Degrees Celsius. 

* PVC measures the present value of future consumption. Trillion US 1990 $. 
 
4.2. Imperfectly controlled economy – the Kyoto restriction 
 
In order to address how the emission reductions implicit in the Kyoto protocol affect the 
resource allocation and consumption possibilities, the Kyoto restriction is implemented as a 
scenario where the North faces an emission constraint of stabilising the emissions to 5% 
under the 1990 year level by the year 2008-2012 (period 3 in the model). The South is 
assumed not to take any actions to reduce its emissions.  
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Table 2: Market Economy augmented with the Kyoto restriction 
Scenario Tr    Temp
† PVCN*
  PVCS*  PVCTOT*
 
0  s    N.a. -  0.053  -0.392  0.578  0.186 
Tr available,  0  s    Yes -  0.053  0.152  0.621  0.773 
†  Temp measures the temperature change over the planning period minus the corresponding temperature 
change in the uncontrolled market economy in Table 1. Degrees Celsius. 
 
*   PVC measures the difference in present value of future consumption between this scenario and the 
uncontrolled market economy in Table 1. Trillion US 1990 $. 

 
In our analysis, the Kyoto restriction imposed on the North holds during the remaining 
planning period. Given the Kyoto restriction, the temperature increase is estimated to be about 
2.410 degrees Celsius, whereas the temperature increase in the uncontrolled market economy 
(our reference case) is 2.463 degrees Celsius, implying a difference of 0.053 degrees Celsius.  
This confirms the finding of other studies that the Kyoto protocol will have a modest effect on 
the mean temperature level. If the option of using the technology transfer is not available (the 
first row in the table), the present value of consumption for the North is reduced by 
comparison with the reference case. The reason is that the emission reduction implied by the 
Kyoto protocol is quite costly for the North. However, at the global level, the present value of 




Opening up the possibility of using the technology transfer, this option will be used by the 
North from the period the Kyoto restriction becomes binding. As a consequence, the present 
value of future consumption increases for both the North and South relative to the case when 
this option is not available. Interestingly, the present value of future consumption facing the 
North actually becomes larger than in the uncontrolled market economy. By comparing the 
first and second rows in the table, we can see that the possibility of using the technology 
transfer implies a gain for the North of about 540 billion U.S. $.
19 As such, this gives an 
indication of the potential gains for the North of using the technology transfer. The total 
increase in present value of future consumption for the South, compared to the case in which 
                                                 
18 Recall that the North in our model comprises all Annex I countries; also the U.S, which has not yet ratified the 
protocol. 
19 Since the size of the transfer depends on the abatement already implemented by the South, it is interesting to 
note that even if the South were to choose the same rate of emission control as in the noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium (see below), it would still be in the North’s interest to use a positive technology transfer in order to 
reach the Kyoto target at minimum cost. Technology Transfers…   13 
no transfer is used, is 43 billion U.S. $. This is partly due to the overall productivity gain (at 
constant employment shares) and partly to labour mobility. The additional gain associated 
with labour mobility is relatively small by comparison; about 2-3 billion U.S. $.
20 However, 
this moderate effect is dependent of the assumptions underlying the labour mobility in the 
South, whereas the other qualitative results are not sensitive to these assumptions. The size of 
the technology transfer, given the emission reduction targets in the Kyoto protocol, is about 5 
billion U.S. $ in the first period and 2 billion in the last period of analysis, which is shown in 
the Appendix C (Figure 2). As such, it only represents a small fraction of wealth in the North.
 
It is also interesting to compare the size of the transfer in our model during period 3 (which is 
the period when the Kyoto restriction becomes implemented) with the observed amount of 
resources spent on such climate projects in the developing countries during the time period 
1991-1997. Clearly, the size of the transfer implied (for the Kyoto-period) by our model 
exceeds the observed amount of resources spent on climate projects between 1991 and 
1997.
21  
4.3. The Cooperative Equilibrium  
 
The cooperative equilibrium concept adopted here is based on the assumption that a global 
social planner maximises the sum of the region-specific objective function subject to the 
resource constraint for the North and South, respectively. This means that the marginal costs 
and benefits of emission control will balance at the global level. It is the latter aspect of 
cooperation that we would like to capture; we are not assuming that the regions pool all their 
resources into one single resource constraint. 
   
In the baseline simulation, which does not allow for the technology transfer from the North to 
the South, the environmental policy is limited to the choice of emission control rate in each 
region.  
 
                                                 
20 Note that although this effect appears to be small, it implies a movement of the equivalent of about 1-10 
million workers from the informal to the formal sector.  
21 See Michaelowa (2000). Note that in our model, transaction costs are disregarded. Transaction costs are often 
described as one important obstacle in the context of implementation of technology transfers. Technology Transfers…   14 
Table 3: Cooperative Equilibrium 
Scenario Tr    Temp
† PVCN*
  PVCS*  PVCTOT*
 
Baseline, s   free  N.a. -  0.365  0.642  2.106  2.749 
Tr available, s   free  Yes -  0.467  -0.219  2.991  2.773 
Tr available, 0  s     Yes -  0.473  -1.729  4.491  2.762 
†  Temp measures the temperature change over the planning period minus the corresponding temperature 
change in the uncontrolled market economy in Table 1. Degrees Celsius. 
 
*   PVC measures the difference in present value of future consumption between this scenario and the 
uncontrolled market economy in Table 1. Trillion US 1990 $. 

 
Clearly, the present value of future consumption is higher in both regions than in the reference 
case (the uncontrolled market economy), and the temperature increase becomes 2.098 degrees 
Celsius which is 0.365 degrees Celsius lower than in the reference case. 
 
Let us now turn to the second row of Table 3, where we introduce the option of using the 
technology transfer. Our results imply that this option will be used during the entire 
simulation period. This leads to an increase in the present value of future consumption at the 
global level. The optimal domestic emission control rates of the North and South do not 
change much by comparison with the baseline simulation. Therefore, by introducing the 
technology transfer, the total emissions will be reduced. Note that the technology transfer 
makes the North worse off relative to the baseline simulation. However, the gain for the South 
outweighs the loss for the North; the implication in the table is that the present value of future 
consumption increases at the global level. This means that, if a global social planner (with the 
objective discussed above) would decide upon the optimal emission reduction strategy for 
both countries, then the North would actually be forced to do extra emission abatement in the 
South. Once again, the welfare gain for the South is partly due to increased productivity 
accompanied by labour mobility from the informal to the formal sector. However, the latter 
(productivity-related) effect only constitutes a small part of the total increase in the present 
value of future consumption for the Southern economy.  
 
If we impose the restriction that the emission control rate of the South should be equal to zero 
(the third row in Table 3), then the optimal size of the technology transfer increases relative to Technology Transfers…   15 
the previous simulation, where the Southern emission control rate is chosen freely by the 
global social planner. The emission control rate for the North does not change significantly, 
and the considerable size of the technology transfer brings the Southern industrial emissions 
near the level associated with the previous simulation. This means that the global social 
planner uses the technology transfer as an imperfect substitute for Southern abatement; the 
option of which is no longer available. As the North is now forced to do all the abatement in 
the South, the North becomes worse off, while the South becomes much better off. The effect 
of labour mobility becomes more important when the Southern abatement is set to zero in the 
pre-transfer situation and amounts to about 25 billion U.S. $ in terms of its contribution to the 
present value of future consumption. The emission paths are shown in the Appendix C (Figure 
3). Note that the emissions path of the North does not change significantly when the 
technology transfer is introduced; the most important effect is, instead, that the emissions of 
the South are reduced. 
The share of the transfer in the regional equivalent to GDP for the North is shown in the 
Appendix C (Figure 4), where we concentrate on the scenario giving the highest present value 
of future consumption (the second row in Table 2). The cost of the transfer ranges from 0.15 
billion 1990 U.S. $ in the first time period to 17 billion U.S. $ in period 13, which is shown in 
the Appendix C (Figure 5). Our model implies a smaller technology transfer than found by 
Yang (1999).
22 Except that the North and South in our model do not represent exactly the 
same countries as the corresponding regions in Yang’s model, one reason for a smaller 
technology transfer in our case is that the cost of the transfer depends on the level of domestic 
abatement implemented in the South. The larger the Southern emission control rate, ceteris 
paribus, the smaller the marginal abatement cost differential between the regions. Notice that 
these numbers for the transfer are based on a simulation where the emission control rate of the 
South is positive. If, on the other hand, the emission control rate of the Southern economy is 
not a decision variable for the global social planner, the results change dramatically. In the 
latter case, the size of the transfer ranges from 2 billion U.S. $ in the first period up to 433 
billion U.S. $, which is considerably higher than in the corresponding estimates by Yang. 
Therefore, in our model, the assumptions about which abatement policy options are available 
in the South are of considerable importance for the optimal size of the technology transfer. 
 
                                                 
22 The transfer in the corresponding scenario of Yang’s model ranges from about 1 billion to 80 billion U.S. $. Technology Transfers…   16 
4.4. The Noncooperative Nash Equilibrium 
The noncooperative Nash equilibrium concept is based on the assumption that the resource 
allocation in each region is decided upon by a domestic social planner, who treats the policies 
chosen by the other region as exogenous. As a consequence, since each regional planner only 
considers the welfare facing the domestic residents, the domestic welfare effects associated 
with greenhouse gases will become internalised, whereas the transboundary external effect 
remains uninternalised. 
 
Table 4: Non-cooperative Nash equilibrium 
Scenario Tr    Temp
† PVCN*
  PVCS*  PVCTOT*
 
Baseline, s   free  N.a. -  0.271  0.798  1.683  2.481 
Tr available, s   free  No -  0.271  0.798  1.683  2.481 
Tr available, 0  s     Yes -  0.101  0.243  1.015  1.258 
†  Temp measures the temperature change over the planning period minus the corresponding temperature 
change in the uncontrolled market economy in Table 1. Degrees Celsius. 
 
*   PVC measures the difference in present value of future consumption between this scenario and the 
uncontrolled market economy in Table 1. Trillion US 1990 $. 

Consider first the baseline simulation, where it is not possible to carry out the technology 
transfer. This means less emission control and a larger increase in the average temperature 
than in the cooperative equilibrium. However, note that the difference in present value of 
future consumption between the cooperative equilibrium and the noncooperative Nash 
equilibrium is relatively small at the global level; the difference between, on the one hand, 
these two resource allocations and, on the other, the uncontrolled market economy is much 
greater. Therefore, if each region chooses its environmental policy in order to maximise its 
own welfare, while treating the actions of the other region as given, we may actually come 
relatively close to the global optimum. 
 
Now, consider the effects of introducing the technology transfer (second line). If the South 
chooses its emission control rate in an optimal way, it is not in North’s interest to transfer 
technology to the South. The reason is that, although the transfer increases the welfare at the 
global level, the North becomes worse off. This is not surprising; the abatement carried out by Technology Transfers…   17 
the South reduces the abatement cost differential between the regions. If, on the other hand, 
the emission control rate of the South is restricted to be equal to zero prior to the introduction 
of the transfer (third line), then the North will choose to make a transfer to the South; the 
abatement cost differential becomes much greater here than when the Southern emission 
control rate is subject to choice. In other words, if the South does not control any of its 
emissions by domestic actions, the North will find it worthwhile to transfer some abatement 
technology to the South (instead of carrying out all abatement domestically). Using the 
transfer makes the North better off compared to the case of doing all abatement domestically. 
However, the present value of future consumption becomes much smaller for the North, as 
well as at the global level, compared to the case where the southern emission control rate is 
subject to choice. This suggests that Southern abatement is important from the perspective of 
global welfare. The industrial emissions in the cooperative equilibrium and the 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium are shown in the Appendix C (Figure 6). 
4.5. Sensitivity Analysis 
 
We have carried out sensitivity analyses for some of the parameters in the model. The 
sensitivity analyses refer to (i) the production functions in the South, (ii) the relationship 
between technological change and abatement, (iii) the ratio between emissions and output, 
and (iv) the production externality. We only discuss the qualitative results of these sensitivity 
analyses here. Details are available from the authors upon request. 
 
In the simulations presented in the main text, the parameter attached to the capital stock in the 
production function for the Southern formal sector, , takes the same value as the 
corresponding parameter in the northern production function. These estimates originate from 
the RICE- and DICE-models. The parameter attached to the capital stock in the production 









 , which is motivated 
by the assumption of more labour intensive production. The first sensitivity analysis suggests 
that the qualitative results are not sensitive to small changes in   and ; the simulation 








Turning to the second sensitivity analysis, we find that the larger the productivity effect of 
abatement, i.e. the parameter
ns    , the larger will be the reallocation of labour between Technology Transfers…   18 
sectors in the South. Therefore, an increase in the parameter   contributes to increase the 
effect of the technology transfer on the Southern economy. The other qualitative results 
remain as above. 
 
In the reference case, the Southern emissions increase more sharply than the Northern 
emissions along the general equilibrium path, mainly due to the higher emissions to output 
ratio for the South. In the third sensitivity analysis, we eliminate part of the region-specific 
difference in the ratio between emissions and output. Although this will, to some extent, affect 
the levels of optimal abatement in the two regions as well as the level of the technology 
transfer, the qualitative results remain as they are in Tables 1-4. 
 
As mentioned above, we have also carried out a sensitivity analysis for the parameters in the 
damage functions associated with temperature increase, i.e. the production externality. In 
Tables 1-4, the damage facing the regions due to a temperature increase of 2.5 degrees Celsius 
is assumed to be of the order of 1 per cent of GDP for the North and 2 per cent of GDP for the 
South. These assumptions correspond closely with the original RICE and DICE-models. Our 
sensitivity analysis means that these effects are doubled. Interesting to note here is that the 
emissions chosen by each region are reduced substantially by comparison with those 
associated with the original model; for the North, the emissions are reduced well below the 
levels following from the Kyoto Protocol restriction. In the Nash equilibrium version of the 
model, the most important qualitative result remains unchanged; the North will not use the 
technology transfer, as long as the South carries out abatement.
5. Conclusions 
This paper deals with the consequences of introducing a technology transfer from the North to 
the South in the context of a numerical general equilibrium model. Our model comprises two 
regions, North and South, where the North represents the so called Annex I, or industrialized, 
countries in the Kyoto protocol, and the South represents the non-Annex I, or developing, 
countries. We distinguish between four different resource allocations prior to the introduction 
of the transfer; (i) uncontrolled market economies; (ii) imperfectly controlled market 
economies, which means imposing the emission reduction requirement in the Kyoto Protocol 
to the otherwise uncontrolled market economies; (iii) a cooperative equilibrium; and (iv) a Technology Transfers…   19 
noncooperative Nash equilibrium, where the resource allocation is decided upon by regional 
social planners (who treat each other as Nash competitors). 
We find that a technology transfer from the North to the South, if designed appropriately, 
reduces the emissions and increases welfare at the global level. Given the Kyoto Protocol, our 
results indicate to what extent the CDM might be used in order to reduce the total costs for the 
North of implementing the emission reduction targets. In comparison with the reference 
scenario of our model, where the regions were uncontrolled market economies prior to the 
agreement, the results in the Kyoto restriction scenario imply that the North will make 
transfers to the South in order to reduce the abatement costs implied by the restriction. In 
addition, although the Kyoto Protocol would be beneficial for the South even without the 
technology transfer, the use of the transfer contributes to increase the welfare in the South, 
partly by a reallocation of resources from the informal to the formal sector. Although our 
Kyoto scenario assumes that the South is not taking sufficient domestic measures of emission 
abatement, it is interesting to note, that also in a situation where the South were to choose the 
same level of domestic abatement as in the Nash equilibrium, the North would still have an 
incentive to use the transfer in order to reach the Kyoto target at minimum cost. 
 
As opposed to the uncontrolled market economies, it is also interesting to analyse the role of 
the technology transfer in the context of a (hypothetical) cooperative equilibrium, as it implies 
that the transfer is governed by the preferences of the citizens in the North and the South. In 
this case, the (Utilitarian) global social planner would use the transfer instrument, because the 
welfare increase facing the residents in the South outweighs the welfare loss facing the 
residents in the North. The optimal policy implicit in the cooperative equilibrium implies 
abatement of the emissions originating from both regions and a technology transfer from the 
North to the South. 
 
If the regions behave as Nash competitors prior to the introduction of the technology transfer, 
and although the transfer leads to higher welfare at the global level, the incentives of using 
this transfer appear to be week from the perspective of the North. The reason is that the 
abatement carried out by the South in our model tends to reduce the abatement cost 
differential between the regions. On the other hand, if we were to add the restriction that the 
South does not abate its own emissions, our results suggest that the North will, indeed, make a 
technology transfer to the South. The intuition is that the abatement cost differential (prior to 
the introduction of the technology transfer) becomes relatively large in this case. Therefore, if Technology Transfers…   20 
the industrialised countries are concerned with climate change, and the developing countries 
are only taking trivial steps to reduce their own emissions, our results suggest that it would be 
in the interest of the industrialised countries to transfer environmental technology to achieve 
abatement in a more cost-efficient way. From the Southern perspective, the technology 
transfer might imply large benefits; both in terms of a better environment and in terms of 
technological change followed by a reallocation of resources from the informal to the formal 
sector. 
 
Our results indicate that by introducing the possibility for using technology transfers between 
the industrialised and the developing countries in international climate policy, significant 
global welfare benefits might be achieved, both in terms of a more cost-efficient abatement 
from the perspective of the North and economic development in the South; let be that the 
magnitude of the latter effect is subject to considerable uncertainty. It is shown that in the 
absence of a global social planner, the incentives for the North to use the technology transfer 
might be weak, especially if we allow for Southern domestic abatement in the pre-transfer 
equilibrium. However, the incentives to use a technology transfer are shown to increase if 
South is not taking sufficient measures to reduce its own domestic emissions or if there exist 
legally binding emission targets, like in the Kyoto protocol, which have to be implemented. 
This result indicates that the CDM might play an important role when it comes to reaching the 





MAT  Atmospheric CO2 concentrations 
MUP  concentrations in upper oceans 
MLO  concentrations in lower oceans 
TE  Atmospheric temperature change 
TLO  Oceanic temperature change 
F  Total radiative forcing 
O  Exogenous radiative forcing 
 
Following Nordhaus and Yang (1996), we have 
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Appendix B 
 
Most parameters in our numerical model, including those presented in the Appendix A, 
originate from Nordhaus and Yang (1996). As our regions do not fully correspond to those of 
Nordhaus and Yang (who use a more disaggregated framework), the parameters in our model 
are weighted averages of those used by Nordhaus and Yang, where each weight is defined as 
the size of the underlying variable in each country in the original model relative to the size of 
this variable in our regional framework. Our model also introduces additional structure, and 
the new parameters are: 
 
  = 0.8,    
n = 0.3,   f
s = 0.3,   i
s
 = 0.1,   , d = d 0.0001
ns   
n = d
s = 0.9,   2
n = 2.15,  
 2
s = 2.15,  K = 0.1 and   = 0.1 
 
Table B1: Time varying parameter values 
Period
*  1
n (t)   1
s (t)   
n (t)   f
s (t)  i
s (t) 
1  0.170     0.130  0.205      0.546      0.670  
2  0.134     0.091     0.181      0.451      0.383     
3  0.107    0.067    0.162     0.390     0.233    
4  0.088     0.051     0.147      0.348      0.150     
5  0.073      0.040      0.135      0.316      0.101     
6  0.062 0.033 0.124 0.290 0.070 
7  0.053      0.028      0.115      0.269      0.051     
8  0.046      0.024      0.107      0.249      0.037     
9  0.041      0.021      0.101      0.230      0.028     
10  0.036      0.019      0.094      0.212      0.022     
11  0.033    0.017    0.089     0.193     0.017    
12  0.030 0.016 0.084 0.172 0.013 
13  0.027 0.015 0.079 0.149 0.010 
* Ten year periodsTechnology Transfers…   23 
The parameters associated with the CO2 emissions/output ratio ( 
n,  f
s) are calibrated such 
that the total emissions and temperature paths for the North and South in our baseline scenario 
closely tracks the corresponding paths in Nordhaus and Yang (1996). The emissions/output 
ratio for the informal sector ( i
s) is composed of the exogenous land use emission path from 
Nordhaus and Yang. The parameters of the cost functions ( 1
n,  1
s) are calibrated such that the 
total emission reductions in our cooperative equilibrium correspond to the emission 
reductions in the corresponding scenario analysed by Nordhaus and Yang. 
Appendix C 
Figure 1.







































         
Figure 2.
Cost of the Technology Transfer, uncontrolled market 
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Figure 3.
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Figure 6.





































North NashTechnology Transfers…   26 
References 
 
Ambec, S. and Barla, P. (2006) Can Environmental Regulation be Good for Business? An 
Assessment of the Porter Hypothesis. Energy Studies Review 14: 42-63. 
 
Anger, N., C. Bohringer and U. Moslener (2007) Macroeconomic Impacts of the CDM: The 
role of investment barriers and regulations. Climate Policy 7, 6:500-517. 
 
Aronsson, T. and Blomquist, S. (2003) Optimal Taxation, Global Externalities and Labor 
Mobility. Journal of Public Economics 87: 2749-2764. 
 
Aronsson, T., Löfgren, K-G. and Backlund, K. (2004). Welfare Measurement in Imperfect 
Markets – A Growth Theoretical Approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited. 
 
Aronsson, T., Jonsson, T. and Sjögren, T. (2006) International Environmental Policy 
Reforms, Tax Distortions and the Labor Market. FinanzArchiv 62: 199-217. 
 
Austin, D. and Faeth, P. (1999) How much Sustainable Development can we expect from the 
Clean Development Mechanism? World Resources Institute, Washington D.C. 
 
Banuri, T. and Gupta, S. (2000) The Clean Development Mechanism and sustainable 
development: An economic analysis. Asian Development Bank, Manila. 
 
Barrett, S. (1994) Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements. Oxford Economic 
Papers 46: 878-894. 
 
Borensztein, E. De Gregorio, J. and Lee, J-W. (1998) How does foreign direct investment 
affect economic growth? Journal of International Economics 45: 115-135. 
 
Carraro, C. and Siniscalor, D. (1993) Strategies for the International Protection of the 
Environment. Journal of Public Economics 52: 309-328. 
 
Coninck de, H., Haake, F. and van der Linden, N. (2007) Technology transfer in the Clean 
Development Mechanism. Climate Policy 7, 5: 444-456. Technology Transfers…   27 
Dessy, S. and Pallage, S. (2003) Taxes, inequality and the size of the informal sector Journal 
of Development Economics 70: 225-233. 
 
Dui´c, N., Alves, L.M., Chen, F. and Carvalho, M. (2003) Potential of Kyoto Protocol Clean 
Development Mechanism in transfer of clean energy technologies to small island developing 
states: Case study of Cape Verde. Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews 7, 1: 83-98.  
 
Ellerman, A., Jacoby, H. and Decaux. (1998) The Effects on Developing Countries of the 
Kyoto Protocol and CO2 Emissions Trading. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No 
2019.  
 
Forsyth, T. (1999) Flexible Mechanisms of Climate Technology Transfer. Journal of 
Environment and Development 8: 238-257. 
 
Gallaher, M. and Delhotal, C. (2005) Modeling the Impact of Technical Change on emissions 
Abatement Investments in Developing Countries. Journal of Technology Transfer 30: 211-
225. 
 
Grubb, M. (2000). Economic Dimensions of Technological and Global Responses to the 
Kyoto Protocol. Journal of Economic Studies 27: 111-125. 
 
Haites, E., Duan, M. and Seres, S. (2006) Technology Transfer by CDM projects. Climate 
Policy 6, 3: 327-344. 
 
Ihrig, J. and Moe, K. (2000) The Dynamics of Informal Employment. Federal Reserve Board, 
International Finance Discussion Paper No. 664. 
 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007) Climate Change 2007: Scientific 
Basis. U.K: Cambridge Univ. Press. 
 
Jotzo, F. and Michaelowa, A. (2002) Estimating the CDM market under the Marrakech 
Accords. Climate Policy 2: 179-196. 
 Technology Transfers…   28 
Michaelowa, A. and Dutschke, M. (2000) Climate Policy and Development - Flexible 
Instruments and Developing Countries, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.  
 
Mitchell, R. and Parson, E. (2001) Implementing the Climate Change Regime’s Clean 
Development Mechanism. Journal of Environment and Development 10:125-146. 
 
Millock, K. (2002) Technology Transfers in the Clean Development Mechanism: An 
Incentive Issue. Environment and Development Economics 7: 449-466. 
 
Nordhaus, W. and Yang, Z. (1996) A Regional Dynamic General-Equilibrium Model of 
Alternative Climate-Change Strategies. American Economic Review 86: 741-765. 
 
Painuly, J. (2001) The Kyoto Protocol, Emissions Trading and the CDM: An Analysis from 
Developing Countries’ Perspective. The Energy journal 22: 147-169. 
 
Philibert, C. (2000) How Could Emissions Trading Benefit Developing Countries? Energy 
Policy 28: 947-956. 
 
Roediger-Schluga, T. (2004) The Porter Hypothesis and the Economic Consequences of 
Environmental Regulation. A Neo-Schumpetarian Approach. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing Limited. 
 
Tahvonen, O. (1994) Carbon Dioxide Abatement as a Differential Game. European Journal 
of Political Economy 10: 686-705. 
 
United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) (1992) United 
Nations. 
 
United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change (UNFCCC) (2007) Innovative 
options for financing the development and transfer of technologies. United Nations. 
 
Wagner, M. (2003) The Porter Hypothesis Revisited: A Literature Review of Theoretical 
Models and Empirical Tests. Center for Sustainable Management. Lüneburg. 
 Technology Transfers…   29 
Woerdman, E. (2000) Implementing the Kyoto Protocol: why JI and CDM Show More 
Promise than International Emissions Trading. Energy Policy 28:29-38. 
 
Yang, Z. (1999) Should the North Make Unilateral Technology Transfers to the South? 
North-South Cooperation and Conflicts in Responses to Global Climate Change. Resource 
and Energy Economics 21: 67-87. 
 
Youngman, R., Schmidt, J., Lee, J. and de Coninck, H. (2007) Evaluating technology transfer 
in the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation. Climate policy 7: 488-499. 
 
Zhang, Z. (2004) Meeting the Kyoto Targets: the Importance of Developing Country 
Participation. Journal of Policy Modelling 26, 1: 3-19. 
 IIEnvironmental Fiscal Reform in Namibia  





Department of Economics, 
Umeå University 




In this paper, the likely effects of an environmental fiscal reform in Namibia are examined 
using a Computable General Equilibrium model. Namibia is a natural resource rich country 
with poverty alleviation as one important target on the policy agenda. One way for the 
government of simultaneously ensuring both a sustainable use of the resources and a less 
skewed income distribution might be to introduce an environmental fiscal reform, where taxes 
on natural and environmental resources (fish rents, energy and water) are recycled in order to 
give additional benefits (in terms of GDP, employment and income distribution) to the 
economy. The results indicate that for some recycling options, there is scope for additional 
benefits. Subsidizing unskilled labour would give the most favourable result, at least in terms 
of real GDP and employment. However, poverty might not only be a question of employment; 
since food constitutes a significant part of poor households’ expenditures, a decrease in taxes 
on food might be an interesting option if GDP, employment, income distribution and 
environmental impacts are considered in combination. 
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1. Introduction 
The welfare consequences of environmental tax reforms, where higher environmental taxes 
partly replace other taxes, have been subject to a considerable research effort in the last few 
decades. So far, environmental tax reforms have mainly been implemented and studied in the 
US and Europe, where the main focus has been on energy taxation, and whether a second 
dividend (in addition to the welfare gain from a cleaner environment) in terms of GDP and/or 
employment can be obtained by using the environmental tax revenues to reduce other 
distorting taxes in the economy.
1 As the theoretical and empirical evidence for whether there 
exist additional benefits is mixed, the effects of an environmental tax reform need to be 
evaluated in each specific case.
2  
 
In recent years, along with an intensified debate about linkages between poverty and the 
environment in international development policy, environmental tax reforms have slowly 
started to gain interest also in the literature on developing countries. As the design of 
environmental policy reforms in developing countries might differ from the reforms analysed 
in the mainstream literature mentioned above, this is often referred to as environmental fiscal 
reform rather than tax  reform in the literature on developing countries.
3 In addition to 
environmentally related taxes on pollution, the design of an environmental fiscal reform in a 
developing country might also include taxes on natural resource use (e.g. forestry and 
fisheries) and user charges or the removal of environmentally harmful subsidies (e.g. on water 
and electricity use).
4 Another feature distinguishing environmental fiscal reforms in 
developing countries from those studied in the US and Europe is that in poor countries, the 
poverty issue might not necessarily only be related to employment; poverty is often more 
widespread and can, to a greater extent, also be related to, for example, the prices of 
commodities that constitute a significant part of the poor households’ expenditures (food).  
 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Bovenberg and De Mooij (1994), Goulder (1995), Bovenberg and Goulder (1996), 
Bovenberg and Van der Ploeg (1998), Bovenberg (1999) and Bosquet (2000). 
2A review of the results from the above mentioned studies shows that there are many different factors affecting 
the outcome of an environmental tax reform; for example, the type of model used (the number of sectors and 
production factors) and the level of complementarity between factors of production. A general result, though, is 
that additional benefits in terms of efficiency are improbable, unless there are initial distortions in the tax system 
or in the market (such as unemployment). 
3 OECD (2005). By definition, environmental fiscal reform refers to a range of taxation and pricing mechanisms 
aiming at providing economic incentives to correct market failures in the management of natural resources and 
the control of pollution.  
4 Bosquet (2000). Environmental Fiscal Reform…   2
In this paper, the likely effects of an environmental fiscal reform in Namibia are examined 
using a Computable General Equilibrium model. Since Namibia is a country highly dependent 
on its natural resource base (especially mining, fishing, agriculture and nature-based tourism) 
and has one of the world’s most unequal income distributions (the gini-coefficient is 0.7)
5, the 
Namibian government has to find ways of reducing the intensity of the resource use while, at 
the same time, reducing poverty and inequality. One interesting option for achieving both 
these targets simultaneously would be to implement an environmental fiscal reform, where 
taxes on natural and environmental resources are recycled in order to give additional benefits 
in terms of increased GDP, increased employment and a less skewed income distribution. The 
purpose of this analysis is to find out whether a revenue-neutral environmental fiscal reform, 
where revenues from taxation on resource rents in the fishing sector, the removal of 
environmentally harmful water subsidies and the introduction of a CO2-tax are recycled to the 
economy, may give rise to benefits such as increased output, increased employment and lower 
income inequality. The economy-wide effects are analysed for five different revenue-neutral 
scenarios, which differ according to the way in which the environmental fiscal revenues are 
recycled; a) a general decrease in the commodity sales tax rate, b) a decrease in the 
commodity sales tax rate on food only, c) subsidization of unskilled labour, d) an increase in 
direct governmental transfers to all households (general transfers) and e) an increase in direct 
governmental transfers to poor households only (targeted transfers).  
 
The reform studied in this paper is similar to that of another recent CGE-based study on South 
Africa, where a triple dividend, in terms of reduced emissions, increased GDP and reduced 
poverty is found if the environmental tax revenues from increased energy or water taxation 
are recycled through a reduction of taxes on food.
6 A shift of focus from employment to 
income distribution and poverty can also be seen in another CGE-based study of the Chilean 
economy, where it is shown that the combination of environmental and social policies (in 
terms of increasing governmental transfers to households) is of critical importance for the 
distributional consequences of a fiscal reform.
7 While the two above examples include 
environmental and/or natural resource policies, there are other examples of CGE-based 
studies in developing countries primarily focusing on the distributional and poverty impacts 
                                                 
5 This number comes from the Namibian Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) 1993/1994. 
6 Van Heerden et al. (2006b). See also Van Heerden et al. (2006a) for a similar environmental fiscal reform, but 
where water taxation is not included. 
7 O’Ryan et al. (2005). Environmental Fiscal Reform…   3
of non-environmental policies. There are several studies showing that the tax and transfer 
systems in developing countries can be reformed to achieve distributional benefits.
8  
 
An important contribution of this paper, which also distinguishes it from the South African 
studies by Van Heerden et al. (2006a, 2006b), will be to emphasize the potential non-
environmental effects of using rent taxation in the design of an environmental fiscal reform in 
natural resource rich developing countries. Even though taxation of rents is often pointed out 
as an important approach to environmental fiscal reform in developing countries, there are 
few studies focusing on pure resource rent taxation. According to Bosquet (2000), one reason 
for this is that while prices remain unchanged, rent taxation does not create any immediate 
incentives for resource conservation, i.e. there is no direct quantifiable effect on 
environmental quality, at least not in a short-run analysis where effects on entry and exit are 
not considered. Another reason why rent taxation is rarely analysed is that there are usually no 
available estimates of the sizes of actual resource rents.
9 With respect to the latter, Namibia, 
with its relatively well developed system of Natural Resource Accounting, provides an 
interesting example for rent taxation analysis. 
 
As the environmental effects of resource rent taxation cannot be measured in a static CGE-
model, the main focus of the analysis will be given to the recycling of the revenues from the 
perspective of alleviating poverty. As compared to the studies by Van Heerden et al. (2006a, 
2006b), which also include a reduction of direct and indirect taxes as recycling options, 
another contribution of the present paper is the analysis of additional recycling options of 
increasing general and targeted transfers to households.  
 
The outline of the paper is as follows: In section 2 background information on the Namibian 
economy is presented while in section 3, the different parts of the environmental fiscal reform 
are described. This is followed by a discussion of the model and data in section 4. A 
description of the different simulation scenarios is given in section 5 and in section 6, the 
results of the simulations are presented. Section 7 provides the concluding remarks.  
 
                                                 
8 See e.g. Go et al. (2005) and Chitiga (2000). 
9 Although the role of resource rent taxation in environmental fiscal reforms has previously been acknowledged, 
the potential effects on the economy of recycling such revenues have not been investigated. In a study of the 
Russian Federation by Bosquet (2002), rents for oil, gas and timber were estimated, followed by a proposal to 
introduce a revenue neutral fiscal reform (shifting the tax base from capital and labour to natural resources), 
without an explicit analysis of the likely effects on the economy of such a reform. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   4
2. Namibia 
 
Namibia is a country that is highly dependent on its natural resource base: mining, fishing, 
agriculture and wildlife based tourism. With a per capita income of USD 3 000 per year, 
Namibia is, by definition, a middle-income country.
10 However, these statistics hide the fact 
that Namibia’s income distribution, measured by a gini coefficient of 0.7, makes Namibia one 
of the most unequal countries in the world.
11 Furthermore, the official unemployment rate is 
approximately 35 per cent




An explanation of the current state of the economy, as well as of the main goals of 
development policy in Namibia, can partly be found in the history of the country. On March 
21, 1990, Namibia gained independence after a 70-year period of South African rule.  During 
that period, many of Namibia’s natural resources were exploited in a non-sustainable way and 
the benefits did not always accrue to the Namibian population. The highly skewed income 
distribution is, to a large extent, a heritage from the South African apartheid regime; a small 
white minority of the population still owns most of the land and businesses and the richest 1 
per cent of the population consumes the same amount as the poorest 50 per cent.
14 Since the 
independence, the government has been struggling to set up policies which can contribute to a 
sustainable management of the resources that form the basis of the economic activity in the 
country and, at the same time, ensure that the economic development will reduce inequality.
15
 
The ratio of government expenditures over GDP is 34 per cent in Namibia, which is a rather 
high number when compared to other developing countries. A high level of government 
expenditures, especially within education and health, has been motivated in order to increase 
                                                 
10 These are countries with a per capita income between USD 906 and USD 11 115; see World Bank (2007). 
11 This official figure is based on the Namibian Household Income and Expenditure Survey (NHIES) 1993/1994 
which, according to the World Bank, makes Namibia  the most unequal country in the world. According to the 
preliminary NHIES 2003/2004, the gini-coefficient has fallen to 0.6. However, this would still place Namibia 
among the most unequal countries in the world in terms of income distribution. 
12 The estimated unemployment rate in the labour force survey 2000 was 34.5%, while it was 36.7% in 2004.  
13 This estimate comes from Van Rooy (2006) who uses the 1993/1994 NHIES, so this percentage might change 
according to the 2003/2004 survey. 
14 The Namibian Central Bureau of Statistics (2002). 
15 One example of such a policy is the development of the “Nature Conservation Act” in 1996, which enabled 
the establishment of community based conservancies through Namibia’s Community Based Natural Resource 
Management Programme. By creating incentives for rural local communities to invest in nature based tourism 
activities, a sustainable management of wildlife as well as poverty reduction could be achieved simultaneously.  Environmental Fiscal Reform…   5
the chances for poor people of finding employment or becoming self-employed.
16 However, 
in terms of combating poverty and the highly skewed income distribution, these policies do 
not seem to have been very successful. Namibia’s tax burden accounted for about 29 per cent 
of GDP in the financial year 2004/2005, which can also be considered a high figure as 
compared to other developing countries.
17 The structure of governmental tax revenues can be 
seen in table 1 below. 
 
Table 1. Governmental Revenue Structure 
Governmental Revenue structure, 2001/02 
Tax Revenue 89.31%
   Taxes on income and profits 33.65%
      - Income tax on individuals 19.43%
      - Company taxes 13.28%
                   - Diamond Mining Companies 5.41%
                   - Other mining companies 0.63%
                   - Non-mining companies* 7.24%
   Taxes on property 0.51%
   Domestic taxes on goods and services (VAT) 22.22%
   Taxes on International trade and transactions  30.10%
Non-Tax Revenue 8.44%
(for example diamond royalties)
Other Revenue
(for example external grants) 2,25%
*of which actual fish rents constitute about 50 %.   
Source: Schade (2005). 
 
As can be seen from the table, the main source of revenue for the government is taxes on 
international trade and transactions within the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
18, 
followed by taxes on profits and income and the General Sales Tax (or VAT).  
 
Although the Ministry of Finance has expressed the need to introduce environmental taxes in 
Namibia, there are currently no environment-related taxes except for a tourism levy charge
19 
                                                 
16 New classrooms and clinics have primarily been built in poor rural areas.  
17 Schade (2005). 
18 The member countries of SACU are South Africa, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland. All customs 
duties are collected through SACU’s common revenue pool in South Africa and then distributed according to a 
“revenue sharing formula” based on each member country’s share in intra-SACU trade. For Namibia, this 
implies that the SACU revenues appear as a lump sum, where the amount is higher than the actual SACU tariffs 
collected due to the revenue sharing formula. According to a new SACU agreement in 2004, the current system 
for revenue sharing will be changed into a less favourable distribution for Namibia in the near future.  Environmental Fiscal Reform…   6
as well as park entry fees to partly cover the costs of wildlife conservation. Although a fuel 
levy system is currently in place, it is not expected to give any significant environmental 
effects. The levy is not motivated by environmental concerns; it is low and only levied on 
three fuels; petrol, diesel and paraffin.
20  
 
According to a study by Rakner (2002), the tax base in Namibia is not used to its full potential 
because of evasion and a number of tax exemptions considered to erode the tax base. Certain 
groups of tax payers, such as farmers, fishing companies and the mining sector, pay little tax 
in comparison to their contribution to GDP, which might seem surprising as commercially 
exploited resources usually generate considerable rents; a potential source of government 
revenue. A further investigation of the taxation of the two main natural resource sectors in 
Namibia, mining and fishing, shows that in the mining sector, a considerable part of the 
resource rent is actually being taxed while in the fishing sector, only about 20 per cent of the 
rent are captured by the government.
21  
 
Rakner also points out that Namibia’s skewed income distribution might imply that the 
current tax system is effectively regressive. Although – in comparison to the situation in many 
other African countries – the Namibian government has been successful in many respects, the 
pronounced governmental goals of ensuring a sustainable and equitable development calls for 
further revisions and developments of the economic policy. To achieve such an integrated 
policy, one option would be to look for opportunities to implement environmental taxes that 
can be redistributed in a way that might have positive effects on GDP and employment as 
well as lead to a more equal income distribution. This paper aims at analysing the likely 
welfare effects of a specific environmental fiscal reform where the additional tax revenues can 
be used to reach distributional and other objectives. 
 
The potential benefits in terms of increased GDP, increased employment and reduced income 
inequality in Namibia will depend on how the production and consumption patterns are 
affected by the environmental tax reform. In fact, as there is a significant level of 
unemployment among unskilled labour in Namibia, the effects in terms of increased 
employment and real GDP may, to a large extent, depend on how the environmental tax 
                                                                                                                                                          
19 A special levy included in the price for accommodation. 
20 Humavindu and Barnes (2006). 
21 Lange (2003). Environmental Fiscal Reform…   7
reform affects demand for unskilled labour. If, for example, environmental taxes mainly affect 
skilled labour (which is considered to be fully employed) and other fixed factors, while the 
demand for unskilled labour is increased via revenue recycling, unemployment will most 
likely be reduced in the Namibian economy.
22 When it comes to income distribution, poverty 
might not only be a question of employment but also of the prices of commodities that 
constitute a significant part of the poor households’ expenditures. Therefore, a change in 
prices of food might also affect the outcome in terms of poverty and income distribution in 
the model. 
3. Environmental fiscal reform in Namibia 
 
In situations involving externalities, economists have long favoured the use of taxes as a 
corrective instrument. In Namibia, important sectors like fishing, agriculture and wildlife-
based tourism are highly dependent on a sustainable management of the natural resources 
fish, land, water and wildlife biodiversity. In this paper, fish and water are included in the 
environmental fiscal reform, while wildlife and land are not. This does not mean that these 
resources are less important – rather, as the tourism sector is the sector considered to have the 
largest potential to grow in the future, biodiversity conservation should be taken seriously, 
and considering the fact that farmers currently pay little tax in comparison to their 
contribution to GDP, the taxation of land rents would be interesting to take into consideration. 
However, due to the lack of appropriate data from the tourism sector as well as estimations of 




Namibia has made renewable resources a case of high priority and attempts to increase the 
share of energy sources like solar, wind, wave and biomass of the national energy 
production.
24 This makes it interesting to include increased taxation of CO2-emissions in an 
                                                 
22 As there is no choice-mechanism between leisure and work for the households in this model, employment of 
unskilled labour is determined by firm demand for unskilled labour. The assumption of involuntary 
unemployment is therefore important for the possibilities of increasing employment via revenue recycling in this 
model.   
23 Although lack of data prevents the inclusion of appropriate levels of such taxes, simulations are carried 
through with approximate levels of such taxes to give intuition to how the inclusion of such taxes would most 
likely affect the outcome of an environmental fiscal reform. See Appendix B and Appendix E, respectively, for a 
discussion of these simulations. 
24 In the energy chapter of the second National Development Plan, which is the most recent energy policy 
document, alternative energy uses, like renewable resources, are encouraged. Through “The Energy White Environmental Fiscal Reform…   8
environmental tax reform. The three parts of the environmental tax reform studied in this 
paper are: taxation of the resource rents in the fishing sector which may reduce long-run 
incentives for overfishing, the removal of water subsidies which will increase the price of 
water used in the currently subsidized sectors (the shortage of fresh water is currently 
considered to be the main constraint to development in Namibia), and an increase in the 
energy tax (based on actual carbon content) that can lead to lower CO2 emissions. The 
additional tax revenues are then recycled in different ways, by a decrease in indirect 
commodity taxes, subsidization of unskilled labour or increased direct governmental transfers 
to households. The different parts in the fiscal reform are described in more detail below.  
3.1. Taxation of rent in the fishing sector 
 
During the period of South African occupation, Namibia’s fisheries often operated as an open 
access resource, which resulted in a depletion of the fish stocks. After the independence, a 
new fishing policy with two main objectives was implemented: i) to ensure ecologically 
sustainable management of the fisheries and ii) to significantly increase the share of benefits 
for Namibians from the fisheries sector, especially those previously excluded from the 
industry due to discriminating laws during the apartheid regime.
25  
 
To achieve the first part of the fishing policy, the government sets quotas for the total fish 
catches allowed every year. The existing quota levies have been shown to be considerably 
lower than the actual rents generated by the fishing industry. The non-taxed rents appear as 
higher than normal profits
26 in the fishing sector, which means that there are still incentives 
for overfishing and, as a result, the government is exposed to lobbying from the fishing sector 
for an increase in the fishing quotas.
27  
 
The second objective can be interpreted to fit into the broader context of the government’s 
focus on policies of alleviating poverty. Even if quotas have been allocated to new companies 
that were not established in the industry before the independence, the only way for the poorest 
                                                                                                                                                          
Paper”, the government has committed itself to introducing more renewable energy resources and the Ministry of 
Mines and Energy (see website http://www.mme.gov.na/energy/policy.htm) is working actively towards this 
goal.  
25 Lange (2003). 
26 Resource rent is the income to the fixed factor: in this case fish. 
27 According to Manning (2000), many of the new companies have been involved in the fishing industry by way 
of rent seeking, i.e. searching for opportunities to trade in fishing permits, rather than practically developing the 
capacity to manage their own fishing activities.  Environmental Fiscal Reform…   9
people of gaining benefits from the resource that initially belongs to the country as a whole is 




Even if progress has been made both considering the goal of increasing Namibian’s share of 
benefits and in halting further depletion of the fish stocks, there is a growing concern that too 
much of the economic benefit still accrues to foreign companies and it is obvious that the 
expected recovery of fish stocks to the high levels last observed in the 1960s has not occurred. 
Consequently, there are reasons to further increase the taxation of the rents generated in this 
sector. Although rent-capturing may not influence the short-run incentives for overfishing, at 
least not much, there are reasons to believe that this will have a positive effect on the 
sustainability of the fisheries in the long run, as it will decrease the currently high level of 
entry into the industry. Calculations based on Namibia’s national accounts show that the 
percentage of the rent collected by the government has decreased from 50 per cent after the 
independence to about 20 per cent by the year 2000.
29  
3.2. Reducing environmentally harmful subsidies for water 
 
Although water is an extremely scarce resource and is considered to be the main constraint to 
development for Namibia, the financial costs for providing water were heavily subsidized 
during the period of South-African occupation, especially for the commercial farming 
sector.
30 Since its independence, Namibia’s water policy has changed and the new Water 
Resources Management Act
31 emphasizes the need to recognize the economic value of water. 
To promote an economically efficient water use, water tariffs should reflect the full 
opportunity cost of water, including the direct costs of providing water as well as the 
environmental impact. Studying the published data on costs of providing water compared to 
the tariffs paid by end users, it is clear that full direct cost recovery pricing had not yet been 
achieved by the year 2001-2002.
32 Actually, Lange (2006) found an error of underestimation 
in the cost of irrigation water in these figures and she concludes that especially commercial 
                                                 
28 Lange (2003). 
29 Lange (2003).  
30 See Lange (2006). 
31 See Water Resources and Management Act 2004. 
32 See Technical Summary of Water Accounts  Department of Water Affairs 2006. Although the share of end-
users that pay the full cost for water has increased significantly since the 1990’s, some sectors continue to be 
heavily subsidized. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   10
irrigated crop production continues to be heavily subsidized. Even though taxation would be 
the appropriate tool for capturing the full social costs of water, no estimations of the full 
social costs for water supply are available at present. The fact that water is a basic necessity 
further complicates the construction and implementation of a system of water taxes if it is not 
to harm the poorest households. Therefore, in this paper, the elimination of the total amount 
of water subsidies is implemented as a first step towards full social cost recovery of the water 
supply. It is important to note that the current government is actually working towards full 
private cost recovery and this study will highlight the possible economy-wide effects of 
implementing the first step of such a policy.  
3.3. Energy taxation 
 
A third option for environmental taxation in Namibia would be increased energy taxation. 
Namibia is not a major player when it comes to carbon emissions and as a non-Annex I 
country in the Kyoto protocol, Namibia has no international obligations to reduce emissions 
in the first commitment period 2008-2012. However, even without binding international 
targets for reducing carbon emissions, the use of CO2 taxation may be an interesting option to 
consider. Namibia has made renewable resources a case of high priority and attempts to 
increase the share of sources like solar, wind, wave and biomass of the national energy 
production. At present, domestically produced electricity is mainly hydroelectric power, and 
although there exists a coal based power plant in Namibia, this is rarely used for production. 
As domestic electricity production does not cover domestic demand, the remaining part is 
imported (coal based electricity) from South Africa. Further, there is no domestic production 
of petroleum products in Namibia; all oil based fuels are imported. 
 
At present, only petrol, diesel and paraffin are subject to a fuel levy, the main objective of 
which is to finance the maintenance of the road network system. It would be a reasonable step 




                                                 
33 This is actually proposed by Humavindu and Barnes (2006) in a study about possible financing options for 
biodiversity conservation and a sustainable use of natural resources in Namibia. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   11
This paper analyses the effects of introducing a tax on the final consumption of petroleum 
products.
34 This tax is based on actual carbon content in the different fuels, which implies that 
the fuel tax simulated in this paper is a CO2-tax, although based on the consumption of fuel 
and not on the emissions themselves.
35 From a distributional point of view, as most of the 
poorest households do not drive their own car and mainly use the informal forest sector to 
collect their fire wood, these households may not be significantly affected by a higher 
petroleum tax, thereby suggesting that this policy could be easier to motivate from an equity 
perspective than a tax on water.  
 
3.4. Options for revenue recycling 
 
In many developing countries, there is a particular concern that any attempt at improving the 
environment through higher taxes will have negative effects on development in the country. 
Therefore, in this study, the focus is on the possibilities of recycling the tax revenues from the 
environmental tax reform in a way that might lead to benefits in terms of increased GDP, 
increased employment and alleviating poverty. The additional tax revenues will be recycled in 
five different ways, where the first two alternatives refer to decreased indirect taxation; first as 
a decrease in the general commodity sales tax rate (or VAT) and then as a decrease in the 
commodity sales tax on food only.
36 A comparison of these options in terms of income 
distribution will be of particular interest as poor households spend relatively more of their 
total expenditures on food than other households. The third option considers a subsidy 
towards employing unskilled labour. The above three recycling options are similar to the 
recycling options studied in two studies of South Africa by Van Heerden et al. (2006).
37 The 
last two ways of recycling the additional tax revenues are general and targeted governmental 
transfers. While general transfers might be unnecessarily costly depending on how large the 
                                                 
34 Although the intention was to implement a coal based CO2-tax also for imported electricity consumption, it 
was decided to exclude this from the analysis. The reason is that in this kind of model, a price increase for only 
imported electricity would imply substitution into more domestically produced electricity, but as only the 
residual demand currently is imported, such a substitution is not possible in the short run as domestic production 
is used to its full capacity. However, as petroleum products constitute the main source of CO2-emissons in 
Namibia, the exclusion of a tax on imported coal based electricity will be of minor importance for the analysis of 
overall CO2-emissions. 
35 See section 4.2.3. for further discussions of data for the energy sector. 
36 The general VAT rate in Namibia is 15%. 
37 In the two studies by Van Heerden et al. (2006), where there are pre-existing factor taxes for both capital and 
labour, both these taxes are decreased by means of revenue recycling. According to the authors, the reason for 
decreasing both factor taxes is that the South African Revenue Service would not be inclined to favour one factor 
of production over another in tax adjustment schemes. In Namibia, where no factor taxes are reported for capital 
or labour in the SAM, a subsidy of unskilled labour is used as a recycling option. This is motivated by the high 
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leakages to the rich households will be, the reason for targeting transfers is to support only 
those in need.
38  
4. The CGE model and data 
 
4.1. The model 
 
The model used for the simulations is based on a generic CGE model for developing country 
analysis, developed by the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). CGE models 
have become a standard method for economic policy analysis and have, for example, been 
used in the analysis of taxation, structural adjustment and trade policy. This specific model 
has been used in numerous studies on macro economic policies in developing countries, 
especially African countries
39, and it follows the standard neoclassical modelling tradition on 
which all original general equilibrium models are based. More specifically, the IFPRI model 
derives its basis from the well-known neoclassical-structuralist CGE-framework of Dervis et 
al. (1982), where the model agents’ production and consumption decisions are driven by the 
maximization of profits and utility, respectively. In some respects, the model allows the user 
to depart from the typical neoclassical Walrasian modelling tradition, for example by 
allowing for structural rigidities like fixed wages and absence of factor mobility. These 
features of CGE-modelling have become increasingly popular, especially in the developing 
country literature, as they often represent a more realistic and practical way of modelling the 
functions of the economy in these countries.
40 The model makes use of comparative static 
analysis: a shock to some of the exogenous variables causes the relative prices to change and 
the economy adjusts to a new equilibrium. The values of the endogenous variables following 
from the policy-shock can then be compared to the values in the base-year equilibrium. This 
section provides a brief summary of the model; for a full documentation of the original model, 
see Löfgren et al. (2002). A formal description of the model equations is found in Appendix 
B. 
 
                                                 
38 See section 4.2.4. for an explanation of how the (imperfect) targeted transfers are carried out in this study.  
39 Examples of macro-policy studies in African countries where the generic IFPRI CGE-model is used; Malawi: 
Löfgren et al. (2001) and South Africa: Thurlow (2002) and Go et al. (2005).  
40 See, for example, Van Heerden et al. (2006) where a similar CGE-model for South Africa is used and the high 
unemployment rate among low skilled workers is explicitly modelled by a fixed wage for this particular labour 
category. This wage rigidity is an important driving force for the results of the policy analysis. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   13
4.1.1. Production 
Each producer is assumed to maximize its profits subject to the production technology in a 
perfect competition setting: the firm takes prices of output, production factors and other inputs 
as given. Production technology is divided into two levels; the top level, representing the 
substitution decision between intermediate inputs and factors of production and the second 
level, representing the choice between factors of production. At the top level, a Leontief 
specification is used, implying no substitutability between factors of production (value added) 
and intermediate inputs in production. At the second level, a CES function is used to represent 
the substitutability between primary factors used in the production. The share of composite 
commodities used as intermediate inputs in the production is determined by a Leontief 
technology. The structure of the production technology is shown in figure 1 below.
41 As a 
result of profit-maximization, each producer uses a set of factors up to the point where the 
marginal revenue product of each factor is equal to its factor price.  















Source: Löfgren et al. (2002). 
 
                                                 
41As a Leontief production structure is used for intermediate inputs, the model does not allow for substitution in 
production between, for example, energy or water and other intermediate inputs. (For factors of production, 
though, a CES function is used, allowing for substitution in the production between capital and labour, for 
example.) This structure of limited substitution for intermediate inputs on the production side is standard in most 
CGE-models and is also used in the model by Van Heerden et al. (2006) where it is motivated by a short-run 
time horizon for the simulations.  Environmental Fiscal Reform…   14
4.1.2. Institutions 
The institutions in the model include households, enterprises (firms), the government and the 
rest of the world. Households receive income from the factors of production (directly from 
labour and indirectly via enterprises from capital) and transfers from other institutions. The 
income is then used for direct tax payments, saving, consumption and transfers to other 
institutions. Household consumption is allocated across different commodities according to a 
linear expenditure system (LES), implying that the consumption spending for a specific 
commodity is a linear function of total consumption expenditure.
42 The consumption pattern 
differs across household groups due to different consumption shares of each commodity and 
different elasticities of market demand for each commodity between the different household 
groups.
43 Enterprises receive factor income from capital and transfers from other institutions. 
This income is then allocated to direct taxes, savings and transfers to other institutions. The 
government collects taxes from sales, households and enterprises, import and export and 
value added and receives transfers from other institutions. All taxes are treated as fixed ad 
valorem taxes. This income is used for consumption and transfers to institutions. All transfers 
to or from the rest of world are fixed in foreign currency. Foreign savings constitute the 
difference between foreign currency spending and receipts.  
4.1.3. Commodity Markets 
The model allows for one single activity to produce more than one commodity and for one 
commodity to be produced by more than one activity. The first step is therefore to generate 
aggregated domestic output from the output generated by different activities for a given 
commodity, using a CES aggregation function. Demand for the output of each activity is 
based on minimizing the cost for supplying a given quantity of aggregated output. For each 
disaggregated commodity, activity-specific commodity prices ensure that the market will 
clear.  
 
Aggregate output is allocated between exports and domestic sales based on suppliers’ revenue 
maximization, subject to a Constant Elasticity of Transformation (CET) function, which 
                                                 
42 The linear expenditure system contains the first-order conditions resulting from the maximization of a Stone- 
Geary utility function, i.e. it is assumed that for each household, a minimum level of some good must be 
consumed, irrespective of its price or consumer income. After subsistence has been achieved, the relative 
contribution of each commodity to utility can be considered. 
43 The consumption shares are taken from the SAM, while the elasticities differ slightly between rich and poor 
household groups (using the same pattern of elasticity values as in the CGE study of South Africa, from which 
the elasticities are mainly taken). See section 4.2.5. for the elasticities data.  Environmental Fiscal Reform…   15
implies that although the supply of exports is determined by the relative price of exports and 
domestic goods, the producers’ maximization of sales is subject to imperfect substitutability 
between export and domestic sales. Export demands are assumed to be infinitely elastic at 
given world prices, and export prices are expressed in domestic currency by adjusting the 
world price with the exchange rate and potential export taxes.  
 
Domestic demand consists of household and government consumption, investment and 
intermediate inputs. If a commodity is imported, domestic demand is measured for a 
composite commodity which comprises imports and domestic output. The consumers’ choice 
between domestically produced and imported variants of the same commodity is subject to 
imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic commodities represented by a CES 
aggregation function.
44 International supplies are assumed to be infinitely elastic at given 
world prices.  
 
The assumptions of imperfect transformability between exports and domestic output, and 
imperfect substitutability between imports and domestic output are made to better reflect the 
empirical realities of most countries and this is a standard assumption in CGE-modelling. 
Figure 2 below presents an overview of the flow of marketed commodities in the model.   




































Source: Löfgren et al. (2002). 
                                                 
44 This CES-function is called the Armington function and is used to prevent unrealistic import and export 
responses to policy changes as it allows for some independence of the domestic price system as compared to the 
international one. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   16
4.1.4. System constraints 
In addition to the behavioural assumptions for the agents described above, the model 
equations also include a set of constraints that must be satisfied for the system as a whole, 
which is not necessarily considered by any individual agent. These include constraints for 
factor- and commodity markets and macroeconomic aggregates.
45 With regard to the factor 
markets, this paper follows Van Heerden et al. (2006) by assuming the capital stock in each 
sector to be fixed, while the rate of return is allowed to vary. The same assumption holds for 
the fish factor as well as the mixed factor used in agricultural production.
46 This is the 
standard way in which capital and land are modelled in static CGE-models in developing 
countries and it is motivated by the relatively short time horizon. The labour market in 
Namibia is divided between skilled and unskilled labour, where skilled labour is characterized 
by full employment while there is significant unemployment among unskilled workers. To 
reflect this division, the two different labour categories are treated differently in our model. 
Skilled labour is assumed to be fully employed and mobile between sectors. In terms of model 
specification, this implies that supply is fixed while an economy-wide wage rate can be freely 
adjusted to ensure that demand equals supply. On the other hand, the real wage rate for 
unskilled labour is fixed to allow for unemployment among unskilled workers.
47  
 
Concerning the macroeconomic aggregates, an important assumption is that all tax rates, 
except those collected via the fiscal reform, are fixed. Foreign savings are also assumed to be 
fixed in the model, which prevents any misleading short-run effects on household welfare in a 
single-period-model.
48 The level of real government consumption and real investment is 
exogenous and thus not assumed to be affected by the policies in question and the model 
numeraire in all simulations is the Domestic Producer Price Index (DPI).
49 A full description 
of the macroeconomic model constraints is found in Appendix C.  
 
                                                 
45 These constraints are satisfied by different model closure rules. By choosing closure rules, the user determines 
which variables should be exogenous and which should be endogenous; see Appendix D for a specification of 
the alternative closure rules available. 
46 See section 4.2. for a clarification of this mixed factor. 
47 It is the real wage rate (after factor tax) for unskilled labour that is fixed, i.e. the after tax nominal wage rate 
deflated by the consumer price index. This allows for variation in the firm’s labour costs if the factor tax and/or 
the general price level changes. These factor closure rules coincide with the factor market closure rules used in 
similar studies dealing with environmental tax reforms in South Africa; see Van Heerden et al. (2006). 
48 An increase (decrease) in foreign savings will cause a rise (fall) in household welfare. These results might be 
misleading in a single-period model as the analysis does not capture welfare losses (benefits) in later periods that 
arise from a smaller (greater) foreign debt. See Appendix D for a further discussion of this closure rule. 
49 As the model is a real model, only relative prices are of importance and a numeraire must be chosen. All 
simulated price and income changes are interpreted as changes in comparison to the numeraire price index. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   17
4.2. Data 
 
The primary database on which the CGE model is built is the preliminary Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) for Namibia from 2002 (full documentation is given in Lange et al. 2004 and 
the full initial database can also be found in Sahlén, 2008).
50 The SAM divides the economy 
into 26 sectors of production, five factors of production and six household groups according 
to their main source of income. To make the model easier to solve numerically, a number of 
the smaller manufacturing and service sectors as well as the different commercial agricultural 
sectors have been aggregated when fed into the CGE-model. 
 
The factors of production included in the original SAM are unskilled labour, skilled labour, 
capital, a mixed factor in the commercial agricultural sectors (representing a mix of farm 
owners’ labour, capital and a land component) and a mixed factor in the traditional 
agricultural sector (analogous to that in the commercial sectors, but with a negligible capital 
component). The reason for using the mixed factors in the database is that it is difficult to 
distinguish between different types of earnings of self-employed farmers; the surplus of sales 
revenue over input costs includes a payment for own labour, own capital input as well as land 
input. Therefore, in the national accounts, this surplus is left as “mixed income”.  
 
Some small adjustments in the SAM (concerning the traditional agricultural sector and tourist 
data) were necessary for the data to fit the standard model set-up and purpose of analysis. 
These small adjustments are described in Appendix A, while the data adjustments as well as 
the complementary data for the more important sectors are described in this section. 
 
4.2.1. Fish-sector data 
To study the effects of a larger share of the resource rents captured by the government within 
the fishing sector, fish needs to be included in the current SAM as a factor of production in 
the fish and fish processing sectors. This is done by making use of the resource rent (as factor 
income distributed to different households etc.) estimated through the Natural Resource 
                                                 
50 A SAM is an economy-wide data framework representing the economic structure of a country for one year. 
Technically, it is a square matrix where each account is represented by a row and a column where the incomes of 
an account appear along its row and its expenditures along its column. The economy is disaggregated into 
factors, activities (production), commodities and institutions. The sum of each row (total revenue) must equal the 
sum of each column (total expenditure) in the SAM. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   18
Accounts (NRA) methods for fish.
51 In the original SAM, the factor income for capital in the 
fishing sector contains a capital rent component and a fish rent component. To identify the 
latter, which is the factor income attributable to the production factor fish, the total amount of 
fish rent is redistributed from the total capital rents in the fish sectors into actual fish rents 
instead. According to these resource rent data, in the year 2001 (which is the latest year for 
which the resource rent is calculated) 20 per cent of the total rents were actually captured by 
the government. These captured rents appear in the original SAM as a part of the business tax 
in the fishing sectors. For the purposes of this study, the amount of taxed fish rents is 
transferred from the business tax account to a direct tax on fish rents, which also constitutes a 
more correct specification than the former way of presenting rent taxes in the SAM. The rest 
of the total fish rent is distributed as factor incomes to enterprises and foreign factor owners 
according to the same distributional shares by which capital rents are distributed. This 
adjustment opens up the possibility of studying the effects of an increased share of the fish 
rent captured by government – through an increase in the direct tax on fish rents.  
4.2.2. Water data 
There is no information about water subsidies in the SAM from 2002. The sectors subjected 
to significant water subsidies by the year 2001-2002, corresponding to actual sectors in the 
SAM, are mainly the agricultural sectors (commercial crop and livestock production) and 
private services.
52 In the SAM, water is considered to be an intermediate input in production 
and not a factor of production. As only a few sectors actually pay the lower price for water, 
the SAM needed to be extended to include a second water commodity, which represents the 
water bought by the subsidized sectors only. The removal of the water subsidies will reduce 
the current incentives of over-use in these water-intensive sectors. In total, the amount of 
water subsidies is only about N$ 15 million, only constituting a small part (about 4 per cent) 
of the total environmental tax revenues.
53  
                                                 
51 The Namibian fisheries accounts are based on the UN System of Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounts (SEEA). See Lange (2005) for a detailed description of the methodology for fish-rent calculations. 
52 See Lange (2006). While urban households in general pay more than the actual private cost of providing 
water, poor rural households are subsidized. However, as the current water accounts do not distinguish between 
different categories of households, only the production sectors subjected to water subsidies can be included in 
the analysis. 
53 As the subsidies are not included in the original data – and a chain of different assumptions would have to be 
made in order to include them in the SAM – this environmental policy is actually modelled as an increased tax 
on the sector-specific water in the model simulations. This will be of minor importance as the direct effects of a 
removal of subsidies or an introduction of a tax on the currently subsidized sectors will be the same. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   19
4.2.3. Energy data 
To calculate the environmental tax to be levied on fuels, an official energy balance for 
Namibia from the year 1999 is used. This is the latest energy balance compiled for the 
economy and as energy production and consumption between the years 1999 and 2002 have 
most likely not changed to any considerable extent, the different years for the energy balance 
and the SAM should not constitute any major problem. In the energy balance, there is 
information about which fuel types are actually included in the aggregated petroleum 
commodity account in the SAM. The implemented tax is based on the actual final 
consumption of petroleum products (according to the carbon content) and not actual 
emissions by production sector.
54 This can be seen as a fuel tax, where the tax rate for the 
commodity “petroleum products” is calculated as the CO2-tax
55 multiplied by the carbon 
content of petrol, diesel and all other products included in the petroleum product account 
found in the Namibian national accounts for 2002. The carbon content in the total 
consumption of petroleum products is calculated by using the Intergovernmental Panel on 
Climate Change (IPCC) default conversion factors.  
 
4.2.4. Household data and the Representative Household approach 
The household groups in the SAM are divided into six different subgroups according to their 
main source of income. These groups are 1) urban households who receive their income from 
wages and salaries, 2) urban households involved in business activities including farming, 3) 
urban households who depend on pensions, cash remittances and other sources of income, 4) 
rural households who receive their income from wage and salary, 5) rural households within 
business activities and commercial farming and 6) rural households depending on subsistence 
farming, pensions, cash remittances
56 and other sources of income. Although the household-
data is poor in the sense that the households are not divided by income deciles in the SAM, 
the division into separate socio-economic income groups makes it possible to identify the 
households in terms of location and income source, which is often decisive for the general 
                                                 
54 The tax is levied on industrial use as well as household consumption of petroleum products. As Namibia does 
not produce any petroleum products domestically, there is no problem of energy losses from converting coal to 
petroleum, which is otherwise the main reason why emissions should be taxed at the point of combustion rather 
than consumption.   
55 The level of CO2-tax used here is 35 Rand per tonne CO2 (  35 N$), following van Heerden et al. (2006). This 
rate is based on estimations of the global climate change damage costs by Sandor (2001) which, according to van 
Heerden et al. (2006), correspond well with the median of marginal climate change damages reported in the 
literature. 
56 These are private intra-household transfers of income, for example regular transfers from a family member 
working away from home or occasional gifts. These transfers often play a significant role for poor households in 
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living conditions. This approach to studying poverty and income distribution effects is called 
the Representative Household (RH) approach which represents the most common approach 
used among the vast literature of dealing with the links between different macro-reforms and 
changes in poverty and income distribution through CGE-models.
57 This approach implies 
that changes in income in the subgroups are interpreted as changes for all households within 
the group. The main drawback is that the within-group income distribution is not taken into 
account, but the reason why this approach is the most popular is the lack of more detailed data 
in developing countries.  
 
When it comes to assigning which household groups are the poorest – and thereby should be 
subject to targeted transfers  it would be interesting to know more about the household 
groups than the total income given in the SAM. Average income per household within each 
household group was calculated using available data on the total income of each household 
group (provided in the SAM) together with data on the actual number of households in each 
household group (provided in the preliminary report of the Namibian HIES 2003/2004).
58 The 
average income is lowest for urban households including pensions, cash remittances and other 
sources of income, rural households that get their income from wages and salaries and other 
rural households mainly including subsistence (self-sufficient) agriculture. In this paper, the 
effects on income distribution are studied in terms of changes in real income for the three 
poorest household groups in comparison to the corresponding changes for richer household 
groups.
59 The three groups with the lowest average income can be identified and these three 
groups are then subject to the targeted transfers in order to minimize the leakages to rich 
households. Having decided which households should be subject to targeted transfers, the 
total amount of transfers can be distributed among the low-average-income groups according 
to the number of households in each of the poor household groups, thereby ensuring that each 
                                                 
57 While general equilibrium modellers generally have shown little interest in distributive impacts of policies, the 
standard CGE model developed by Löfgren et al. introduces the representative household approach, which has 
become the traditional way of involving distributive impacts in CGE-analysis. Other more recent approaches are, 
for example, the CGE-integrated multi-household approach and a micro-simulation sequential approach. 
However, these methods require more specific household data than what is currently available in the case of 
Namibia; see Boccanfuso (2007). 
58 The preliminary report of the Namibian HIES 2003/2004 only presents the main findings at an aggregated 
level. As the final report of the Namibian HIES 2003/2004 has not yet been published, there is unfortunately no 
updated household income and expenditure data available that can be added to this analysis. 
59 Naturally, the current division of household groups conceals some of the variations in income within rural 
sectors, but as about 70% of the poor live in rural areas and the remaining poor are to a large extent unemployed 
urban households (The World Bank Group: Poverty Monitoring Database), at least the majority within the three 
chosen household groups can be considered to be really poor.  Environmental Fiscal Reform…   21
household obtains an equal amount of transfer.
60 In this respect, my way of distributing the 
transfers to each chosen representative household group differs from a study of targeted 
versus unilateral transfers in the Zimbabwean economy by Chitiga (2000). The latter study 
also uses the representative household approach, but the transfers are only distributed 
according to the total original income of each group and not according to the number of 
households within each group.  
 
4.2.5. Elasticities 
Apart from the SAM, some additional data is needed to calibrate the model, mainly 
elasticities, depending on the chosen shape of the model equations of the production and 
consumption structure, which are further described in Appendix B. The elasticities of interest 
are trade elasticities, substitution elasticities between the factors of production and 
expenditure elasticities of market demand by households. Trade elasticities include the 
elasticity of substitution between imports and domestic output in domestic demand (the so-
called Armington-function) as well as the elasticity of transformation between exports and 
domestic demands for domestic marketed output (CET-function).
61 The substitution 
elasticities between factors of production are represented by a CES-function
62 and the 
expenditure elasticities by a linear expenditure system.
63 Concerning the expenditure 
elasticities for household energy demand (more specifically petroleum and electricity), these 
values are taken from an empirical study of Namibian energy demand by De Vita et al. 
(2006).
64 Since, to my knowledge, there are no other available empirical estimates of the 
required elasticities in Namibia, all other elasticity values are taken from a CGE model of the 
                                                 
60 The general transfers are also distributed to all households according to the number of households in each 
household group. This is motivated by the fact that this is how real pensions or other transfer systems usually 
work: a fixed amount given to all households. 
61 See equations (22) and (23) in Appendix C for the functional relationship (represented by a CES-function) 
between imports and domestic output and equations (19) and (20) for the functional relationship (represented by 
a CET-function) between exports and domestic sales. Parameters  c
t and  c
q can be calibrated by including trade 
elasticities.
 
62 In Appendix C, the equation affected by the elasticity of factor substitution is equation (11), where  a
va is 
calibrated. 
63 See equation (32) for the household demand function, where parameters  ch  (subsistence quantity) and  ch (the 
relative contribution of each commodity to utility after subsistence has been achieved) are calibrated using 
expenditure elasticities and a Frisch parameter.  
64 De Vita et al. estimate income- and price-elasticities of the Namibian energy demand by end users, both at the 
aggregated level and by type of energy (electricity, petrol and diesel), for the period 1980 to 2002. 
Unfortunately, this analysis does not include a sectoral analysis; i.e. it does not take into account that energy 
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South African economy by Thurlow (2004).
65 This is motivated by the fact that the structure 
of the Namibian economy is similar to that of the South African economy. 
5. Simulation scenarios 
The additional tax revenues raised via carbon taxation, lower water subsidies and rent taxation 
are combined with the different ways of recycling the tax revenues described above, thus 
resulting in five different scenarios. The environmental part of the fiscal reform includes an 
increase in the petroleum tax by about 30 per cent (following from the calculations of carbon 
contents described in section 4.2.3.), the introduction of a tax on the water use for the 
commercial agricultural sector and the private service sector of about 9 per cent 
(corresponding to the total amount of N$ 15 million which is the recorded amount of the 
current water subsidies among these sectors) and an increase in the direct tax on the fish 
factor of production from the current level of about 20 per cent to a case of total governmental 
capture of fish rent, i.e. the tax being 100 per cent of total fish rents. As this is a pure rent tax 
in the model, it will have no significant effect on the level of fish production, only on the 
distribution of fish factor income. As the main problem in Namibian fisheries currently seems 
to be a high pressure of new entries into the industry, the purpose of this policy would be to 
prevent new entries as well as force inefficient companies to exit by reducing the profits made 
within the industry. This will help secure a sustainable long-run fish stock. However, given 
the static model to which I have access, it is not possible to capture possible effects on entry.  
 
Concerning the choice of total governmental rent capture, it can be argued that, since the 
actual size of this rent is generally associated with a high degree of uncertainty, total rent 
capture is too risky a policy objective. The Namibian fisheries accounts are based on the UN 
System of Integrated Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA), which has also been 
used to construct fish accounts in a number of other countries including, for example, 
Norway, Iceland and the Philippines. In the calculations of rent, the only figure required (that 
is not provided by the national accounts) is the opportunity cost (rate of return) of fixed 
capital. In Namibia, a 20 per cent return is used in order to reflect the high risk associated 
                                                 
65 These elasticities, in turn, are mainly based on empirical estimates for the South African economy. See 
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with fishing activities.
66 This rather high rate of return, together with the fact that rent 
calculations are based on realised and not potential rents that could have been realised without 
inefficiencies like over-capacity, should reduce the risk of an over-estimation of the fish rents. 
However, as the model does not capture any possible effects on entry and exit, it might still be 
argued that the tax revenues from a 100 per cent profit tax may be overestimated and 
therefore, a sensitivity analysis has been conducted for the case of 50 per cent rent capturing. 
The results of this sensitivity analysis are presented in Appendix D. 
 
In total, the environmental fiscal revenues amount to about 1-2 per cent of total GDP, 
suggesting that the environmental fiscal reform will only create minor changes in the structure 
of the economy. The contents of the five different scenarios are shown in table 2 below.  
Table 2. Simulation Scenarios 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Environmental taxes (fish, energy and water) x x x x x
Recycling alternatives:
 - Decreasing the commodity sales tax rate  x
 - Decreasing the commodity sales tax rate on food x
 - Subsidizing unskilled labour x
 - Increasing (general) transfers to all households x
 - Increasing (targeted) transfers to poor households x  
 
In scenario 1, the tax revenues are recycled through cuts in the commodity tax rate while in 
scenario 2, only the commodity taxes on food are decreased. In scenario, 3 the environmental 
tax revenues are used to introduce a subsidy of unskilled labour. In scenarios 4 and 5, direct 
governmental transfers to households are introduced, first through an increase in the transfers 
to all households, i.e. general transfers, and then by targeted transfers to the poorest household 
groups only. 
                                                 
66 This rate is higher than the return used in other countries (Norway 7% and the Philippines 10-15%) and also 
higher than the 10% rate used for calculating the value of minerals in Namibia.  
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6. Simulation results  
 
6.1. Environmental effects 
Although the environmental benefits of fish rent taxation, which constitutes the main part of 
the environmental fiscal reform in this paper, are not measurable in the context of the model, 
it is interesting to note that in terms of total CO2 emissions and water use, all scenarios will 
lead to decreased CO2-emissions, while the water use will slightly increase in all scenarios 
except the transfer scenarios. The total change in the consumption of petroleum products and 
water is shown in table 3 below.  
Table 3. Consumption of petroleum products and water 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
 (household and intermediate demand)
Total consumption of petroleum products -0.73 -1.05 -0.01 -1.22 -1.61
Total consumption of water 0.23 0.13 0.75 -0.15 -0.31
 
 
The decrease in total CO2-emissions is mainly a result of decreased household demand for 
petroleum products in the economy. From table 3, it is clear that the scenarios where the tax 
revenues are recycled through direct transfers to households, followed by the scenario where 
taxes on food are reduced, are the most efficient in terms of reducing CO2-emissions. It is 
interesting to note that in scenario 3, there is only a minor decrease in the consumption of 
petroleum products. The main reason is the relatively high increase in total production in this 
scenario as compared to the others. However, despite the correlation between the change in 
petroleum product consumption and the change in the overall production level in the 
economy
67, this does not fully explain the differences between scenarios; while for example 
scenarios 1 and 2 achieve almost the same positive effect on overall GDP
68, scenario 2 (food 
tax reduction) reduces petroleum consumption, and thereby CO2-emissions, more than 
scenario 1 (overall commodity tax cuts).  
  
                                                 
67 See section 6.2.1. and table 4 below for the effects on the real GDP-level in each scenario. The transfer 
scenarios give significant environmental benefits, but this comes at the cost of reduced real GDP. The 
environmental benefit in the scenario where unskilled labour is subsidized is less significant, but one reason for 
this is that the economy grows the most in this scenario.  
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The reason why total water use increases is partly because the removal of water subsidies 
only constitutes a small share of the fiscal reform and partly because the model does not allow 
for a high rate of substitution between intermediates, thus implying that water use will closely 
follow the change in total production. 
6.2. Effects on production, employment and income inequality 
 
In this section, results concerning the potential non-environmental additional benefits from 
the environmental fiscal reform are presented. As unemployment together with the skewed 
income distribution are two important characteristics of the Namibian economy, it is 
interesting to evaluate the policies in terms of changes in these measures. In addition, the 
overall effect on GDP is also of interest. Therefore, the variables considered in this section are 
the real GDP, the employment of unskilled labour and the real consumption by the poorest 
household groups in relation to the real consumption by richer households. The effects on 
these variables are summarized for all scenarios in table 4 below. The results for other key 
variables are shown in Appendix D. 
Table 4. Effects on target variables 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Effect on real GDP 0.19 0.17 0.49 -0.03 -0.04
Effect on employment for unskilled labour 0.53 0.42 1.47 -0.10 -0.16
Change in real consumption:
                  - among the poorest households 0.53 1.03 1.23 0.74 1.96
                  - among the richer households 0.27 -0.20 0.88 -0.88 -2.07
 
 
6.2.1. Real GDP  and employment 
Scenario 3 leads to the largest increases in real GDP and employment among unskilled 
labour. While increased environmental taxes raise the production costs and, in turn, reduce the 
demand for unskilled labour
69, the subsidization of unskilled labour decreases the production 
costs and thereby increases the demand for unskilled labour. As the positive recycling effect 
                                                 
69 As the model does not allow for substitution between different intermediate inputs, the production costs 
increase along with the increasing costs of petroleum and water inputs. The production levels are reduced and 
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more than offsets the first negative effect on overall production levels, the result of this 
scenario is a significant increase in employment of unskilled labour as well as real GDP. This 
result is intuitive as the subsidy is directed towards unskilled labour only (which is the factor 
that is unemployed), while the environmental tax to a large extent falls on one of the fixed 
factors, fish, without any significant negative effect on production in the model.  
A positive effect on real GDP and employment can also be achieved by reducing commodity 
taxes, as in scenarios 1 and 2. The main reason is that overall commodity prices fall, leading 
to a fall also in the cost of employing unskilled labour (as the unskilled labour wage  paid by 
firms  is tied to the CPI) and thereby an increase in employment of unskilled labour, which 
is seen in table 3 above.
70 The positive effect on GDP is larger when the tax revenues are 
recycled through cuts in all commodity taxes than when only food taxes are cut, although the 
difference is relatively small.
71  
 
The effect on real GDP in scenarios 4 and 5 is negative; in fact, the increase in direct 
governmental transfers to households does not have the positive effect on real GDP and 
employment as do indirect and direct tax cuts/subsidies. The main reason is that there is no 
direct effect on costs of production and also, more importantly, no direct effect on the 
unskilled labour wage from increasing governmental transfers. Therefore, the negative effect 
on GDP and employment resulting from increased environmental taxes is not offset by this 
recycling option. Using the tax revenues to increase governmental transfers, the structure of 
economic activity is only affected through the changes in demand patterns among household 
groups. The more the transfers are directed to rural households, the larger is the negative 
effect on employment and GDP. The reason is that when increasing the income of poor  
mainly rural, agricultural households  relatively more agricultural products and food are 
                                                 
70 The fall in overall commodity prices also affects the cost of intermediate inputs, so that the overall costs of 
production decrease, but the decrease in the unskilled labour wage is the main driving force behind the increased 
employment and production levels throughout the economy. 
71 These results can be compared to the results of the South African studies by Van Heerden et. al. (2006). In the 
South African studies, where environmental tax revenues were recycled through a food tax break, a general tax 
break on all commodities or a decrease in the factor taxes on capital and labour, the food tax break was shown to 
be the only recycling option resulting in a positive effect on GDP. One explanation as to why there seems to be 
more scope for positive GDP-effects in this study is that the tax on fish rents is non-distortionary. The reason 
why the subsidy of unskilled labour performs so well in terms of employment and GDP-effects is that the whole 
subsidy is directly directed towards the unemployed factor; in the South African study, factor taxes were equally 
reduced on capital, skilled and unskilled labour (unskilled labour only contributes about 14% to total factor 
income). The reason why a reduction of the taxes on all commodities increases GDP and employment more than 
a reduction of food taxes only, which is contrary to the case in the South African model, is that, in Namibia, food 
production is less labour intensive than, for example, the service sector. However, this might be due to the 
problem of distinguishing factor income within the agricultural sectors; see section 4.2. concerning the “mixed 
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demanded in the economy. The prices of these products increase, mobile factors like labour 
move to these more profitable sectors, and the prices of fixed factors within these sectors 
increase. At the same time, in the service sectors, there is a decrease in production along with 
the price of sector-specific factors, thus explaining the decreased factor income for 
households relying on these factors (especially richer household groups) and this is the reason 
why the total effect on demand is negative. In this specific case, as agricultural production is 
less labour intensive than the service sectors, the result of this redistribution of production is 
increased unemployment in the economy. The reason why this result holds also in the case of 
general transfers to all households is that the transfers are distributed according to the number 
of households in each group. While there is a greater number of poor households, these as a 




6.2.2. Distribution of real consumption changes among rich and poor households 
When it comes to real consumption
73 by all households, the total effect is positive for 
scenarios 1, 2 and 3, where the increase is largest in scenario 3. However, for scenarios 4 and 
5, there is a slight decrease in total real consumption of all households. Turning to the change 
in real consumption among the three poorest household groups only, it is clear that the effect 
is positive for all scenarios. If only looking at the total increase in real consumption by the 
poorest households, scenario 5 is subject to the largest increase, followed by scenarios 3, 2, 4 
and 1.  
 
However, in terms of income distribution, it might be more interesting to study how 
consumption by the three poorest household groups is changed as compared to that of richer 
households. If the richer household groups benefit as much – or relatively more – than the 
poorest groups, the current gap between the rich and the poor in Namibia would remain or 
even increase. According to the model results, it is clear that all five scenarios will actually 
decrease the current gap between rich and poor households.
74 In scenarios 4 and 5, where 
governmental direct transfers to households are increased, the differences between real 
                                                 
72 Interesting to note is that if the transfers were designed to only target rich urban households instead of all or 
only poor (rural) households, demand for services would increase in relation to agricultural and food products, 
resulting in the reverse impacts and a small positive GDP- and employment effect in the economy.  
73 Real consumption is equal to real disposable income.  
74 It is interesting to note that increased environmental taxes on fish rents, energy and water will mainly affect 
the richer household groups, thus implying that even without recycling the environmental tax revenues, a 
redistribution effect can be achieved. However, recycling of the revenues reinforces the redistribution of income 
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consumption changes for rich and poor households are most significant. In scenario 5, where 
the transfers are concentrated to the three poorest household groups only, the real 
consumption of these three household groups increases significantly while it decreases for all 
other groups. This scenario gives the most significant effect on income distribution in terms 
of decreasing the gap between rich and poor households, followed by the scenario with 
general transfers to all households. The reason why poor households benefit more than rich 
households in the transfer scenarios is that poor households constitute a significant share of 
the total number of households. As a group, poorer households will receive a greater amount 
of total transfers than richer households. The direct effect is that the poor households will use 
their transfer incomes to increase their consumption, especially of agricultural products, 
which leads to an increase in production in these sectors which, in turn, also indirectly affects 
the income of poor rural households as they are mainly employed within the agricultural 
sectors. At the same time, production decreases within service sectors and households 
depending on factor income from the sector-specific factors within these sectors (mainly 
richer households) will be subject to a loss of factor income as the prices of these factors 
decrease. This, together with a slightly increased price level throughout the economy, actually 
results in a negative effect on total real household consumption. This implies that while 
unilateral as well as targeted transfers seem to ensure that the poorest household groups will 
be better off, these benefits come at the cost of making richer households significantly less 
well off as compared to the base situation. 
 
Comparing scenarios 1 and 2, where commodity taxes are cut, the difference between the 
consumption changes of poor and rich households is greater in scenario 2, thus implying that 
by reducing the commodity sales taxes on food only, it is possible to achieve a more equal 
income distribution than in the case of general commodity sales tax cuts. In fact, scenario 2 is 
the second most redistributive scenario (after scenario 5) considering the targeting of poor 
households. However, this also comes at the cost of decreased real income for richer 
households, although not as significant as in the transfer scenarios. The mechanisms behind 
these results are a general decrease in the price level followed by increased demand and 
production levels in the economy. When only food taxes are cut, poor households benefit 
relatively more as they spend a greater share of their income on these products. This also has 
the effect of slightly redistributing the production structure in favour of agricultural products 
in relation to the service sectors. This is the reason why richer households as a group become 
worse off in scenario 2, as compared to scenario 1.   Environmental Fiscal Reform…   29
Regarding scenario 3, which gives the most significant effect on total real household 
consumption, the redistribution profile is less significant in comparison with scenarios 2, 4 
and 5. The reasons why scenarios 3 and 1 do not have a strong redistribution effect are that 
especially the household group “urban wage and salary”, which is the largest of the three 
richer household groups, benefit relatively more in scenarios 1 and 3 than in other scenarios. 
This is due to the fact that urban households demand relatively more of other commodities 
than food, thus explaining the positive effect on urban households in scenario 1 and this 
household group also owns a great deal of unskilled labour, which means that it will benefit 
significantly from increased employment of unskilled labour following from scenario 3. 
7. Conclusions 
 
The purpose of this paper was to find out whether different forms of recycling of revenues 
from environmental taxation of fish rents, energy and water could give rise to additional 
benefits in terms of GDP, employment and income distribution to the Namibian economy. 
Concerning the environmental effects, the results show that while water consumption, to a 
large extent, seems to follow the economy-wide changes in production, the consumption of 
petroleum products, and thereby CO2-emissions, decreases for all scenarios irrespective of the 
direction of the overall production level (although the decrease in CO2-emissions is low in the 
scenario where unskilled labour is subsidized). The results also show that for some of the 
recycling options, there is some scope for additional, non-environmental benefits. Therefore, 
an environmental fiscal reform should be considered as an interesting option for policymakers 
in Namibia when deciding how to ensure a more sustainable and equitable future for the 
country. However, the way in which the tax revenues should be redistributed needs to be 
carefully examined as the economy-wide effects of each recycling option will most likely 
differ.  
 
It is interesting to note that according to the results, environmental taxes might not necessarily 
be regressive in nature; the increased taxes on fish rents and energy together with decreased 
subsidies of water will mainly affect richer households. Although all recycling options 
considered in this analysis reinforce the redistribution of income in terms of reducing the gap 
between rich and poor households, the degree of this redistribution differs across recycling 
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the largest effects on real GDP and total change in real consumption by all households, this 
might not necessarily be the first choice for reducing CO2-emissions as well as reducing the 
gap between rich and poor households. Another interesting option for using the additional 
revenues to achieve both an increase in GDP and a more equal income distribution would be 
to decrease the taxes on food. The reason why this scenario performs better from the point of 
view of reducing the income gap between rich and poor households is that food constitutes a 
significant share of poor households’ total expenditures. These results provide further 
evidence of the idea that in developing countries, poverty is not only a question of 
employment: although the employment effect is roughly the same when reducing general 
commodity taxes and taxes on food only, the latter performs significantly better in targeting 
poor households. However, it is important to consider the risk of making the richer 
households significantly worse off. Furthermore, as household data in the current SAM is 
based on the income and expenditure survey from 1993/94, which is quite old and does not 
allow for a high level of disaggregation between different household groups, a more detailed 
data-set for the households would be necessary to make a more rigorous analysis of the 
poverty implications of potential environmental fiscal reforms in Namibia. Although the 
inclusion of rent taxation (which was feasible through a relatively well-developed system of 
Natural Resource Accounting in Namibia) is an important contribution of this study, further 
research should focus on the environmental effects of this kind of environmental fiscal 
reform. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   31 
Appendix A – Adjustments of the SAM-data 
Agricultural sector data 
Some necessary small adjustments in the SAM have been made for the traditional agricultural 
sector. In the original SAM, the traditional agricultural sector produces an “own” commodity 
called “traditional commodity”, which can be described as “food for own consumption”; this 
is largely cereal crop production. However, for modelling purposes, it is important that food 
produced in the traditional agricultural sector could be substituted for food purchased from 
elsewhere. Therefore, the “traditional commodity” has been redefined; it is assumed that the 
traditional sector produces crops (mainly cereals) that are replaceable either by crops 
produced elsewhere in the country or by imported crops. Some adjustments have also been 
made with regard to the distribution of factor income in the traditional agricultural sector in 
the SAM. In the traditional agricultural sector, the mixed factor category includes land rents 
and income generated by labour supplied by people informally employed in the sector. By 
recognizing the approximate number of informal workers in the subsistence agricultural 
sector (see Angula and Sherbourne 2003) together with an estimate of the mean rural informal 
wage (see Humavindu 2007), part of the total mixed income in the traditional sector can be 
transformed into factor income for unskilled workers.  For the purposes of this study (where 
any effects on the demand for unskilled labour will be important for the distribution of 
income as well as total income in the economy), this small adjustment represents a better way 
of modelling the factor income distribution in the traditional agricultural sector.  
 
Tourism data 
Due to lack of data, a full representation of tourism was not possible at the time of 
development of the SAM. Therefore, tourism is treated as a “dummy sector” in the current 
SAM, which is a way of pointing out the importance of an activity which does not correspond 
to an actual industry. This dummy sector corresponds to the total value of “the purchase of 
products in the Namibian economy by non-residents”, which was found in the national 
accounts.
75 However, in the CGE-model, activities without factor inputs are not allowed, so 
this dummy sector had to be eliminated from the original SAM for the data to fit the model. 
This was simply done by directly treating the values of purchases by foreign tourists for each 
commodity as “exports”. Due to the lack of specific data for the tourism sector, a reasonable 
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analysis of raising taxes within this industry is not feasible. In addition, in contrast to the fish 
sector data described above, there are no available estimations in the natural resource 
accounts for “rents” on wildlife. Therefore, the tourism sector is not included in the 
environmental tax reform studied in this paper.
76
 
Appendix B – Mathematical statement of the model 
Equations of the model 
Price Block 
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76 Since the tourism sector represents a significant part of the Namibian economy and since it is highly 
dependent on the quality and sustainability of wildlife, this industry is an interesting target for future 
environmental taxation. Therefore, I have simulated a variant of the model, where an approximate tax level in 
the “hotel and restaurant sector” (one important tourism sector) is introduced. However, as this extension did not 
affect the directions of any results, I decided not to include the simulation of this extended model in the paper, 
since the tourism data is not reliable. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   33
Activity revenue and costs: 
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Leontief technology: demand for aggregate value added: 
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Disaggregated intermediate input demand: 
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Commodity production and allocation:         
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Output transformation for non-exported commodities: 
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Composite supply for non-imported outputs and non-produced imports: 
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Intra-institutional transfers: 
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Investment demand: 
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Government consumption demand:  
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System constraint block 
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Current account balance for rest of the world: 
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EG  Government  expenditures  PEc  Export price (domestic currency) 
EHh   Consumption spending for  
  household h    price for activity a  
a PINTA   Aggregate intermediate input  
EXR   Exchange rate (LCU per uni
   
t of FCU)  
 
a PA Activity price   
GADJ   ncy)  Government consumption  
 adjustment  factor 
c   Import price (domestic curre PM
GOVSHR  Government share in nominal  
 absorption 
' c PQ   Composite commodity price  
INVSHR  Investment share in nominal  
 absorption 
a Value-added price (factor inco PVA  me 
  per unit of activity) 
fa QF   Quantity demanded of factor f  
from activity a 
c PX   Aggregate producer price for  
 commodity  c   
c QG ac PXAC   Producer price of commodity c
 
 Government  consumption   
  demand for com
  
modity c  for activity a 
ch QH a QA     Quantity consumed of commodity 
  c by household h 
Quantity level of activity Environmental Fiscal Reform…   38
a QINTA   c QD   Quantity of aggregate intermediate 
 input 
Quantity sold domestically of 
 domestic  output 
ca QINT   c QE Quantity of commodity c as  
  intermediate input to a
  Quantity of exports 
  ctivity a 
c QINV   Quantity of investment deman
  for commodity c 
d   pplied to  
domestic market (composite  
 
c QQ   Quantity of goods su
 
supply) 
c QM Quantity of imports   of  commodity 
 c   
c QT   Quantity of commodity c  
  demanded as trade input
' i Marginal propensity to consume 
  by household h  
MPS   c Quantity of domestic outpu
 commodity  c 
QX  t  of 
 
QXAC Quantity of outpu f YF   Income of factor f 
 
 t  of  commodity 
  c from activity a 
a QVA   Quantity of (aggregate) value added  e  YG  Government  revenu
TABS  i YI   Total nominal absorption  Income of (INSDNG) institution i 
i TINS              Direct tax for domestic non- 
 (INSDNG) 
 
Income to domestic institution i  
 
f i YIF  
governmental institution i  from factor f 
' i i T Transfers from institution i’ to  RII  
institution i’ (both in set INSDNG)     




Symbol     Explanation 
 L  et al. (2002). 
 
 
ymbol     S
Exogenou
CPI  C   index  onsumer price uantity of sup f QFS  Q plied  factor 
FSAV   Foreign savings (FCU)  Savings rate scaling factor  MPSADJ  




fa WFDIST   Wage distortion factor for fa
share  in activity a 
IADJ   GADJ Investment adjustment factor             nt      government consumption adjustme
 factor 
TINSADJ       direct scaling factor  f            After tax price of unskilled labour  WFAT
Source: Löfgren et al. (2002). 
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Appendix C: Micro and Macroeconomic Model Constraints 
vailable closures in the standard CGE-model   A
Factor Market Government Rest of World Savings-Investment
FAC-1 GOV-1 ROW-1 SI-1
Fixed factor supply; Flexible government savings; Fixed foreign savings; Fixed capital formation;
flexible wages;  fixed direct tax rates flexible real exchange rate uniform MPS point change 
mobile factors for selected institutions
FAC-2* GOV-2 ROW-2 SI-2
Flexible factor supply; Fixed government savings; Flexible foreign savings; Fixed capital formation;
fixed wages;  uniform direct tax rate, point fixed real exchange rate scaled MPS for selected
mobile factors change for selected  institutions
institutions
FAC-3 GOV-3 SI-3
Fixed factor supply; Fixed government savings; Flexible capital formation;
fixed wages; scaled direct tax rates for fixed MPS for all non-gov.
immobile factors selected institutions institutions
(activity specific)
SI-4
Fixed investment and gov. 
consumption absorption 
shares (flexible quantities);
uniform MPS point change 
for selected institutions
SI-5
Fixed investment and gov.
consumption absorption
shares (flexible quantities);
scaled MPS for selected 
institutions
* For the purpose of my model, this model has been extended from the pre-programmed case by fixing the 
post-tax-real wage  instead of the pre-tax real wage.
acroeconomic balances 
ces include balances for savings-investment, the government and 
oncerning the government balance
77, there are basically two options for closures. The first 
possible closure option for the government balance uses flexible direct tax rates and fixed 
                                                
M
The macroeconomic balan




77 which relates to equation (40) in Appendix C: YG = EG + GSAV, where YG are governmental revenues, EG 
are governmental expenditures and GSAV are governmental savings. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   40
governmental savings. The second option, which is used in this study, is one where all tax 
rates, except those changed in the fiscal reform, are fixed. In a study of tax reforms, fixed 
direct tax rates are a necessary condition as it ensures that the changes in tax levels imposed 
through the specific tax reform are the only tax changes taking place. A revenue-neutral fiscal 
reform can then be ensured by recycling exactly the amount raised from the environmentally 
motivated taxes. The level of real government consumption is exogenous. 
 
When it comes to the external balance,
78 foreign savings constitute the difference between all 
ceipts and expenditures of foreign exchange. As transfers between the rest of the world and 
closure rule must be specified for the savings-investment balance.
80 There are 
arious options for closure rules for the savings-investment balance in the IFPRI model. The 
re
domestic institutions and factors are fixed, either the real exchange rate or the current account 
deficit must be adjusted to maintain the external balance. In this model, foreign savings are 
assumed to be fixed, implying that the exchange rate is instead free to vary. This is the most 
common approach used for static CGE-models, motivated by the fact that it prevents 






main difference between the various options available is related to whether savings or 
investments should be endogenous. If savings are chosen to be endogenous, the savings rates 
of non-government institutions are adjusted to maintain the fixed level of real investment. If, 
on the other hand, investment is assumed to be endogenous, the savings-rates for all non-
government institutions are held fixed while the quantity of investment is adjusted to equal 
the level of savings. In this study, the first closure rule is used, i.e. the level of real investment 
is fixed. However, this is of minor importance for the policy reform studied in this paper: as 
the foreign savings are chosen to be fixed and a revenue-neutral fiscal reform also ensures 
                                                 
78 which relates to equation (39) in Appendix C: M + Net Transfers – X = FSAV, where M are imports, X are 
exports and FSAV are foreign savings. 
79 In this model, the export volumes might be affected by the choice of the domestic price index (DPI) as the 
numerarie. Export volumes are determined by the relative price of exports and domestic goods, and while the 
DPI is held fixed, a decrease in the domestic price of some goods will imply an increase in the domestic prices of 
other goods.  As this constraint might affect the generation of exports volumes, an explicit analysis of the effects 
on export/import ratios is avoided by choosing fixed foreign savings. Therefore, although the Namibian 
exchange rate is tied to the South African rand, and South Africa is the main trading partner, fixed foreign 
savings (and a flexible exchange rate) are chosen here. 
80 This is related to equation (42) in Appendix C and can be written: PSAV + GSAV + FSAV = INV, where PSAV 
are private savings, GSAV are governmental savings, FSAV are foreign savings and INV is investment. Environmental Fiscal Reform…   41
governmental savings to be fixed, there is no need for private savings to be adjusted in order 
to maintain the fixed level of investment. 
Appendix D – Sensitivity analysis of fish rent taxation and the inclusion of 
n approximate land rent tax, and results of other key variables
 a possibility 
at the taxable fish rent might be over-estimated. Therefore, a sensitivity analysis has been 
r the case of fish rent taxation being 50% 
a
 
Due to the uncertainty associated with the calculation of actual fish rents, there is
th
conducted concerning the size of fish rent taxation for the results of the environmental fiscal 
reform. The results from the sensitivity analysis, where the fish rent taxation is decreased to 
50 per cent, are shown in table 5 below. 
 
Table D1: Effects on target variables fo
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Effect on real GDP 0.07 0.06 0.19 -0.03 -0.04
Effect on employment for unskilled labour 0.2 0.16 0.59 -0.09 -0.12
Change in real consumption:
                  - among the poorest households 0.24 0.45 0.51 0.39 0.89
                  - among the richer households 0.08 -0.19 0.29 -0.48 -0.96
It is clear that while higher fish rent taxation allows for higher tax revenues, which increase
e possibility of achieving additional benefits through different forms of recycling, the 
analysis of land 
nt taxation in this paper, it is interesting to point out what the likely effects of such a policy 
 
th
directions of the results do not change depending on the level of fish rent capturing. In fact, 
all qualitative results presented for total rent capture still hold also in a case of 50 per cent rent 
capturing. These results are intuitive; as the model does not take entry effects into account, 
the taxation of rents, unlike the other taxes in the model, is non-distortionary. 
 
Although the lack of reliable estimates of actual land rents prevented a formal 
re
would be. A variant of the model is simulated where an approximate land rent tax of about 50 
per cent of the total mixed factor in the commercial agricultural sector (assuming that land 
constitutes half of the mixed factor) is included. The results indicate that the GDP and Environmental Fiscal Reform…   42
employment effects will not change as long as the sum of fish rent and land rent taxes is equal 
to the case of 100 per cent fish rent taxation. Concerning the distributional impacts, taxation 
of land rents in the commercial agricultural sector will have a greater impact on income 
distribution than the fish rent tax; rich households in the farming business will be 
considerably less well off as their factor income will decrease significantly when land rents 
are taxed. 
Table D2: Results of other key variables (rent taxation 100%) 
Percentage change as compared to base case Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3 Scenario 4 Scenario 5
Consumer Price Index -0.8 -1.0 1.4 0.2 0.3
Change in production of: 
 - Commercial Agriculture 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Traditional Agriculture 0.8 1.0 2.3 0.1 0.2
 - Fish 0.1 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Fish processing 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0
 - Mining 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0
 - Meat production 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Grain Milling 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
 - Beverages production 0.3 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
 - Industry  0.4 0.2 0.5 0.0 0.0
 - Construction 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
 - Water 0.2 0.3 0.7 -0.1 -0.2
 - Electricity 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0 -0.1
 - Services 0.1 0.1 0.4 0.0 -0.1
 - Hotels and Restaurants 0.5 0.2 0.8 -0.3 -0.5
 - Transport 0.4 0.1 1.3 -0.2 -0.4
 - Government services 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0
Change in real factor income (to households):
 - Mixed factor commercial agriculture 1.8 2.8 0.6 0.2 0.4
 - Mixed factor traditional agriculture 2.3 3.8 4.2 0.0 0.1
 - Skilled Labour 1.5 1.1 -0.9 -0.2 -0.4
 - Unskilled Labour 0.5 0.4 1.1 -0.1 -0.2
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A NET BACK VALUATION OF IRRIGATION WATER IN 
THE HARDAP REGION IN NAMIBIA 
 






Namibia is currently in the process of phasing out water subsidies in its government-
sponsored irrigation schemes. However, the financial effects on the affected farmers are 
frequently unclear, and so are the economic effects on society as a whole. The net back 
method provides a framework for estimating rough values of irrigation water in 
situations such as those in Namibian agriculture, where farmers face a number of 
constraints which are difficult to model explicitly due to the dearth of reliable data. 
 
We apply the net back method to estimate the value of irrigation water used for 
different crop alternatives in the Hardap region in southern Namibia. We find that all 
the crop alternatives, which farmers in the region currently choose between, will 
remain financially viable after the increases in user charges which are envisaged in the 
near future. However, substantial shifts in agricultural production will become 
necessary once the long term cost recovery policies are in place in the water sector. We 
also extend the net back framework in order to study potential effects of further 
increases in water user charges, which may become necessary in future as the water 




In Namibia, as in many other countries in southern Africa, water use has 
grown rapidly over the past 25 years, and there is concern that potential water 
sources are running short. Consequently, water management policy is 
becoming a critical component of Namibia’s development strategy. Until 
recently the government has mainly emphasised the importance of increased 
supply of water, but with the realisation of water as a finite resource, the focus 
is now on the demand side of water management. This means that different 
demand-side policies, for example water pricing and investments in advanced 
technologies, are used in order to achieve a decreased demand for water. As 
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the competition for water will intensify further in the future, it is essential to 
examine the current situation of water use and the influence of different 
policies on water demand. The design of sustainable development policies 
requires an understanding of the full social value of water (Lange, 1998). 
 
The most water intensive sector in Namibia is agriculture, where irrigated 
crop production uses twice as much water as livestock agriculture. Irrigation 
water has been heavily subsidised historically, and those farmers who are 
supplied through government irrigation schemes do not pay the full financial 
cost of supplying water. However, the government is planning to raise the 
user charges for irrigation water in the near future, with the goal of full cost 
recovery. The problem is that currently farmers are mainly growing low-value 
crops under inefficient irrigation systems, and therefore may not be able to 
bear the full cost of water. A change of the production into more high-value 
crops and more efficient irrigation methods may be necessary if the farmers 
are to be able to pay the new, higher user charges. 
 
Obviously, it is necessary to have some idea of how changes in water user 
charges will affect crop patterns and, hence, water demand. However, as in 
many African countries, there are a number of constraints affecting farmers’ 
decisions – limited access to capital markets, information costs for establishing 
new middleman relationships in order to market new crops, and so on – and 
it is frequently difficult to find the economic data which would be needed if 
one were to include these constraints in sophisticated modelling frameworks. 
Empirical studies of water needs in Namibian agriculture have therefore often 
used the net back technique, a version of the residual imputation approach 
which relaxes some of the more restrictive assumptions in that method but 
which can still provide rough estimates of the values of irrigation water in 
different potential uses (Lindgren, 1999; Brunnström & Strömberg, 2000; 
Lange et al, 2001). 
 
This study applies the net back technique to study crop patterns and the value 
of irrigation water in the Hardap region in southern Namibia. However, we 
extend the technique slightly in order to estimate an upper bound for the 
demand for irrigation water at different water user charges. A detailed 
prediction of the exact amount of water which will be demanded at different 
user charges is not possible to make, using the information provided by the 
net back method, but an upper bound for water demand at different user 
charges is nonetheless useful for planning, for instance, investments in water 
supply facilities. This slight modification of the net back method can thereby, 
hopefully, provide a useful planning tool. 






The  residual imputation method is one of the most frequently used 
approaches for determining shadow prices for irrigation water. The method 
measures the value of an input used to produce intermediate goods. If 
appropriate prices are assigned by market forces to all inputs but one, the 
remainder of total product is imputed to the remaining or residual input. By 
subtracting all costs of production but one from the total value of output, the 
approach approximates the value of the marginal product of a productive 
input, such as water. The remaining, or residual, value is assigned to the non 
priced input (Young, 1996). 
 
Two conditions need to be fulfilled to derive the residual function. First, the 
competitive equilibrium requires that the prices of the inputs are equated to 
returns at the margin. It is assumed that profit maximising producers add 
productive inputs until the value of marginal products are equal to the 
opportunity costs of inputs; however, where credit markets are not 
functioning well, or where retraining in order to grow new crops is not 
readily available, the opportunity costs of physical and human capital may 
not correspond closely to the market prices (if any) for these inputs. 
 
The second requirement is that the total value of production can be divided 
into shares so that each factor, except the unpriced one, is paid according to its 
marginal productivity, and that thereby the total value of the production is 
completely exhausted; this will only be the case if constant returns to scale 
apply (Debertin, 1986). The residual imputation method is highly sensitive to 
these restrictive assumptions and, if they are not fully met, will produce 
misleading shadow prices for water. 
 
The residual method has been used in a survey at the Stampriet Aquifer in 
Namibia to estimate the value of water for an average farm (Lindgren, 1999). 
However, a subsequent study in the same area (Lange et al, 2001) found 
results which indicated that the assumption of constant returns to scale did 
not hold. Moreover, given that very little retraining is available for active 
farmers in Namibia, wishing to change to new production alternatives, and 
given that interest rates on loans to farming are high and variable – where 
loans are available at all – the assumptions of clearing markets in physical and 
human capital do not necessarily hold and are, in any case, difficult to model. 
 
The net back method (Bate & Dubourg, 1997) is closely reminiscent of residual 
imputation, but relaxes the restrictive assumptions in the residual imputation 




agriculture (Brunnström & Strömberg, 2000; Lange et al, 2001) as well as in 
South African agriculture (Tren, 1997). If we consider a farm abstracting water 
in a region where water is a scarce resource, and cannot be supplied 
costlessly, a simple net back model of the water use for growing a specific 
crop can be written as N = (P * Q) - C, where P represents the price of the crop, 
Q is the quantity produced of that crop and C represents the total non-water 
costs of producing the quantity Q. This model is applied for each crop 
separately. 
 
The net back for a given crop reflects the farmer’s maximum ability to pay for 
water (MATP), and is represented by N in the equation above. This value of 
MATP is the maximum amount a farmer could possibly pay for the water 
used to grow a crop, with the crop still remaining financially viable. While the 
residual imputation method assumes that the shadow price calculated in this 
fashion provides a correct marginal valuation of the water used, the net back 
approach acknowledges that the correct marginal value – and hence the 
willingness to pay – for the last unit of water may be lower than the MATP, 
for instance because of omission or underestimation of the shadow price of 
some production factor. 
 
In our study we have calculated the farmers’ MATP/m3 for irrigation water 
when growing different crop alternatives under different irrigation 
techniques. These values can then be compared to the current tariff for 
irrigation water and also to the total cost for water supply (water, 
maintenance, all capital costs and flood damage), to see what user charge the 
farmers would be able to pay, while still remaining profitable. 
 
The demand for water is affected by which crops are grown and by what 
irrigation method the farmers use. Therefore the demand for irrigation water 
can be decreased if the farmers choose to change the production from a low-
value alternative that gives a low MATP/m3 to a higher-value alternative 
with a higher MATP/m3. An outer bound for the demand curve for water can 
be determined by assuming that farmers will change their production 
alternative if a higher user charge makes their current alternative 
unprofitable. The change in production can be attained through a raise in the 
user charge for irrigation water. 
 
The demand curve thus estimated only shows the farmers’ maximum ability to 
pay and thereby the maximum total demand for water, based on current 
production patterns in the region, and cannot predict the farmers’ real 
behaviour and reactions to a raised user charge for water. Farmers may 




other production alternatives than the ones currently grown. Consequently, 
the demand for water at a specific user charge may be less than what is 
indicated by our calculations; the relationship between actual demand and 
estimated demand is illustrated schematically in Figure 1, where the 
horizontal shifts in the estimated demand curve occur at those water user 
charges where some crop alternative becomes unprofitable and has to be 
replaced by some other crop alternative. Actual demand at a specific user 
charge is thus likely to be less than the demand estimated through our 
method. Nonetheless, for planning purposes it is of considerable interest to be 
able to predict the maximum demand for irrigation water at different user 
charges, even if actual demand falls short of this predicted amount. 
 
Water user 












Figure  1: The approximate relationship between the actual demand for 




The Hardap dam is the largest state water dam in Namibia and is situated in 
the Fish River catchment approximately 250 km south of the capital, 




an assured water supply for the town of Mariental and the Hardap irrigation 
scheme. The main reasons for the dam’s location are the suitable topography 
in this area for the construction of a dam and the good soil for a large scale 
irrigation scheme. The Fish River catchment area flowing into the dam covers 
an area of 13 600 km2 and stretches from the Hakos Mountains in the north-
west, to just north of Maltahöhe in the south-west. The storage capacity of the 
dam was calculated in 1992 to 294 593 000 m3. The dam generally reaches its 
full capacity during February, but depending on rainfall this can be delayed 
until as late as mid April. Rainfall data have been recorded in this part of the 
country from the year 1913, and the yearly average rainfall of the catchment 
varies from 180 mm in the northwest to 209 mm in the southeast. The 
vegetation type in the area is typical for the dry expanses of the southern parts 
of the country, namely dwarf shrub savannah vegetation. 
 
In the years 1963 – 1964, shortly after the Hardap dam was completed, the 
irrigation scheme was established. Water is bought from the water parastatal, 
Namwater, by the Ministry of Agriculture, Water and Rural Development 
(MAWRD), which in turn distributes the water to the farmers in the scheme; 
there are currently 32 commercial farmers benefiting from the scheme. The 
irrigated area also includes the Hardap Research Station, which consists of 
governmental experimental farms with an area of 135,40 ha, and a 20 ha plot 
farmed by the Mariental prison. Apart from the irrigation scheme, Namwater 
also supplies water from the dam to the local population and to a tourist camp 
located in the Hardap dam National Park (Muduva & Williams, 2001). 
 
Wheat, maize, and cotton are annual crops, which means that they are 
replanted each year. As some of the crops have their growing season in the 
winter period, and others during the summer, it is possible to combine two 
crops on the same land area during a year. The growing season for wheat in 
this area lasts from May or June until December, while for maize and cotton 
the season lasts approximately from December or January until June. Lucerne 
and grapes are so called permanent crops, i.e. their lifecycles stretch over 
periods of several years – lucerne has to be replanted every five years while 
grapes are replanted approximately every 25 years. Wheat and maize are 
grown in combination on approximately 1000 ha, wheat and cotton in 
combination on about 100 ha, lucerne on 800 ha, and grapes on 250 ha. 
 
Most of the irrigation at the Hardap scheme is gravity fed surface irrigation, 
mainly flood irrigation. Other irrigation systems are used only on a small 
scale; the main alternative method is micro or drip irrigation, which is used 
for grape production. The irrigation techniques have varying degrees of 




Table 1:  Irrigation system efficiency 
 
 Irrigation System  Efficiency % 
 Surface systems (flood)  50 
 Sprinkler  70 
 Centre Pivot  80 
 Micro  85 
 Drip  85 
Source: Siegfried Engels, personal communication. 
 
Combining these figures with the different crops’ annual net water 
requirements gives the gross water requirements listed in Table 2. 
 
Table  2: Net and gross water requirements for different crops and 
irrigation systems 
 
   Wheat  Maize  Cotton  Lucerne  Grapes 
Net water req.       
m3/ha/annum  5974 12415 8000 22716  15100 
Gross water req.       
m3/ha/annum       
Flood 11948  24829  16000  45432  25167 
Sprinkler  8534  17735 11429 32451 21571 
Centre pivot  7468  15518  10000  28395  18875 
Micro/drip 7028  14605  9412  26725  17765 
Sources:  Siegfried Engels and Francois Wahl, personal communication, and calculations based on 
Table 1. 
 
In Hardap, water for irrigation is distributed through a system of lined canals, 
but also through buried pipelines, to 114 individual offtakes on the east and 
west banks of the Fish River. Farms are grouped close together on both sides 
of the river so as to make the water distribution more effective. The water 
consumption at the scheme depends on the growing seasons and the stages of 
the growth of the crops. Consumption is measured by water meters at each 
individual offtake. As the old meters do not function properly, it is important 
to be aware of the fact that it is very difficult to get reliable figures for the 
actual water consumption; both our calculations, and the billing from 
MAWRD, are therefore based on estimates of water use rather than on the 
actual figures. Improved water meters are currently being tested by 





In 1993, the average subsidy to users of government water supply in Namibia 
was 71% of total costs. Commercial crop farmers were the most heavily 
subsidised, on average paying only about 4% of total costs (Lange, 1998). The 
farmers in Hardap pay N$  0,02147/m3 of water to MAWRD’s Mariental 
office2, whereas Namwater charges MAWRD N$ 0,03/m3. In the near future 
the water tariffs charged to farmers will increase to N$ 0,03/m3 so that the 
actual cost of water from Namwater is covered. This will still not cover 
MAWRD’s costs for the scheme which, including water, maintenance, all 
capital works (new pipelines, reed spraying, etc.) and flood damage, are 
estimated to be approximately N$ 0,109/m3 (Engels, personal 
communication). The user charge for water will increase further over time, in 
order to compensate for these costs. In future, as water demand from other 
sectors and regions increases, Namwater may increase water user charges 
further and MAWRD will then, presumably, have to pass these increased 
costs on to the farmers. The exact increases in user charges are of course 
difficult to predict, but this nonetheless means that it is necessary to have an 




A survey was carried out among some of the farmers in the Hardap region 
with help from people at the MAWRD and at the Ministry of Environment 
and Tourism – Directorate of Environmental Affairs (DEA). The questionnaire 
dealt with questions about the land use on the farm, irrigation technology, 
and incomes and costs connected to each crop grown. In many cases, farmers 
did not know the exact figures for their incomes and costs but were able to 
provide estimates. This was combined with information from Arnold Klein, 
manager of the Hardap co-operation, from Francois Wahl, who had made a 
survey in the region a few years earlier, as well as from Siegfried Engels, 
engineer at the MAWRD and stationed at the Hardap scheme. All figures 
were recalculated into real values with the year 2000 as base year. 
 
The farmers had some difficulties separating the capital costs between their 
different crops. Therefore, the capital cost for each crop alternative grown at 
the farm was calculated with concern to the percentage share of the total ha 
under irrigation. However, refrigeration was only used for growing grapes 
and the capital costs for refrigeration could therefore be entirely allocated to 
                                                 




this crop. All capital costs, as well as revenue from multi-year crops, were 
recalculated into annualised values using a discount rate of 8%. 
 
Centre pivot irrigation has relatively low investment costs compared to the 
other irrigation techniques. However, this irrigation method has high 
operating costs, and no local data on these costs were available. Including 
only the low investment costs, but not the high operating costs, would have 
made this technique seem more attractive than it really is. We therefore used 
estimates of operating costs for centre pivot irrigation for similar farms in 
South Africa (Meiring & Oosthuizen, 1991), with the cost estimates 
recalculated into current prices. 
 
In order to compare financial and economic results for the different crop 
alternatives, shadow prices were applied (Barnes, 1994). The social costs for 
unskilled labour were valued at 35% of their financial value, reflecting the 
high unemployment in Namibia. All tax-inclusive prices were adjusted 
downwards by a flat 11% rate except fuel costs, where taxes are assumed to 
internalise externalities and hence reflect the fuel’s social costs. Concerning 
subsidies, no adjustments were necessary in our calculations as water is the 
only input in agriculture that is still subsidised. A foreign exchange premium 
of 12% was used to calculate the economic values of tradable goods. 
 
When the values of MATP/m3 had been calculated for each crop grown, these 
values were used to estimate a demand curve for irrigation water. As this 
curve is intended to show which production alternatives the farmers have, the 
financial values for MATP/m3 were used. The fact that some of the crops can 
be grown on the same land at different seasons of the year, like for example 
wheat and maize, means that these crops together can be seen as one 
production alternative. Due to this an MATP/m3 is calculated for these two 
crops jointly, in order to get a value based on a one year period. The same 
reasoning also applies for the alternative of growing wheat and cotton. The 
relevant alternatives for the construction of the demand curve are; lucerne, 
wheat plus maize, and wheat plus cotton, grown under flood irrigation, and 




The survey information on incomes and costs for the different crops grown 
was used to calculate the MATP/m3 for each crop alternative under each 
irrigation technology. In the tables, micro and drip irrigation are placed in the 
same column because the equal investment costs and efficiency rates for these 





The least valuable crop, lucerne, has a financial MATP/m3 of N$ 0,103 under 
flood irrigation (Table 3). This implies that lucerne will still be financially 
viable after the user charge for irrigation water is raised to N$ 0,03/m3, the 
raise currently envisaged. However, if the full supply cost for the irrigation 
scheme were taken into account, so that the user charge were raised to N$ 
0,109/m3, lucerne would no longer be financially viable with any of the 
available irrigation methods and would thus be replaced by other crops. 
 
Table 3:  Financial and economic values for Lucerne 
 
AVERAGE FINANCIAL VALUES        
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income (N$/ha)  12276 12276  12276  12276 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  5469 5469  7803  5469 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  6807 6807  4474  6807 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  2149 3846  3186  4318 
MATP (N$/ha)  4659  2961  1287  2490 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  45432 32451  28395  26725 
Gross income (N$/m3)  0,270 0,378  0,432  0,459 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  0,150 0,210  0,158  0,255 
MATP (N$/m3)  0,103  0,091  0,045  0,093 
AVERAGE ECONOMIC VALUES        
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income (N$/ha)  12237 12237  12237  12237 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  4976 4976  7305  4976 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  7261 7261  4932  7261 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  2139 3831  3173  4301 
MATP (N$/ha)  5123  3431  1759  2961 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  45432 32451  28395  26725 
Gross income (N$/m3)  0,269 0,377  0,431  0,458 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  0,160 0,224  0,174  0,272 
MATP (N$/m3)  0,113  0,106  0,062  0,111 
 
The economic value of lucerne production is calculated as N$ 0,113 per m3. 
The slightly higher economic value is largely due to the social cost of the 
employed unskilled labour being lower than the financial cost for this labour. 
It deserves to be noted that the economic value of the lucerne production per 
m3 is actually higher than the full supply cost for the water, and that even 
though lucerne production would no longer be financially viable under full 
cost recovery, it might still be economically justified as being preferable to 
having no production at all. However, as shown below, all other crop 
alternatives have higher economic values per m3 than lucerne does, so a shift 




Maize is a typical low-value crop and is grown by a majority of the farmers at 
the Hardap scheme. The crop is relatively water intensive. Due to this, the 
combination of wheat and maize, grown under flood irrigation, is only 
slightly more profitable than lucerne in terms of N$ per m3 of water (Table 4). 
The financial MATP/m3 for this crop alternative is slightly less than the full 
supply cost, so that this alternative would also become unprofitable if 
MAWRD were to raise user charges in order to recover its provision costs. 
Lucerne and the combination of wheat and maize are currently the two 
dominant production alternatives in the area, so the implementation of full cost 
recovery pricing will lead to important shifts in production in the long term. 
 
Table 4:  Financial and economic values for wheat and maize 
 
AVERAGE FINANCIAL VALUES       
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income from wheat (N$/ha)  7913 7913 7913  7913 
Gross income from maize (N$/ha)  7587 7587 7587  7587 
Gross income (N$/ha)  15500 15500 15500  15500 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  8428 8428  10317  8428 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  7073 7073 5184  7073 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  3126 4824 4163  5295 
MATP (N$/ha)  3947  2249  1020  1778 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  36777 26269 22986  21634 
Gross income (N$/m3)  0,421 0,590 0,674  0,716 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  0,192 0,269 0,226  0,327 
MATP (N$/m3)  0,107  0,086  0,044  0,082 
AVERAGE ECONOMIC VALUES       
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income from wheat (N$/ha)  7888 7888 7888  7888 
Gross income from maize (N$/ha)  7563 7563 7563  7563 
Gross income (N$/ha)  15451 15451 15451  15451 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  8199 8199  10084  8199 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  7252 7252 5366  7252 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  2926 4618 3960  5088 
MATP (N$/ha)  4326  2633  1406  2163 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  36777 26269 22986  21634 
Gross income (N$/m3)  0,420 0,588 0,672  0,714 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  0,197 0,276 0,233  0,335 
MATP (N$/m3)  0,118  0,100  0,061  0,100 
 
In the same fashion as for lucerne, the economic value per m3 of producing 
wheat and maize is slightly higher than the financial value because the 
opportunity cost of farm labour is less than the financial cost. Therefore, just 




not utilising the water at all. Again, however, there are production 
alternatives which are economically preferable to growing wheat and maize. 
  
Cotton is sometimes grown on the same land as wheat, instead of maize, 
during the other half of the year, and uses less water per hectare than maize 
does. Cotton prices are more volatile than maize prices, but the average price 
is higher. The combination of wheat and cotton, grown under flood irrigation, 
therefore has a higher MATP per m3 (Table 5). This alternative would remain 
financially viable even if MAWRD were to raise its user charges to the cost 
recovery level. Cotton is a more labour intensive crop than lucerne, wheat or 
maize, so that the economic value per m3 for this crop alternative is 
substantially higher than the financial value. The water savings and low 
opportunity cost of labour, taken together, mean that it would be 
economically (though not financially) attractive to switch from flood irrigation 
to micro or drip irrigation for this crop alternative. 
 
Table 5:  Financial and economic values for wheat and cotton 
 
AVERAGE FINANCIAL VALUES      
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income from wheat (N$/ha)  7913 7913 7913 7913 
Gross income from cotton (N$/ha)  9828 9828 9828 9828 
Gross income (N$/ha)  17741 17741 17741 17741 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  10279 10279 11714 10279 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  7462 7462 6027 7462 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  3198 4895 4235 5367 
MATP (N$/ha)  4265  2567  1792  2095 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  27948 19963 17468 16440 
Gross income (N$/m3)  0,635 0,889 1,016 1,079 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  0,267 0,374 0,345 0,454 
MATP (N$/m3)  0,153  0,129  0,103  0,127 
AVERAGE ECONOMIC VALUES      
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income from wheat (N$/ha)  7888 7888 7888 7888 
Gross income from cotton (N$/ha)  9797 9797 9797 9797 
Gross income (N$/ha)  17684 17684 17684 17684 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  8806 8806 10239  8806 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  8878 8878 7445 8878 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  3180 4872 4214 5342 
MATP (N$/ha)  5698  4006  3231  3536 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  27948 19963 17468 16440 
Gross income (N$/m3)  0,633 0,886 1,012 1,076 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  0,318 0,445 0,426 0,540 




Grapes are a high-value crop and far more profitable, both financially and 
economically, than the low-value crops discussed earlier. In recent years, 
some of the farmers in the area have realised this fact and started to grow 
grapes. However, due to the high investment costs and the loss of income 
during the first three years of the lifecycle, it is not yet a very common crop in 
the area. The water requirements for grapes are low compared to other crops 
grown in the area, and as grapes are a high-value crop the water requirements 
can be further decreased by profitable investments in more technically 
advanced irrigation systems. 
 
The annualised financial values for MATP/m3 are considerably higher for 
grapes than for any of the other production alternatives (Table 6). This is due 
to the high export prices for grapes, which in the long run outweigh the 
relatively high investment costs and the first three years’ loss of income. It can 
be seen that investments in more technically advanced irrigation methods 
give a higher MATP/m3 than the low-technology method of flood irrigation. 
Micro or drip irrigation, which have the highest investment costs but are also 
the most water efficient methods, give the highest MATP/m3 of N$ 1,318. 
 
Table 6:  Financial and economic values for grapes 
 
AVERAGE FINANCIAL VALUES        
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income (N$/ha)  74856 74856  74856  74856 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  36452 36452  38003  36452 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  38404 38404  36853  38404 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  12821 14518  13858  14990 
MATP (N$/ha)  25584  23886  22995  23415 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  25167 21571  18875  17765 
Gross income (N$/m3)  2,974 3,470  3,966  4,214 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  1,526 1,780  1,952  2,162 
MATP (N$/m3)  1,017  1,107  1,218  1,318 
AVERAGE ECONOMIC VALUES        
Irrigation methods  Flood  Sprinkler  Centre pivot  Micro/drip 
Gross income (N$/ha)  74616 74616  74616  74616 
Variable costs (N$/ha)  27418 27418  28966  27418 
Gross margin (N$/ha)  47199 47199  45650  47199 
Fixed and capital costs (N$/ha)  12786 14478  13820  14948 
MATP (N$/ha)  34413  32721  31831  32251 
Water requirements (m3/ha)  25167 21571  18875  17765 
Gross income (N$/m3)  2,965 3,459  3,953  4,200 
Gross margin (N$/m3)  1,875 2,188  2,419  2,657 




There is a substantial difference between the financial and economic values 
for MATP/m3. As for cotton, this is due to the unskilled labour intensive 
production. Because of this, it is even more economically profitable to grow 
grapes from society’s point of view than it is for the individual farmer. 
 
In Figure 2, the great differences in MATP/m3 between grapes and the other 
alternatives can be seen clearly. The economic values are consistently higher 
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Figure 2:  MATP/m3 for different crop and irrigation alternatives 
 
As discussed previously, the financial values per m3 of water for different 
crop alternatives can be used to determine an outer bound for the demand for 
water at different user charges. This estimated demand curve for irrigation 
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Figure 3:  Maximum water demand at different user charge levels 
 
The vertical intervals on the demand curve represent the present crop 
alternatives grown under current irrigation techniques (A); present crop 
alternatives grown under current irrigation techniques, but with lucerne 
replaced by wheat and maize (B); present crop alternatives grown under 
current irrigation techniques, but with lucerne and the combination of wheat 
and maize replaced by the combination of wheat and cotton (C); lucerne, 
wheat, maize and cotton replaced by grapes grown under flood irrigation (D); 
all flood irrigated crops replaced by grapes grown under sprinkler irrigation 
(E); all flood irrigated crops replaced by grapes grown under centre pivot 
irrigation (F); and, finally, grapes grown under micro or drip irrigation 
everywhere (G). 
 
It is possible that once improved water meters are in place, and once the first 
round of user charge raises have been carried out, farmers will become more 
conscious of their water use and start switching to less water intensive 




happen. All the current crop alternatives will still be financially viable after 
the user charge has been raised to N$ 0,03/m3, so farmers will not be forced to 
change their production. Total water use may therefore remain at the current 
levels. However, if MAWRD raises its water user charge to N$ 0,109/m3, the 
level needed for full recovery of its supply costs, lucerne and maize will cease 
being financially viable and water demand will decrease by (at least) a 
quarter. If farmers switch to grapes, rather than combined wheat and cotton 
production, water demand will decrease even further. Once production has 
shifted to grapes (which would have to take place if the user charge were 
raised over N$ 0,153) farms can bear substantially higher user charges for 
their irrigation water without having to change their production again. If 
farmers were to switch to grapes grown under micro or drip irrigation, water 
use would be reduced by over half and user charges could potentially be 
raised to over N$ 1,3. 
 
As already mentioned, it is important to bear in mind that our demand curve 
only shows the upper limit of water consumption at different user charge 
levels. This means that the real demand for water at a specific user charge 
level cannot be predicted, as this will in the end depend on farmers’ 
behaviour and reactions to a raised user charge. A raise in the user charge for 
water may cause a change into a more water efficient production alternative 





The envisaged short-term increase in user charges for irrigation water in the 
Hardap area, from N$ 0,02147/m3 to N$ 0,03/m3, will not necessarily have 
any effect at all on farming. All the crops currently grown in the area will 
remain financially viable after this increase. However, it is thought-provoking 
that neither of the two production alternatives which are currently favoured 
by most farmers, lucerne and combined production of wheat and maize, 
would remain profitable if farmers were charged user charges sufficiently 
high to recover the supply costs of water. Since the long-term intention is to 
raise user charges to at least this level, it appears that agricultural production 
in the area is likely to change substantially. 
 
This raises important issues. Some farmers in the region have started growing 
grapes, a crop which uses considerably less water per hectare, and it is highly 
desirable that more farmers switch to this crop; grape production would 
increase farm profitability, reduce water use, and create new employment for 




from changing their production, but are concerned about the investment costs 
and high initial losses. They do not have easy access to credit for investing in 
new production, especially not if they will have to manage without revenue 
during the first three year period. Moreover, some farmers are concerned 
because grapes are perceived as being more difficult to grow than lucerne or 
maize. 
 
Obviously, if water user charges are raised to the point where none of the 
current low-value crops remain financially viable, the current farmers will 
either change their production or be replaced by other farmers who do. 
However, it is likely that this would be a highly disruptive process. If the 
government were to provide state-guaranteed loans and/or training for those 
farmers who wish to start growing grapes, a substantial decrease in water use 
could probably be achieved rapidly and with considerably less disruption. 
Such a policy could be justified by the high potential for employment 
generation. The unskilled farm labour used in grape production will in all 
likelihood be unemployed otherwise, which means that in the long term 
grape production is even more profitable for society as a whole than for the 
individual farmer. 
 
Our paper extends the net back methodology slightly in order to estimate the 
maximum demand for irrigation water at different user charges. As pointed 
out elsewhere in the paper, agricultural water demand at a given user charge 
may be lower than what our demand curve suggests. Nonetheless, this 
method can still provide useful information. Policy makers in the water sector 
in Namibia and elsewhere are frequently in a situation where, unlike previous 
investments, future investments or reinvestments in water supply schemes 
are expected to be paid for by the beneficiaries of these schemes, through 
increased user charges. However, if these higher user charges will lead to 
drastic decreases in water demand – as seems likely in Hardap, and probably 
in many other irrigation schemes – this should be taken into account before 
the decisions on investments or reinvestments are made. Being able to predict 
what the maximum demand for water will be, at a given user charge, can thus 
help policy makers to avoid investing in supply schemes that nobody will 
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Abstract
The recent increases in international food and oil prices have raised concerns about how these 
exogenous shocks will affect the economic activity as well as poverty in developing countries. 
In this paper, the effects of international food and oil price increases on the Namibian 
economy are studied by means of a Computable General Equilibrium model. As a corn and 
oil importing Sub-Saharan African country, Namibia is among the countries considered to be 
particularly vulnerable to these price shocks. Besides, since Namibia is also one of the driest 
Sub-Saharan countries, the role of water scarcity is explicitly addressed in this particular 
context. The results show that the Namibian economy will be negatively affected by the food 
and oil price increases. In the case where the supply of water is assumed to be constant, it is 
shown that there will be even less ability to adapt for the economy, thus resulting in a more 
significant decrease in GDP than in the case where additional water sources are assumed to be 
available.
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1. Introduction
The recent increases in global food and oil prices have raised concerns about how such 
external shocks will affect developing countries, both in terms of overall economic activity 
and poverty.
1 The rising food prices have become one of the most important questions on the 
World Bank agenda, where the recent price increases are referred to as “the current food 
crisis”. There is concern that this current food crisis might threaten the possibility of reaching 
the Millennium Development Goal that calls for halving the share of people suffering from 
extreme poverty and hunger by the year 2015.
2 The reason is that while net-food-exporting 
countries will most likely benefit from higher world market prices, for net-food-importing 
countries, which are often poor countries, the negative impacts of higher world market prices 
of food might outweigh the positive effect on agricultural production. Further, while the 
increased profitability of agricultural activities following from higher world market prices of 
food might create a chance for many developing countries of expanding and improving the 
effectiveness of their agricultural production, a conceivable constraint for agricultural 
expansion might be the rising world market prices of crude oil and petroleum products which 
are currently taking place along with the food price increases.
3 In oil-importing countries, the 
negative effects on overall economic activity of the oil-price increases might be significant
4
and these price increases might have an offsetting effect on the potential growth of the 
agricultural sectors, depending on how petroleum-intensive agricultural production is in 
relation to other economic activities.  
The expected growth of agricultural production in many developing countries also raises 
further concerns about the sustainability of natural resources; in particular water resources. In 
developing countries, the agricultural sector’s share of total national water consumption is 
often substantial and in water scarce regions, such as for example Sub-Saharan Africa, further 
agricultural expansion might lead to the depletion of water resources.
5 In other words, water 
1 A recent working paper on the likely responses of higher food and oil prices was prepared by the World Bank 
to be discussed by the world leaders at the G8 summit meeting held in Japan in July 2008; see World Bank 
(2008a). 
2 See World Bank (2008b). 
3 See World Bank (2008a).  
4 In an analysis of the global impacts of high oil prices, made by the International Energy Agency (IEA) 2004, 
Sub-Saharan African oil-importing countries are singled out as being particularly vulnerable to international oil 
price increases. 
5 See Von Braun et al. (2008).  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 2
scarcity might be an important constraint to the possibilities for agricultural sector growth in 
many poor countries.  
In this paper, the likely economy-wide impacts of the recently observed increases in world 
market prices of food and oil on the Namibian economy are analysed by means of a 
Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model. Since Namibia is a dry country, special focus 
is given to the importance of water scarcity for agricultural sector growth and thereby, the 
possibility for the economy of adapting to the exogenous world market price changes. The 
importance of water scarcity is analysed by comparing the outcome in the case where 
additional water resources are assumed to be available to the case where total water supply is 
assumed to be constant. 
As the economy-wide effects of food- and oil price increases, respectively, will most likely 
differ, a general equilibrium analysis is particularly useful for analysing the effects of both 
price shocks in combination. Besides, the use of a CGE model, in combination with 
disaggregated household data, also allows for a household level impact analysis. In terms of 
poverty impacts, food prices are in general considered to be of greater concern than oil prices 
since food constitutes a larger share of the expenditures of poor households.
6 Existing 
analyses show that the poverty impacts of rising food prices are likely to be diverse; while the 
poorest people in general spend a larger share of their total income on food, farm households, 
which are often among the poorest groups in low-income countries, may experience a rise in 
income when there is an increase in commodity prices.
7 Although several studies show that 
the overall impact of higher food prices on poverty is generally negative
8, there is need for a 
careful examination at the household level, also including indirect effects, in order to examine 
whether changes in prices of food will benefit or harm the poor people in a specific region.
9
6 While rising oil and petroleum prices will also have negative effects on household welfare, oil price increases 
are, in general, likely to mainly affect richer household groups. See World Bank (2008a). 
7 See, for example, Hertel (2006). 
8 Several studies have shown that, in general,  there are more net food buyers than sellers among the poor. See, 
for example, Jayne et al. (2000), Warr (2005) and Byerlee et al. (2006).  
9 Despite a widespread concern about the likely negative impacts of higher food prices on poor people, little hard 
information appears to be available on actual impacts on poor people. Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008) suggest 
the need for a re-evaluation of the consensus on the adverse impact of food prices on poverty; further work on 
regional differences and second-order effects is necessary to answer these questions more exactly. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 3
In previous CGE-based literature, the impacts of food and oil price shocks on developing 
countries are in general studied separately.
10 However, as many countries are actually facing 
both higher world market prices of food and oil at the same time, it is highly motivated to 
study these price increases in combination. Further, the existing literature on general 
equilibrium aspects of food price changes mainly focuses on specific national trade 
liberalisation policies and can therefore not provide any general conclusion about the likely 
impacts in developing countries in general, or Namibia in particular, of the recently observed 
increases in the world market prices of several food products.
11 The few recent studies more 
explicitly focusing on the currently observed international food price increases are, in general, 
partial equilibrium analyses.
12 Therefore, this paper contributes to the previous literature both 
by studying the general equilibrium effects of the currently observed international food price 
increases, and also taking into account the increase in oil prices which is currently taking 
place along with the food price increases.  
Although the potential environmental impacts of expanded agricultural production are often 
mentioned in previous studies of food price changes, the magnitude of these impacts is 
generally not further analysed.
13 For that reason, the third important contribution of this paper 
is that the importance of water scarcity is explicitly added to the CGE-analysis. This is one of 
few studies in developing countries where water is explicitly studied in a general equilibrium 
framework. Besides, to my knowledge, it is the first study that analyses water scarcity in the 
context of increased food and oil prices. In the recent literature, where general equilibrium 
approaches are used for analysing water supply and demand, the way in which water is 
included in the analysis can be divided into two categories; it is either explicitly included as a 
factor of production
14 or it is approximated by, for example, agricultural productivity.
15 This 
analysis falls into the first category by including water as a factor in the production process. 
10 For general equilibrium analyses of food price changes, the literature on trade policy can provide some 
examples, see e.g. Warr (2005), Cororaton and Cockburn (2006), Boccanfuso and Savard (2008). See also Gelan 
(2007) for a CGE study on the effects of food aid in Ethiopia. For general equilibrium analyses on oil price 
shocks in developing countries, see e.g. McDonald and Schoor (2005) and Essama-Nssah et al. (2007). There 
are, to my knowledge, no existing CGE-analyses where oil- and food price increases are considered in 
combination. 
11 See the above mentioned studies (in footnote 10) on general equilibrium analyses focused on trade policy.  
12 Some recent partial equilibrium applications of increased food prices are, for example, Ravallion et al. (2004), 
Ivanic and Martin (2008) and Aksoy and Isik-Dikmelik (2008). 
13 See, for example, Ravallion (2004), where the problem of increased water scarcity in Morocco is omitted from 
the analysis of short-term welfare impacts of price changes of cereals. 
14 See, for example, Berrittella et al. (2007), Diao and Roe (2003) and Goodman (2000). 
15 See, for example, Horridge et al. (2005); agricultural productivity is modelled as a function of rain. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 4
As agriculture is the most water intensive activity, this paper focuses on water use in the 
agricultural sectors.
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides some background information about the 
economic structure as well as the water situation in Namibia. In addition, the actual levels of 
the recently observed international price increases on food and oil products are described. In 
section 3, the model and the data are presented followed by a description of the simulation 
scenarios in section 4 and the simulation results in section 5. Section 6 provides the 
concluding remarks. 
2. Background
Namibia is one of the driest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and it is highly dependent on its 
natural resource base: mining, fishing, agriculture and wildlife based tourism. Namibia is, by 
definition, a middle income country with a per capita income of USD 3000 per year.
17
However, when it comes to income distribution and poverty, the picture is no longer that of a 
middle-income country. Namibia’s official unemployment rate is approximately 35 per cent 
and it is estimated that 50 per cent of the population live below the poverty line. Besides, 
Namibia has one of the most inequitable income distributions in the world.
18
2.1. Food and oil price increases – from a Namibian perspective  
The recent rise in international food prices is mainly driven by increases in the world market 
prices of cereals (defined as wheat, course grains and rice) and oilseeds (seeds grown 
primarily for the production of edible, i.e. cooking, oils), which nearly doubled between 2005 
and 2007. Dairy product prices have also been rising nearly as much during this period, while 
the price increases of meat have been more modest (about 20 per cent). Although the OECD-
FAO Agricultural Outlook (2008) expects prices to come down again from the record levels 
of 2007 and early 2008, prices are not expected to return to the low historical levels, at least 
16A similar approach has also been taken in previous water-studies; see, for example, Goodman (2000) and 
Berittella et al. (2007).  
17 According to World Bank (2007), countries with a per capita income between USD 906 and USD 11 115 are 
defined as middle-income countries.
18 The official number for the Gini coefficient is 0.7. Worldwide, Gini-coefficients, as a measure of inequality of 
income distribution, range between about 0.2 for countries with low inequality, e.g. Denmark and Sweden, to 0.7 
for the most unequal country, Namibia. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 5
not during the next decade.
19 This report projects that, on average over the next ten-year 
period (2008-2017), the real prices of cereals, rice and oilseeds will be 10 to 35 per cent 
higher than the average prices in the past decade. Although dairy prices are projected to 
decline from the current levels, these prices, together with meat prices, are also expected to 
remain above the current averages in the next decade. 
In Namibia, agricultural production accounts for about 7 per cent of GDP. Agricultural 
production can be divided into commercial cereal production, commercial other crop 
production, commercial livestock production and traditional agriculture. Like in many Sub-
Saharan countries, Namibia’s domestic production of cereals is low and most of the domestic 
consumption of cereals is imported. The share of other crops
20 that is domestically produced 
is larger and although a significant amount of other crops is also imported, Namibia is a net-
exporter of non-cereal commercial crops. When it comes to livestock production, this sector 
together with the meat processing industry constitute two of Namibia’s most important export 
sectors after mining and fishing. Considering the other food processing industries, Namibia is 
a net importer of grains, beverages as well as other food products.
When it comes to energy, the world market prices of crude oil and petroleum products have 
been rising since 1999, with a sharp increase since 2003. The world market price of crude oil 
reached the new record level of 100 US$ a barrel at the beginning of 2008 and is still on a 
level just below 100 US$ at the time of writing. In real terms, this corresponds to a price 
increase of about 100 per cent since 2003. Even though some experts consider the present oil 
prices as unjustifiably high, a return to the low levels of the last two decades is not likely to be 
expected in the longer term.
21
19 There are reasons to believe that while some of the factors underlying the current high price levels are 
temporary, others are permanent and will most likely make prices remain above the historically low levels. For 
example, the supply of food will most likely be able to recover from the temporary adverse weather conditions in 
large grain producing regions in the last few years. However, the increased demand for 
biofuels is the largest source of new demand in decades and is a strong factor behind an upward shift in 
agricultural prices. 
20 Non-cereal crops produced in Namibia are, for example, vegetables, fruits, cotton and ground nuts, where the 
latter two are examples of oilseeds. 
21 See, for example, Kemfert and Horn (2005). According to the authors, and contrary to what is often 
emphasized, there is no shortage of crude oil at present. One reason for the very high current oil prices is that the 
high level of capacity utilisation in oil extraction creates risks that are reflected in rising prices on the forward 
markets. Although predictions of future prices are difficult, future prices are projected to be somewhere between 
70 and 160 US$ a barrel.   The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 6
Namibia has no crude oil or coal resources and the total consumption of petroleum products is 
therefore imported. This makes Namibia particularly sensitive to fluctuations in international 
crude oil and petroleum product prices. The sectors using most petroleum products in their 
production are the transport sector followed by fishing, mining and construction. According to 
the data on input costs among the agricultural sectors,
22 commercial cereal production is most 
petroleum-intensive, followed by livestock production, traditional agriculture and other crop 
production.
2.2. Namibia’s water resources 
Water is considered to be one of the main constraints to development in Namibia. One 
expression for the importance of water in Namibia is the establishment of a system of water 
accounts, which was first constructed already in the mid 1990’s.
23 The post-independence 
renewed national water policy,
24 which especially emphasises the need to recognise the 
economic value of water and promote an economically efficient use of water, has further 
strengthened the role of water accounting as an important tool for sound water management. 
The Namibian water accounts mainly focus on the flow accounts (supply and use) because 
there is little data available for stock accounts. While complete physical accounts for supply 
and use of water have been established, only partial monetary accounts are available so far 
due to lack of data.
25
 
2.2.1. Water supply and use 
In this section, the main structure of the water accounts is described. A more detailed 
description of the Namibian water accounts can be found in Lange (2006). In the water flow 
accounts, three different sets of classifications are used; natural sources of water, supply 
agencies and end-users. The main natural sources of water include groundwater, perennial 
surface water (from perennial rivers along the northern and southern borders) and ephemeral 
22 This refers to the information about the cost-structure of the production sectors found in the main database 
used in this analysis, the Social Accounting Matrix. See section 3.2. for a further explanation of the data in the 
SAM.
23 See Lange (1998). 
24 The new water policy is specified in the Water Resources and Management Act (2004). 
25 Namibia is one of few developing countries where water accounts are constructed following the UN 
framework for the System of Environmental and Economic Accounts (SEEA). By combining hydrological and 
economic information in a framework consistent with the System of National Accounting, SEEA for water 
resources allows for a more integrated analysis linked to macro-economic policies as opposed to merely sector-
specific analysis. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 7
surface water stored in dams (ephemeral rivers only flow after periods of heavy rainfall). The 
major water supply institution is Namwater, a state-owned corporation operating on 
commercial principles. Namwater abstracts water from the natural environment and then 
directly supplies some end-users as well as other water supply institutions. Other water supply 
institutions include Municipalities, Rural Water Supply and Rural Communities, which 
abstract some water but purchase most of the water from Namwater, and Self-providers,
which include individuals and companies that abstract water for their own use, mainly within 
the agricultural sector. The classification of end-users (production sectors and households) for 
the water accounts can be matched to the industry classification of the Namibian Social 
Accounting Matrix (SAM).
26
Groundwater is the single largest natural source of water in Namibia, accounting for about 40 
per cent of the total water supply. By institution, Namwater and agricultural self-providers are 
the two largest suppliers, together accounting for about 85 per cent of the total water supply.
When it comes to water use, according to Lange (2006), total water use has been growing 
faster than both population and GDP in the last decade, mainly due to the growth of water-
intensive sectors, largely crop irrigation. Agriculture is the major user of water and uses about 
75 per cent of the total water supplied. Crop irrigation is the most water-demanding activity, 
accounting for about 54 per cent of the total agricultural water use compared to 21 per cent in 
the livestock sector. The second largest user of water, following agriculture, is households, 
especially urban households. Interesting to note is that in recent years, water use has grown 
most rapidly in the fishing sector, which traditionally uses modest amounts of freshwater. The 
reason is the emergence of aquaculture in some parts of the country, which is an activity 
considered to have a high growth potential but, at the same time, is as highly water intensive 
as irrigated crop production.
27
Although the data is not sufficient for compiling water stock accounts, there is some concern 
that current water stocks might be declining. In a long-term perspective, there are estimations 
on water availability of up to twice the level used today
28, but these long-term figures should 
be taken with caution. Although total water use does not yet exceed water availability on a 
26 The SAM constitutes the major database on which the CGE-model is built; see section 3.2. for a further 
explanation of the SAM. 
27 Lange (2006). 
28 See Christelis and Struckmeyer (2001).The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 8
national level, there are regional differences in water resources and demand, implying that in 
some regions, water shortages are already a fact.
29 In addition, there is concern that in some 
cases, the use of water has been “locked in” in specific sectors through investment and 
infrastructure development. This might lead to an inefficient water use as it will be difficult to 
use the water for other purposes in a situation when competition for water increases. 
 
2.2.2. Full cost recovery water policy
In the past, the governmental policy of subsidising water, especially irrigation water used in 
commercial agriculture, has contributed to an inefficient allocation of water. Namibia’s water 
policy has changed during the last decade, however,
30 and according to Lange (2006), there 
has been some progress towards full cost recovery at the national level; except for some rural 
households and the commercial irrigated agricultural sectors, end-users do in general cover 
the full private costs of supply. While there is no official information on the marginal costs of 
supplying water, estimates of average supply costs are available. The average cost of 
supplying water varies by institution and natural source of water. The average cost of all 
water abstracted by Namwater is 2.01 N$ per cubic metre of water. For agricultural self-
providers, there is only an estimate available for the average cost of abstracting groundwater, 
which is estimated to 4.18 N$ per cubic metre, but this figure is highly uncertain and there are 
no available estimates of the average cost of supply for other water sources abstracted by 
agricultural self-providers.
31
3. The model and Data 
3.1. The Model 
The model used in this paper is based on a standard CGE-model, developed by the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI). This model has previously been used for 
29 Lange (2006). 
30 The New Water Resources Management Act emphasises the need to recognise the economic value of water; 
water tariffs should reflect the full opportunity cost of water, including private costs of providing water as well 
as environmental impacts. See Water Resources Management Act No. 24: 2004. 
31 See Lange (2006). Concerning agricultural self providers, although actual data on costs is not available, 
farmers pay the full cost of supply for the water they abstract by themselves. It is the water bought from 
Namwater by the agricultural sectors that is subject to subsidies. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 9
macroeconomic analysis in a number of developing countries
32 and it is based on the same 
standard principles of neoclassical modelling as are most often original general equilibrium 
models. The model is a set of simultaneous equations which define the behaviour of different 
actors. All production and consumption decisions are driven by maximization of profits and 
utility, respectively. To some extent, however, the model allows the user to depart from some 
of the typical neoclassical assumptions, for example concerning the functioning of factor 
markets. By allowing for factor immobility and/or wage rigidity, the model can sometimes 
better represent the real functioning of the economy in many countries, especially in 
developing countries. A full documentation of the original model is given in Löfgren et al. 
(2002)
33 and a detailed description of the production and consumption structure, as well as a 
full mathematical statement of the model equations, can be found in Sahlén (2008). The most 
important behavioural assumptions for the model agents as well as some of the system 
constraints are briefly described below. 
3.1.1. Households 
Households receive income from factors of production and transfers from other institutions. 
The remaining income after direct tax payments, savings and transfers to other institutions is 
used for consumption. Households are choosing the bundles of commodities in order to 
maximize utility subject to their budget constraints. The utility function is a Stone-Geary 
function, implying that for each household, a minimum level of each commodity must be 
consumed, irrespective of its price or household income. After subsistence has been achieved, 
the relative contribution of each commodity to utility can be considered. The utility function 
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where qc is total consumption of commodity c,  c is subsistence consumption and  c is the 
relative weight of utility that the consumer spends on commodity c. The first-order conditions 
resulting from the utility maximization are referred to as a linear expenditure system, since the 
expenditure on a specific commodity is a linear function of total consumption expenditures. 
Households consume both domestically produced and imported commodities. In the case 
when a commodity is both domestically produced and imported, household consumption is 
32 Examples of macro-policy studies in African countries where the generic IFPRI CGE-model is used; South 
Africa: Thurlow (2002) and Go et al. (2005), Tanzania: Eskola (2005), Ethiopia: Gelan (2006) and Namibia: 
Sahlén (2008). 
33 This study contains a manual of the standard CGE-model, which can be downloaded from IFPRI’s website.  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 10
measured in terms of a composite commodity, which constitutes an aggregate of domestically 
produced and imported goods. For the aggregation of domestically produced and imported 
commodities, the Armington Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) specification is used. 
The choice between domestically produced and imported variants of the same commodity is 
modelled by assuming that the demanders minimize the cost subject to imperfect 
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In equation 2, QQc is the total (composite) supply of a commodity, while QMc is the imported 
quantity and QDc the domestically produced quantity of the commodity. Further,  c is the 
Armington shift parameter,  c is the share parameter and  c the function exponent. It is 
assumed that international supplies are infinitely elastic at given world prices. The assumption 
of imperfect substitutability is made in order to prevent unrealistic import responses to policy 
changes as it allows for some independence between the domestic and the international price 
system. The use of the Armington function is standard in the CGE literature.  
3.1.2. Production 
The production decisions are guided by the assumption of profit maximization in a perfect 
competition setting. This implies that the firm takes the prices of output, production factors 
and other inputs as given, the level of production is such that the marginal cost of inputs is 
equal to their respective marginal revenue products and there are no pure profits. This implies 
that the production is characterized by constant returns to scale. In the production of 
domestically produced commodities, different factors are combined into value added via a 
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where QVA is the value added output in each production sector, a. QF represents the quantity 
of production factors used in the production process,  a is an efficiency parameter and  a is 
the CES function exponent, which is calibrated using the elasticity of substitution.
34
34 The elasticity of substitution for the CES function is  ) 1 /( 1 a 	    .The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 11
The value added output produced in equation 3 is, in turn, combined with intermediate inputs 
using a Leontief specification, implying no substitutability between value added and 
intermediate inputs in production. Intermediate inputs are, in turn, bundles of composite 
commodities combined via a Leontief production function, implying that the model does not 
allow for substitution between different intermediate inputs.
35
3.1.3. Other agents  
Factor incomes from the factors of production are paid to the factor owners, which are 
households and enterprises. Enterprises do not consume and their incomes are allocated to 
direct taxes, savings and transfers to other institutions, mainly households.   
Imported commodities are paid for to the Rest of World which also pays for domestically 
produced commodities that are exported. Domestic production is divided between domestic 
supply and exports based on suppliers’ revenue maximization, subject to a Constant Elasticity 
of Transformation (CET) function. This implies that although the supply of exports is 
determined by the relative price of exports and domestic goods, producers’ maximization of 
sales is subject to imperfect substitutability between exports and domestic sales. The CET 
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where QXc is total domestic output, QEc is exports and QDc is domestic sales of domestic 
output. The equation also includes shift and share parameters as well as a function exponent. 
The assumption of imperfect transformability is (just like the assumption of imperfect 
substitutability between domestic produced goods and imports), made to better reflect the 
empirical realities of most countries and is a standard component in CGE-models. Namibia is 
assumed to be a price-taker on all export markets, i.e. the country is assumed to be too small 
for its export or import volumes to significantly affect the world market prices of these goods.  
Another important agent in the model is the government, which levies taxes on commodities, 
imports, production, factors, households and enterprises. The government consumes a bundle 
35 This implies that, in general, the model allows for greater substation on the consumption side than on the 
production side, which is a standard feature of most CGE-models. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 12
of government goods and also makes transfer payments to other agents, mainly households 
and enterprises.
Households, enterprises, the government and the rest of world all save part of their income, 
which is accumulated in the Savings-Investment account from which investment commodities 
are purchased. 
3.1.4. Model closure rules 
Besides the behavioural specifications described above, the model also contains a set of 
constraints that must be satisfied for the model system as a whole, which are not necessarily 
considered by, and do not refer to, any individual actor. These include constraints for markets 
(factor and commodity markets) and macroeconomic aggregates (government and external 
balances as well as the savings-investment balance). These constraints are satisfied via the 
model closure rules, which means that the user determines which variables should be 
endogenous and exogenous.
36
For factor markets, different closure rules (which represent mechanisms for equilibrating 
supply and demand) can be chosen for the different factors. In this paper, the capital stock in 
each sector, together with the mixed factor in agricultural production,
37 is assumed to be 
fixed. This is the standard way in which capital and land are modelled in static CGE-models 
in developing countries and it is motivated by a relatively short time horizon. For the labour 
market, a distinction is made between skilled and unskilled labour categories. Skilled labour is 
considered to be fully employed and mobile between sectors. Unskilled labour is also 
considered to be mobile between sectors, although the analysis allows for unemployment 
among the unskilled. The different closure rules for the two different labour categories are 
chosen in order to reflect the fact that a considerable amount of unskilled labour in Namibia is 
actually unemployed. Unemployment is achieved in the model by holding the real wage 
constant for this labour category.
38
36 See Appendix C for a specification of the different closure rules for factor markets and macroeconomic 
aggregates available. 
37 The mixed factor contains a capital as well as land component in the agricultural sectors. See section 3.2. for a 
clarification of the mixed factor. 
38 This assumption is standard in CGE models for countries where unemployment is high. See e.g. Thurlow 
(2002), van Heerden et al. (2006) and Gelan (2007).  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 13
Concerning water, different closure rules form the basis for three different model simulations; 
in the first scenario, water is assumed to be “unemployed”, i.e. water supply is assumed to be 
perfectly elastic and, to a large extent, mobile between sectors. In the second and third 
scenarios, total water supply is fixed and the importance of factor mobility is tested by 
assuming a relatively high degree of mobility between sectors in scenario three, while in 
scenario two, the water is assumed to be sector specific.
39
Concerning the macroeconomic balances, real government consumption as well as all tax 
rates are exogenous and thereby not assumed to be affected by the exogenous price changes. 
This implies that government savings are endogenous in order to maintain the government 
balance. When it comes to the savings-investment balance, real investment is assumed to be 
exogenous while savings are endogenous. In order to address the possible influences on 
exports and imports of the exogenous price increases simulated in this paper, foreign savings 
are assumed to be endogenous while the exchange rate is fixed. The model numeraire in all 
simulations is the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
40
3.2. Data
In order to calibrate the model, a significant amount of data is needed, together with values of 
elasticities (see section 3.2.2.). The original SAM for Namibia from 2002
41 constitutes the 
main source of data on basis of which the model is calibrated. In the base case, the model 
equations ensure that the values in the original SAM are reproduced. The SAM divides the 
economy into 26 sectors of production, five factors of production and six household groups 
according to their main source of income. The household groups are: urban households who 
receive their income from wages and salaries, urban households involved in business 
activities, other urban households (mainly depending on pensions and gifts), rural households 
receiving income from wages and salaries, rural households within business activities and 
commercial farming and, finally, other rural households (mainly depending on subsistence 
farming, pensions and gifts). By combining the total income for each such group (provided in 
39 See section 4 for a detailed description of the simulations scenarios. 
40 As the model is a real model, only relative prices matter and a numeraire must be chosen. All simulated price 
changes are interpreted as changes in comparison to the numeraire price index. Therefore, there is no price 
inflation in the model. This does not reflect the view that inflation is unimportant in this particular context, only 
that the model does not take inflation into account. 
41 See Lange et al. (2004) for a full documentation of the construction of the 2002 SAM. The full original data-
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the SAM) with data on the actual number of households in each household group (provided in 
the preliminary report of the Namibian household income and expenditure survey 2003/2004), 
the average income per household within each household group can be estimated. These 
results show that the average income is lowest for the urban and rural household groups 
depending on pensions and other income, together with the rural household group that 
receives income from wages and salaries. The highest average incomes are found within 
urban and rural household groups involved in business and farming. This information is 
interesting when it comes to analysing the effects on the current income distribution, in 
particular because Namibia has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world.
The factors of production included in the original SAM are unskilled labour, skilled labour, 
capital, a mixed factor in the commercial agricultural sectors (representing a mix of farm 
owners’ labour, capital and a land as well as a water component) and a mixed factor in the 
traditional agricultural sector (analogous to that in the commercial sectors, but with a 
negligible capital component). The reason for using the mixed factors in the database is that it 
is difficult to distinguish between different types of earnings of self-employed farmers; the 
surplus of sales revenue over input costs includes a payment for own labour, own capital input 
as well as land and water input. Therefore, their factor income is left as “mixed income” in the 
national accounts. 
The original SAM needed some minor adjustments in order to fit the purpose of this study. 
First, in order to make the model easier to solve numerically, a number of smaller service 
sectors have been aggregated into a single sector when fed into the CGE-model. Some 
additional small adjustments concerning tourism and traditional agricultural data were also 
needed. In addition, improved fishing sector data, which was first used in an earlier study 
about the Namibian economy by Sahlén (2008), is also included in this paper. These minor 
adjustments are further described in Appendix B while in this section, the more important 
water data adjustments are further described.  
 
3.2.1. Water data 
In this section, the methodology for including water as a factor of production in the CGE 
model is described. A general feature of the model, which is standard in most CGE-models, is 
that it does not allow for substitution between intermediate inputs, only between the different 
factors of production. In the original data, water is included as an intermediate input into The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 15
production, which implies that no substitution between water and other inputs or other factors 
of production is allowed.
42 Therefore, in order to allow for substitution possibilities between 
water and other factors of production in the analysis, water is transformed into a factor of 
production instead of an intermediate good in the production process. By treating water as a 
factor of production, the effects of increased water scarcity can be explicitly modelled by 
introducing restrictions on total water supply. 
 
The water accounts for the flow and use of water constitute an important source of additional 
data. In traditional water accounts, a distinction is made between different natural sources of 
water; groundwater, perennial surface water and ephemeral surface water. In my model, 
however, no distinction is made between the different natural sources of water. The reason is 
mainly that as the monetary accounts are not complete, the potential benefits of dividing the 
water into different types of water would most likely be offset by the drawbacks associated 
with having to rely on a set of additional assumptions.
43 Further, although there are more than 
two water supply institutions in Namibia, only self-providers within the agricultural sectors as 
well as a water distribution service sector are modelled as water abstracting institutions. The 
water distribution service sector is supposed to mainly represent Namwater but also the 
smaller institutions mentioned in section 2.2.1. above.
44
The part of water used in the agricultural sectors that is “self-provided” can, in the original 
data, be seen as a “hidden” factor of production, as it is represented by a fraction of the mixed 
factor used in the agricultural production sectors. In a similar way, part of the initial total 
capital factor in the water distribution service sector should be seen as a water factor. For the 
purpose of this study, the part of the mixed or capital factors that represent water needs to be 
explicitly modelled as a water factor in the agricultural sectors as well as in the water 
distribution service sector.
42 This follows from the fact that a Leontief technology is used for aggregating the different intermediate inputs 
as well as intermediate inputs and factors of production. 
43 The assumptions made concerning the value of water are further described below. In addition, since the costs 
for supplying different water sources also depend on regional differences, a regional instead of a national 
analysis should be carried out for a distinction between different sources of water to be meaningful. Specific 
regional data is not available at the moment and therefore, it was decided not to divide the water factor according 
to natural sources.  
44 In the original SAM, Namwater together with the smaller water supply institutions are aggregated into one 
water distribution sector, while the water provided by agricultural self-providers is basically omitted from the 
data. The inclusion of agricultural self providers in the analysis therefore constitutes an important development 
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To identify the hidden water factor in the agricultural sector and water distribution service 
sector, respectively, additional data on the quantity of water used per sector (in cubic metres) 
as well as the value of water per cubic metre is required. Comprehensive data is available for 
the actual water use among the economic sectors in Namibia, but assumptions must be made 
concerning the value of water. One possible indicator of the value of water would be the 
marginal cost of supplying water to end-users, assuming that end-users actually pay the full 
cost for providing the water. As mentioned in section 2.2.2., while no estimates of the 
marginal costs of water supply exist, there are some estimations of the average cost of water 
supply available for the year 2001-02. This cost varies by type of natural water source and 
water supply institution but, on average, it lies within a range of 1- 4 N$ per cubic metre.
45 In 
the absence of other reliable estimations of the value of water, this unit price of water per 
cubic metre is used as a guideline for estimating the share of total factor income attributed to 
water in the agricultural as well as in the water distribution service sector. For the base case, 
the value of 2 N$ per cubic metre is used
46 but in order to shed some light on the sensitivity of 
these assumptions, a sensitivity analysis has been conducted for the case of a lower initial 
share of total factor income attributed to water (calculated using a water value of 1 N$ per m
3)
as well as a higher total water income (calculated using a value of 3 N$ per m
3). See 
Appendix A for the results of this sensitivity analysis.
47
While a water factor of production is only introduced in the agricultural and the water 
distribution service sectors as described above, the water distribution sector is then assumed 
to deliver water (as a commodity) to the rest of the economic sectors and households, mainly 
following the original structure in the SAM.
48 However, for the purposes of studying total 
45 See Lange (2006) for these estimations. 
46 2N$ per cubic metre is equal to the average cost of supply for all water abstracted by Namwater, which is the 
institution providing the most reliable data for the supply cost estimations. 
47 This approach to determining the size of total water income out of the mixed factor or capital factor in the 
agricultural and water distribution service sectors, respectively, was also used by Goodman (2000). In the dataset 
for the Southeastern Colorado economy used in his analysis, all factor income except labour (which was 
provided by labour income data) was aggregated into “other property income”. As his analysis includes labour, 
capital, land and water as factors, it was necessary to allocate other property income to income from land, water 
and capital.   
48 Some additional small adjustments have been made considering the data on household consumption of water. 
In the original SAM, rural households do not seem to consume much water. The reason is most likely that some 
of the rural households receive water as a benefit attached to their salary from the farms where they work, and 
for some of the poorest rural households, the water costs are completely subsidized by the government, 
explaining the high costs of water for the government registered in the original SAM data. For the purpose of 
this study, the part of the government expenses for water, which according to information from Lange (2006) is 
in fact distributed to rural households, needs to be transferred to rural household consumption in the database 
while, at the same time, these households are compensated via a lump-sum government transfer representing the 
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water demand in the agricultural sectors, the intermediate use of water in the agricultural 
sectors, which is represented in the original SAM as a commodity bought from the water 
distribution service sector, also needs to be transformed into a factor of production. In this 
case, the actual value presented in the SAM is assumed to represent the total cost of the 
amount of water bought from Namwater. The actual water costs for this part of the water in 
the agricultural sector reveal an exceptionally low price per cubic metre of water when 
combined with the actual water use quantity data in Lange (2006). One reason for this is that 
part of the water for agricultural use bought from Namwater is subsidised by the government. 
As a consequence, water productivity in agriculture (measured as the ratio of the value added 
from each sector divided by the water use in each sector) is significantly lower than in other 
economic sectors. 
Considering the different uses of water as a factor, it is reasonable to assume that while the 
self-provided part of the agricultural water might be only transferable between the different 
agricultural sectors, the part that is originally provided by Namwater or other institutions 
should be considered to be exchangeable also between different uses, i.e. between the 
agricultural sectors and the water distribution service sector. The reason why not all water is 
considered to be mobile between agricultural and other water uses is that it is unlikely that the 
self-provided water in the agricultural sectors could be distributed to urban areas for urban 
use.
49 In the model, this restriction on mobility is explicitly modelled by dividing water into 
two different factors of production, where the first type of water (self provided) is only used 
in the agricultural sectors, while the second type of water can be used in the agricultural 
sectors as well as in the water distribution service sector. The initial allocation of self-
provided water as well as other water between the different sectors can be seen in table 1 
below.
50
agricultural sectors, these sectors are allowed to produce an additional commodity, water, which they “sell” to 
the rural households that work on the farms. These households are compensated for their water costs via 
increased labour salaries. These small adjustments remove the misleading result that the rural households will 
not be at all affected by changes in the water prices as, according to the original SAM, they do not seem to 
consume any water at all. However, in terms of overall economy-wide effects, these minor changes are of 
negligible importance. 
49 The reason for this assumption is that a considerable amount of investment in water infrastructure is needed in 
order to transfer water from on-farm boreholes to other urban water uses. Although the water provided by water 
supply institutions might, to some extent, also be geographically constrained at the moment, it is reasonable to 
assume that this part of the water will, at least in the medium run, be more easily transferred between different 
uses.    
50 This implies that in the agricultural sector, the two types of water are not considered to be perfect substitutes in 
the production. This is a reasonable assumption. On each farm, either self-provided water or water bought from 
institutions is used, i.e. generally the two types of water are not used in combination. Farmers are either The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 18
Table 1. Initial use of the factor water by sector in the model 
Water use, in  Commercial  Commercial    Commercial  Traditional  Water distribuiton 
million cubic metres*  cereal  other crop  livestock Agriculture service sector
Self-provided Water 13 000 000 58 000 000 25 000 000 35 000 000
Other water  9 000 000 39 000 000 1 000 000 29 000 000 16 000 000
*Quantities are based on the water use accounts from 2001-02: the total use of freshwater is about 225 million m
3.
Losses from delivery to end-users are excluded from these figures.
3.2.2. Elasticities 
In addition to the data provided in the SAM and the data on water factor quantities described 
in the above section, explicit values for elasticities are needed in order to calibrate the model. 
These include trade elasticities, substitution elasticities between factors of production and 
expenditure elasticities of market demand by households. Concerning the expenditure 
elasticities for household energy demand (more specifically petroleum and electricity), these 
values are taken from an empirical study of Namibian energy demand by De Vita et al. 
(2006).
51 Since, to my knowledge, there are no other available empirical estimates of the 
required elasticities in Namibia, all other elasticity values are taken from a CGE model of the 
South African economy by Thurlow (2004).
52 This is motivated by the fact that the structure 
of the Namibian economy is similar to that of the South African economy. See Sahlén (2008) 
for a further explanation of the elasticities needed in this model. In Appendix A, a sensitivity 
analysis is conducted for the trade elasticities as well as the substitution elasticities for factors 
of production used in this paper. 
4. Simulation Scenarios
In the light of the observed increases in world market prices of food and oil described in 
section 2.1., the increases in world market prices simulated in this paper are the following; a 
connected to the Namwater distribution system, or they are self-providers of water. The division of water into 
two different water factors do not appear to have any significant impact on the overall economy-wide results. If 
all water is considered to be one factor, a greater amount of water will be able to move between the agricultural 
and water distribution service sectors in case of water mobility which will, in general, only affect the possibility 
of expansion in the agricultural sectors following the exogenous price increases. This implies that by dividing 
water into two different factors, the desired realistic constraint on water mobility of the part of water that is self-
provided can be achieved without causing any major changes in the results. 
51 De Vita et al. estimate income- and price-elasticities of the Namibian energy demand by end-users for the 
period 1980 to 2002.  
52 These are, in turn, mainly based on empirical estimates for the South African economy. See Thurlow (2004). The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 19
50 per cent increase in the prices of petroleum products,
53 a 30 per cent increase in the prices 
of cereals and grains (corresponding to cereal production and grain milling in the SAM-data), 
a 20 per cent price increase for other oil seeds (corresponding to other crop production; oil 
seeds only constitute part of the crops included in other crop production in the SAM data) and 
a 10 per cent price increase for meat products (corresponding to livestock production and 
meat processing in the SAM) and dairies (corresponding to other food and beverages 
production; dairies constitute part of this sector in the SAM).
To analyse the importance of water scarcity, these exogenous world market price changes are 
combined with three different assumptions about total supply of water as well as water 
mobility between sectors. These assumptions imply three different model scenarios. In 
scenario 1, the total supply of water is assumed to be perfectly elastic. As described in section 
3.2.1., it is further assumed that self-provided water can only be used in agricultural sectors, 
while the water bought for agricultural use from Namwater can also be used in the water 
distribution service sector. In scenario 2, the total water supply is assumed to be fixed, and the 
water initially used in the different agricultural sectors as well as in the water distribution 
service sector is assumed to be sector specific (immobile). In scenario 3, the total supply of 
water is also assumed to be fixed, but water is now assumed to be mobile between the 
different agricultural sectors and, to some extent, also between the agricultural sectors and the 
water distribution sector (as described in section 3.2.1). These different assumptions will 
affect the outcome of the simulations; the results of the first scenario will indicate how much 
total water demand would actually increase following the expansion of agricultural production 
if total water supply could increase. Scenarios 2 and 3, on the other hand, will point out the 
importance of increased water scarcity and to what extent the different assumptions of water 
mobility will affect the results.  
5. Simulation Results
The results presented here should be interpreted as the likely impacts of exogenous increases 
in the world market prices of food and oil only, assuming these to be the only exogenous 
53 As petroleum products are also produced from other sources than crude oil (like coal and gas), it is unlikely 
that the recently observed 100 per cent increase in crude oil prices is fully transferred to petroleum price 
increases. In South Africa, for example, crude oil constitutes about 50 per cent of the total costs in the petroleum 
production industry; see McDonald and van Schoor (2005). The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 20
changes affecting the economy.
54 The results for key variables are presented for all three 
scenarios in table 2 below.  
Table 2. Simulation results. 
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Percentage change in variables  - perfectly elastic   - constant water supply  - constant water supply
water supply    - water immobile   - water mobile
GDP -1.1 -1.3 -1.3
Total water consumed 20.7  -   - 
Trade balance:
          - Exports 3.7 3.3 3.3
          - Imports -9.7 -9.7 -9.7
Production by sector:
          - Cereal production 4.9 0.9 -5.0
          - Other crop producton 27.5 3.3 7.9
          - Livestock production 0.9 0.7 0.3
          - Traditional agriculture 6.2 3.6 3.3
          - Fish production 0.1 0.1 0.1
          - Fish processing 0.6 0.6 0.6
          - Mining 0.4 0.5 0.5
          - Meat processing 1.0 1.0 0.8
          - Grain milling -0.4 -0.5 -0.4
          - Beverages and other food  0.3 0.3 0.3
          - Textiles -0.3 -0.3 -0.3
          - Light manufacturing -0.9 -0.9 -0.9
          - Heavy manufacturing -0.1 -0.1 -0.1
          - Construction -0 . 10 . 1
          - Water distribution service*  -2.8 -2.2 -3.3
          - Electricity -1.3 -1.4 -1.4
          - Hotel and restaurant -1.9 -1.9 -1.9
          - Other private services -0.3 -0.4 -0.4
          - Transport  -8.7 -8.9 -9.0
          - Governmental services -0.5 -0.5 -0.5
Real household consumption:
           - Total (average)  -9.3 -9.4 -9.4
   Distribution among households:
          - Urban hh, wage and salary -9.0 -9.0 -9.0
          - Urban hh, agr and business -11.0 -11.0 -11.1
          - Urban hh, pensions and other -7.3 -7.2 -7.3
          - Rural hh, wage and salary -11.1 -11.1 -11.2
          - Rural hh, agr and business -8.0 -8.6 -8.8
          - Rural hh, subs. agr. and other -8.6 -8.8 -8.8
* Note that although total water demand for the water factor is increased through the expansion of the agricultural 
sectors, the demand for the water (as a commodity) distributed by the water distribution service sector to all households 
and sectors except agriculture decreases. When output in service and industrial sectors contracts, and when households'  
factor incomes decrease, the demand for water decreases. To adjust to the declining demand, there is a decrease in
the supply of water distribution services. 
54 In a recent study by Reid et al. (2008) about the likely impact of climate change in Namibia, it is shown that 
agricultural production will most likely decrease due to an overall loss in agricultural productivity caused by 
climate change. If such impacts had been included here, it is likely that the agricultural expansion would have 
been more constrained. However, such aspects are not further considered in this paper.  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 21
5.1. Scenario 1 – Water supply is perfectly elastic
In this scenario, water supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic, meaning that water will not 
be a constraining factor for agricultural sector expansion. One interpretation of this scenario is 
that additional groundwater could always be pumped to satisfy increased demand. 
 
5.1.1. Changes in production and water use  
The effect on GDP of external world market price increases in food and petroleum products is 
negative; GDP decreases by 1.1 per cent. This is, to a large extent, due to the increase in the 
world market price of petroleum (0.8 per cent), but the total effect on GDP of the increase in 
international food prices alone is also negative. One reason for this is that the expansion of 
exports, especially in the livestock production and meat processing sectors, does not outweigh 
the negative effect on overall domestic production due to increased production costs. 
Increased world market prices also cause an increase in domestic prices, as prices on imported 
intermediates rise.
55 Increased production costs cause a general decline in production, 
especially in the non-exporting sectors (for example the service sectors) where exports are not 
an offsetting factor. There is a decline in total factor income when factor demand decreases 
and the unemployment of unskilled labour increases. 
Turning to the sector-level changes in production, there is substantial growth in the 
agricultural production sectors. The other crop production sector grows by about 27 per cent, 
followed by the traditional agricultural sector (6.2 per cent), the cereal production sector (4.9 
per cent) and the livestock sector with a nearly 1 per cent increase in production. The main 
reason why other crop production increases more than cereal production, despite the fact that 
the world market price of cereals increases more than that of other crops, is that other crops 
are exported, while cereals are not. This means that the other crop production sector is not 
only dependent on domestic demand, but can increase its production to sell the products at the 
new higher price directly on the world market. The reason why domestic cereal production 
increases, although cereals are not exported, is that the imports of cereals are becoming 
55 Intermediate inputs constitute a bundle of “composite commodities”, which are aggregates of domestically 
produced and imported goods. When the prices of imported goods increase, demand for domestically produced 
commodities increases and thereby, there is also an increase in domestic prices. As there is no domestic 
production of petroleum products in Namibia, the international price increase will translate into an equivalent 
price increase for the final commodity as well as for intermediate inputs of petroleum. The more expensive 
intermediate inputs can, in turn, not be substituted with other inputs due to the Leontief technology for 
intermediate inputs in production, which implies that increases in production costs will be a fact. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 22
relatively more expensive than domestically produced cereals, so that domestic production 
increases and imports decrease.
56 Traditional agriculture mainly produces cereals, but also 
livestock products and other crops, and will also expand domestic production as imports of 
these products are becoming relatively more expensive. Cereal production is the most 
petroleum-intensive agricultural sector, followed by livestock production, implying that cereal 
and livestock production are more negatively affected by the rising petroleum prices than 
other agricultural production. Another reason why livestock production does not respond as 
much to the increased world market prices as crop production is that the world market price 
increase on products produced in the livestock production sector is lower than in the crop 
production sectors.
Concerning the structure of other production sectors, most industry and service sectors reduce 
their output, while fish production and processing, mining, meat processing, beverages and 
other food production expand. While the expansion of meat processing, beverages and other 
food production directly follows from the increased prices of their exported products,
57 it is 
interesting to note that also mining and fish industries increase production following the 
increased world market prices of agricultural and petroleum products. The reason is that these 
are important export sectors, thus implying that when increased costs of production cause 
domestic prices to increase, the negative effect on the domestic market can be offset by an 
increase in the exports of these products. In addition, since both mining and fishing industries 
are relatively skilled labour-intensive, these industries can also benefit from the general 
decrease in wages for this labour category, which follows from the contraction of the service 
sectors.
Turning to water use, the fact that the irrigated crop production sector is the most water 
intensive activity of all agricultural sectors implies that there is a significant increase in total 
water use. Water demand increases for all agricultural sectors, and total water use rises by 
slightly more than 20 per cent in this scenario. This amounts to more than 40 million m
3,
56 Cereals serve, to a large extent, as intermediate inputs for other food production and are to a lesser extent 
directly consumed by households. Due to the limited substitution possibilities between intermediate inputs in the 
production process, there is an increase in the demand for cereals, notwithstanding the price, as other food 
production sectors increase their production. 
57 The reason why grain milling reduces its production is that these products are not being exported, thus 
implying that this sector cannot directly benefit from the increased world market price of the product. In 
addition, this industry suffers from highly increased production costs when the prices of cereals increase. Cereals 
constitute as much as 75 per cent of the total intermediate inputs in this sector and due to the use of a Leontief 
production function for intermediate inputs, there are no substitution possibilities between different inputs.  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 23
which is a significant amount of water. For example, it constitutes almost half the present use 
of water in the other crop production sector. The total water supply is adjusted to maintain the 
balance between demand and supply. It is interesting to note that if only food price increases 
were to be considered, the increase in total water demand would be about 22 per cent, 
implying that the increased petroleum prices only slightly dampen the expansion of the 
agricultural sectors and thereby also total demand for water.
58  
 
5.1.2. Changes in the distribution of real household consumption
At the household level, the real income effects of increased world market prices depend on 
how these exogenous changes translate into changes in the prices of goods and services 
consumed by households and changes in factor incomes. In this case, although the consumer 
price index is held constant, implying that any price increase on a specific good must be offset 
by a price decrease on other goods, household groups can be differently affected by price 
changes as their consumption pattern differs. Concerning changes in household factor income, 
these will differ across household groups according to the differences in the structure of factor 
ownership.
The total effect on real household consumption of the simulated changes in world market 
prices of food and petroleum products is negative. All household groups are negatively 
affected by the external price increases due to decreased factor incomes in the economy, and 
increased prices of food and petroleum products, which constitute significant shares of 
households’ total consumption expenditures. It is interesting to note that if the price increases 
of petroleum products were disregarded, there is one household group for which welfare 
would actually increase. Rural households, which receive their income from agriculture and 
businesses, own a relatively large amount of the factors for which there is an increase in 
demand (mixed income and water) and is therefore the only household group actually 
benefiting from increased international food prices alone. On the other hand, this is also the 
household group that is most negatively affected by the increase in prices of petroleum 
products, which implies that when the food and petroleum price increases are combined, the 
overall effect on real income for this household group is negative. In general, the income 
58 The fact that fish production seems to be increasing together with other food production is interesting from the 
point of view of water use. Although, according to current data, agriculture is the most water intensive 
production sector, fish production is the sector where water use increases the most due to the expansion of the 
water intensive activity of aquaculture. There is a risk that any expansion in fish production would mainly be in 
the form of increased aquaculture and this will put further pressure on the water resources than what can be 
analysed in this model. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 24
distribution is differently affected by the food and petroleum price increase, respectively;
while the negative real consumption effects of petroleum price increases mainly fall on richer 
households; if food price increases are considered in isolation, the rural poor are most 
negatively affected.
59 The main reason is that food products constitute a larger share of total 
expenditures in poor households than in richer households. The real consumption of the rural 
household group that receives its income from wages and salaries, together with that of the 
urban households that receive their income from business activities, is negatively affected by 
both petroleum and food price increases. As is clear from table 3, these are thus the household 
groups that are hit the hardest in these simulations.
60
5.2. Scenario 2 – Total water supply is fixed and water is immobile between sectors  
One interpretation of scenario 2 is that the water use in Namibia is already at the sustainability 
constraint, and the government decides that groundwater should not be pumped at a faster rate 
than it is being replenished. The assumption of fixed total water supply is here combined with 
the assumption of water immobility; it is assumed that the water used in each specific sector 
cannot be used for other purposes, i.e. water is no longer assumed to be mobile between 
different agricultural sectors or between the agricultural sectors and the water distribution 
service sector. This might be the case if there are constraints associated with the transfer of 
water between different uses. There might, for example, be geographical constraints to the 
possibilities of transferring water between different activities, especially between agricultural 
production (mostly in rural areas) and other, urban, uses. In Namibia, which is a large and 
sparsely populated country with limited infrastructure for long-range transport of water, this is 
a problem.
61 Such constraints are here modelled by introducing sector-specific water 
resources. In the model, sector specific water means that increased (decreased) demand for 
water in one sector must be followed by a rise (fall) in the price of water, ensuring that 
demand in each sector always equals the initial supply.  
59 Although the poor urban household group will be less negatively affected, these results are important for 
poverty analysis as poor rural households constitute more than 70 per cent of the total number of poor 
households in Namibia. 
60 Both these household groups consume a relatively large amount of petroleum products and will also suffer 
from higher food prices for different reasons; rural households partly due to reduced factor income, but also due 
to the increased prices of food while urban business households will mainly suffer because their factor income 
decreases substantially as there is a decrease in production in manufacturing and services.  
61 Other, non-geographical constraints are also possible. In some sectors, mainly traditional agriculture, a larger 
share of rain-fed agricultural livestock production is practised and it could easily be argued that rainwater 
provides a far too irregular source of water to be useful for any other purposes than livestock grazing; it is almost 
certainly not sufficient to use for commercial crop production.  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 25
5.2.1. Changes in production and water use
This scenario causes a loss in GDP of 1.3 per cent, which is slightly larger than the loss in 
scenario 1. This is intuitive as the constant water supply and the absence of water mobility 
between sectors constitute constraints on the ability for the economy to adapt. However, the 
implementation of constant water supply does not seem to be of any critical importance for 
the ability of the economy to adapt; the changes in overall production due to the restriction in 
constant water supply are relatively modest.
62 The increase in exports is lower than in 
scenario 1, while imports decrease as much as in scenario 1.  
The increase in production in all agricultural sectors is significantly lower than in the previous 
scenario. Concerning the changes in production in non-agricultural sectors, the results are 
similar to those in scenario 1, except for the water distribution service sector where the 
contraction of production is smaller than in scenario 1. The reason is that water can no longer 
move from this sector into the expanding agricultural sectors. The fact that production other 
sectors do not change is intuitively reasonable as the only thing that is changed between the 
scenarios is the assumption about the supply and mobility of the water factor, which only 
directly affect the sectors using water as a factor of production. 
5.2.2. Changes in the distribution of real household consumption 
As concerns the distribution of real household consumption, the results differ somewhat from 
scenario 1. In general, rural households, especially those receiving their income from 
agriculture and businesses and households that mainly practise subsistence farming, are more 
negatively affected than in scenario 1. The reason is that rural households, to a large extent, 
depend on farm income and, as the expansion of agriculture is now less significant, there is a 
decrease in total farm income.  
5.3. Scenario 3 – Total water supply is fixed and water is mobile between sectors  
In this scenario, water supply is still assumed to be fixed, as in scenario 2, but water is now 
assumed to be exchangeable between the different agricultural uses and between agricultural 
62 It is important to note that in this paper, water scarcity is modelled as a constant water supply. It is possible 
that other definitions of water scarcity would lead to different results. For example, according to the fourth IPCC 
assessment report, one important impact of climate change in the Sub-Saharan African region will be intensified 
and more frequently occurring droughts. Therefore, there is some concern that the water supply might decrease 
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and other uses by allowing for mobility between the different agricultural sectors and, to some 
extent, also between agricultural sectors and the water distribution service sector. This implies 
that in case of an increase (decrease) in total water demand, the price of water will have to rise 
(fall) in order to sustain a balance between total supply and demand.
63 An interpretation is 
that the self-provided part of the water can easily be transferred to other agricultural activities 
but not to other (urban) uses. The water that is distributed by Namwater, however, can also be 
used in the water distribution service sector (and thereby in any other economic activity). As 
compared to the previous scenarios, although some flexibility is maintained due to water 
mobility, the agricultural sector expansion following the increased food prices is constrained 
due to water scarcity; an increase in the use of water in one sector must be offset by a 
corresponding decrease in water use in other sectors.
5.3.1. Changes in production and water use 
The decrease in GDP is almost the same as in scenario 2.
64 Concerning the sector-specific 
production changes, the results show that while the non-cereal crop production sector 
increases its production by 7.9 per cent (as compared to only 3.3 per cent in scenario 2), this 
expansion comes at the cost of a smaller increase (compared to scenario 2) or even a decrease 
in the production in the other agricultural sectors as well as the water distribution service 
sector. The livestock and the traditional sectors still increase their production, but only by 0.3 
and 3.3 per cent, respectively. Cereal production decreases by 5 per cent, however. The reason 
is that when the self-provided water is subject to fixed supply, while free to allocate between 
the agricultural sectors, the increase in water demand in the non-cereal crop production sector 
must be directly offset by a decrease in water demand in the other agricultural sectors. This 
implies that when the price of water increases, following from increased total demand, 
production sectors will, to some extent, substitute water for other, relatively cheaper, factors 
of production. Substitution is more difficult in the commercial crop production sectors as 
63 In a mobile-factor scenario, there is a fixed factor price-distortion-factor that differs between sectors which 
ensures that any initial exogenous differences in the factor value between sectors is maintained. The economy-
wide factor price is instead free to vary. If total demand for a factor increases, the economy-wide factor price 
will have to increase for that factor, thus implying that the factor price increase is the same in all sectors, 
independent of the pre-determined price differential which is maintained by the fixed price distortion factor. 
64 The decrease in GDP is actually slightly larger than in scenario 2 (although the difference is too small to be 
noticed in table 3 above). This might seem surprising, but the reason why this mobile water scenario results in a 
somewhat greater GDP loss than when water is sector specific is related to the inefficiency in water use that is 
built into the model. As the value of water (and thereby the productivity) is lower in agricultural sectors than in 
the water distribution service sector, the transfer of water into the agricultural sectors will contribute to a 
decrease in overall production. This inefficiency in water use becomes evident in the comparison of scenarios 2 
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water constitutes a relatively large share of the total factors used in the production process. 
While the non-cereal crop production sector can afford to pay the higher water price as it 
directly benefits from increased export prices for the products, the cereal production sector, on 
the other hand, which does not export its good, will decrease its water consumption following 
the price increase. The decreased use of water translates into decreased production in this 
water intensive sector. In the other agricultural sectors, water can to a greater extent be 
substituted for other, relatively cheaper, factors of production, and production can increase 
despite less water being used.
Concerning the changes in production among other economic sectors, the results are very 
similar to the results for scenarios 1 and 2. However, it is worth mentioning that the expansion 
of the meat processing sector is constrained in scenario 3. This directly follows from the 
smaller increase of livestock production compared to the other scenarios, since meat 
processing relies heavily on livestock products as inputs to production. Exports do not 
increase as much as in scenario 1, while imports do. Concerning the distribution of real 
income between different household groups, the results are similar to those in scenario 2 but, 
in general, most household groups become somewhat less well off here than in scenario 2.
65
6. Conclusions 
In this paper, a CGE-model of the Namibian economy is used for analysing the likely impacts 
of the recently observed international food and oil price increases. As a cereal- and oil- 
importing country in Sub-Saharan Africa, Namibia is among the countries which are 
considered likely to be most negatively affected by these international price increases. The 
fact that Namibia is also one of the driest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa makes it interesting 
to include the role of water scarcity in the analysis. In this paper, water is included as a factor 
of production in the agricultural as well as the water distribution service sector by making use 
of the existing data on water supply and use provided by the Namibian water accounts. 
The results show that the overall impacts on national production of increased world market 
prices of food and oil-products are negative; the GDP will decrease by more or less 1.1-1.3 
per cent. The main reason is that the increased exports of primarily agricultural products will 
not offset the rise in overall production costs followed by the increased import prices of 
65 Once more, this is a consequence of the inefficiency of water use that is built into the model; see footnote 66. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 28
petroleum and agricultural products. This causes a contraction of total national production. 
Agricultural production will increase as a result of the combined food and oil price increases. 
The agricultural sector that is benefiting the most is the commercial (non-cereal) crop 
production sector. Overall, there is a redistribution of production from non-exporting sectors 
(for example, textiles, manufacturing and the service sectors) into exporting sectors 
(commercial agriculture, fishing and mining). By coincidence, these exporting sectors are all 
natural resource abundant sectors, depending on land, water, fish and mining products like 
diamonds, uranium and gold, implying that this would make the Namibian economy even 
more dependent on its natural resources. This will require additional efforts to ensure a 
sustainable management of the resources.  
The role of water scarcity is explicitly modelled. Since agricultural production uses about 75 
per cent of the total water consumed in Namibia, water scarcity can become a constraining 
factor for the adaptation of the economy to the external price shocks simulated here. It is 
found that the level of agricultural growth will, to a large extent, depend on the availability of 
additional water resources. If water supply is assumed to be perfectly elastic, water use will 
increase by almost 20 per cent following the agricultural expansion. However, as there is 
concern that the current water use might already be near the sustainability constraint, it is 
interesting to analyse the effects if water supply were instead fixed at the current levels. The 
result from the scenarios where water supply is fixed shows that there is then less ability to 
adapt for the economy, thus resulting in a somewhat greater decrease in total GDP than in a 
case when additional water resources are available. The results indicate that due to the current 
policy of subsidizing part of the water used in agriculture, an additional constraint of water 
immobility between sectors, imposed in one of the scenarios, might actually lead to slightly 
less negative impacts than when water is mobile between sectors.  
Concerning poverty impacts of the increased food and oil prices, while oil price increases 
alone mainly affect the richer household groups, food price increases make the poorest rural 
households significantly less well off in terms of real consumption. The reason is that poor 
households spend a relatively larger share of their total income on food products, while richer 
households spend more on petroleum products. The two poor rural household groups, 
including the group with mainly subsistence farm households, would be the two most 
negatively affected household groups if food price increases were considered in isolation. The 
reason why also subsistence farm households are negatively affected by the increased import The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 29
prices of food is that the increase in farm incomes following from increased production is not 
sufficient to offset the negative effects of higher food prices. This analysis reinforces the 
general concern that poor subsistence farmers in developing countries might not necessarily 
gain from higher international food prices. However, in combination with the simultaneous 
petroleum price increases simulated in this paper, the changes in income will be more evenly 
distributed between urban and rural households; rural subsistence farmers might be less 
negatively affected than urban households, but the poor rural households that work on farms 
without owning any land will still be the household group suffering the most from higher 
petroleum and food prices.  The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 30
Appendix A – Sensitivity Analysis 
Size of initial total water factor income 
To shed some light on the sensitivity of the share of total factor income initially attributed to 
water in the agricultural and water distribution sectors, simulations have been conducted with 
a lower as well as a higher total water income as a starting point for the simulations.  
 
Lower water income  
When the initial total water income is lower,
66 this means that a smaller share of total factor 
income within the water using sectors is attributed to water. In scenario 1, where water supply 
is assumed to be perfectly elastic, the size of actual water income out of total factor income in 
each sector will be of importance for the magnitude of changes in water use and production 
among sectors. The agricultural sectors still grow, but less than in the original simulations. 
The reason is that water now constitutes a less significant share of the total mixed or capital 
factors (which are assumed to be sector specific), thus implying a lower rate of factor mobility 
between sectors. The GDP decreases slightly more than in the original simulations (-1.2 as 
compared to -1.1 per cent). However, the qualitative results do not change; the directions of 
the effects are the same. In the sectors not using water as a factor of production, the 
production changes are nearly identical to those of the original simulation. The same is true 
for the income distribution results.  
In scenario 2, where water supply as well as current water use in each sector are fixed, the 
amount of water income out of total factor income in each sector is insignificant; there is no 
difference between the assumptions of the different factors; water, mixed income and the 
capital factor are treated the same and the results are therefore identical to the results in the 
original simulations. 
In scenario 3, where water supply is assumed to be fixed, but water is still assumed to be 
mobile between sectors, the same reasoning as in scenario 1 holds; when total water income is 
lower, the share of mobile water out of the total factors in each sector is smaller and the 
66 The initial total water income is here calculated using the value of 1 N$ per m
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changes in water demand and production likewise. The effect on GDP is nearly identical to 
that in the original simulation.  
Higher water income 
For model scenarios 1 and 3, a higher value of total water income
67 will imply greater 
flexibility; in the case of perfectly elastic supply, agricultural production as well as total water 
demand will increase significantly more than in the original simulations. The negative effect 
on GDP, when water supply is perfectly elastic, is considerably smaller (only -0.5 per cent as 
compared to -1.1 in the original simulation), while in scenario 3 there is no significant change 
of the GDP effect in comparison with the original simulation. The production structure in all 
other sectors is not significantly affected by the level of water income and the results 
concerning the distribution of income are maintained. In scenario 2, where water supply is 
fixed and water is immobile, the level of water income is of no importance at all for the 
results.
Trade elasticities 
As the results to a large extent depend on export and import patterns, a sensitivity analysis 
with respect to trade elasticities is highly motivated. As mentioned in section 3.2.2., most 
initial elasticity values are directly taken from a CGE-analysis of the South African economy 
by Thurlow (2004). Regarding trade elasticities, the elasticity of substitution between imports 
and domestic output in domestic demand (referred to as Armington in the table) as well as the 
elasticity of transformation between exports and domestic demand for domestic marketed 
output (referred to as CET in the table), the initial values, directly imported from the South 
African study, are presented in table 3 below.
67 The initial total water income is here calculated using the unit water value of 3 N$ per m
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Table 3: Initial values of trade elasticities
Armington CET
Agriculultural products 1.596 2
Fish products 0.740 2
Mining 1.026 2
Other food products 0.740 2
Textiles 2.813 2
Manufacturing 0.946 2
Petroleum products 1.528 2
Electricity and water 0.500 2
Construction 0.500 2
Services 0.500 2
Governmental services 0.500 2
These values indicate that imported and domestically produced agricultural and petroleum 
products are, in general, considered to be closer substitutes than many other products. These 
values are based on empirical estimations by the Industrial Development Corporation in 
Pretoria and are well within the range of trade elasticities reported in other CGE-studies.
68
Concerning the elasticity of transformation between domestically produced products and 
exports, there are no empirical estimates available. It is assumed that export supply elasticities
are in general higher than Armington elasticities.
69 However, a sensitivity analysis is 
performed where the value of trade elasticities is varied for the products of particular concern 
in this study; agricultural, food and petroleum products.  
Simulations are run for varying levels of trade elasticities; Armington elasticities as well as 
CET elasticities are increased and decreased by up to 30 per cent, respectively, for 
agricultural, food and petroleum products. To isolate the effect of changed values of trade 
elasticities, everything else is held constant in these simulations. The overall qualitative 
results do not seem to be sensitive to changes in these parameters. In general, the higher is the 
Armington elasticities, the higher is the demand for domestic products and thereby there is a 
greater increase in agricultural production following the increased import prices of these 
products. Likewise, the higher the CET-elasticities, the more exports can increase following 
the changes in relative prices between exports and domestic production. However, the 
changes in overall GDP as well as the distribution of income between different household 
68 See Thurlow (2004) for a further discussion of these trade elasticities. 
69 This implies that following an increase in foreign prices, producers are more able to shift production towards 
the foreign market than consumers can shift their consumption patterns away from imported commodities. See 
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groups are very small and the same reasoning as in the original simulation still holds 
concerning the differences between the three different scenarios. 
Elasticities of substitution between factors of production 
In the initial simulations, the elasticity of substitution between all factors of production is 0.5 
in all production sectors. As the possibility of substitution, especially between water and other 
factors of production, is important for the results, a sensitivity analysis is conducted by testing 
the results for lower as well as higher substitution elasticities in the sectors using water. The 
results show that the higher is the substitution elasticity between factors of production, the 
greater is the ability to adapt for the economy, thus resulting in a greater increase in 
agricultural production and a less negative impact on total GDP. However, the changes in 
production are minor; an increase in the elasticity of substitution to 0.6 in the water using 
sectors results in a 0.03 per cent less negative effect on total GDP. If the elasticity of 
substitution is decreased to 0.4 in the water using sectors, the ability for the economy to adapt 
is only slightly lower, resulting in a 0.04 per cent greater decrease in GDP than in the original 
simulations. 
Appendix B – Adjustments of the SAM-data 
 
Agricultural sector data 
Some small necessary adjustments in the SAM have been made for the traditional agricultural 
sector. In the original SAM, the traditional agricultural sector produces an “own” commodity 
called “traditional commodity”, which can be described as “food for own consumption”; this 
is largely cereal crop production. However, for modelling purposes, it is important that the 
food produced in the traditional agricultural sector could be substituted for food purchased 
from elsewhere. Therefore, the “traditional commodity” has been redefined; it is assumed that 
the traditional sector produces crops (mainly cereals) that are substitutable either for crops 
produced elsewhere in the country or for imported crops.
70 In addition, some adjustments 
70 If these changes are not made, the traditional agricultural sector will be significantly negatively affected by the 
exogenous price increases, as the commodity produced in the traditional agricultural sector will be treated as a 
completely different product than the other agricultural and food products produced in other agricultural sectors. 
Although it can be discussed how subsistence farmers would actually behave in the case of increasing prices of 
their products, it would be highly unrealistic to assume that their products would not be substitutable with other 
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have been made with regard to the distribution of factor income in the traditional agricultural 
sector. In the traditional agricultural sector, the mixed factor category includes land rents and 
income generated by labour supplied by people informally employed in the sector. By 
recognizing the approximate number of informal workers in the subsistence agricultural sector 
(see Angula and Sherbourne 2003) together with an estimate of the mean rural informal wage 
(see Humavindu 2007), part of total mixed income in the traditional sector can be transformed 
into factor income for unskilled workers. For the purposes of this study, this small adjustment 
represents a better way of modelling the factor income distribution in the traditional 
agricultural sector. 
Tourism data 
Due to lack of data, a full representation of tourism was not possible at the time of 
development of the SAM. Therefore, tourism is treated as a “dummy sector” in the current 
SAM, which is a way of pointing out the importance of an activity which does not correspond 
to an actual industry. This dummy sector corresponds to the total value of “the purchase of 
products in the Namibian economy by non-residents”, which was found in the national 
accounts.
71 However, in the CGE-model, activities without factor inputs are not allowed, so 
this dummy sector had to be eliminated from the original SAM for the data to fit the model. 
This was simply done by treating the values of purchases by foreign tourists for each 
commodity directly as “exports”.
Fish data 
By making use of the resource rent (as factor income distributed to different households etc.) 
estimated through the Natural Resource Accounts (NRA) methods for fish,
72 fish is included 
as a factor of production in the fish and fish processing sectors. This adjustment was made in 
a previous study by Sahlén (2008) to capture the likely effects of an increased share of the fish 
rent captured by the government. As this adjustment provides an improvement of the fish 
sector data in the original SAM, it is also used in the present paper, although this is not 
necessary for the analysis. As the fish factor is treated in the same way as capital (i.e. assumed 
to be sector specific), this adjustment will not affect the results of the current analysis at all.   
market when the prices of their products increase. Therefore, for the purpose of this analysis, it was decided to 
transform the traditional commodity into cereals, other crops and livestock products. 
71 Lange et al (2004). 
72 The Namibian fisheries accounts are based on the UN System of Integrated Environmental and Economic 
Accounts (SEEA). See Lange (2005) for a detailed description of the methodology for fish-rent calculations. The Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 35
Appendix C – Model Closure Rules 
In table 4 below, the available factor and macro closure rules for the IFPRI standard CGE-
model are presented. For a further explanation of the available macro-closure rules, see 
Sahlén (2008). 
Table 4. Available closure rules in the standard CGE-model 
Factor Market Government Rest of World Savings-Investment
FAC-1 GOV-1 ROW-1 SI-1
Fixed factor supply; Flexible government savings; Fixed foreign savings; Fixed capital formation;
flexible wages;  fixed direct tax rates flexible real exchange rate uniform MPS point change 
mobile factors for selected institutions
FAC-2 GOV-2 ROW-2 SI-2
Flexible factor supply; Fixed government savings; Flexible foreign savings; Fixed capital formation;
fixed wages;  uniform direct tax rate, point fixed real exchange rate scaled MPS for selected
mobile factors change for selected  institutions
institutions
FAC-3 GOV-3 SI-3
Fixed factor supply; Fixed government savings; Flexible capital formation;
fixed wages; scaled direct tax rates for fixed MPS for all non-gov.
immobile factors selected institutions institutions
(activity specific)
SI-4
Fixed investment and gov. 
consumption absorption 
shares (flexible quantities);
uniform MPS point change 
for selected institutions
SI-5
Fixed investment and gov.
consumption absorption
shares (flexible quantities);
scaled MPS for selected 
institutionsThe Impacts of Food- and Oil Price Shocks… 36
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